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ABSTRACT
EXPLORING CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF
INTERORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
Andrew Paul Williams
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. John C. Morris

Collaboration and other forms of interaction between complex arrangements of
private, nonprofit, and public organizations to address challenging policy problems now
occurs routinely. In many cases collaboration is mandated by law, and often disbursement
of grants to nonprofits is contingent upon demonstrating collaboration with other
organizations. To understand this contemporary landscape of public administration and
develop cumulative knowledge, theory requires reliable and valid constructs of
collaboration and other forms of interorganizational interaction. Theoretical rigor then
underpins practice, including the growing discipline of evaluating the level of interaction
between organizations or an organization’s “collaborative capacity,” and to understand
more broadly how public administrators should best lead, manage and interact in
complex multiorganizational situations.
This dissertation reviews the approaches to conceptualization and
operationalization of interorganizational interaction in the public administration
literature. While many frameworks, typologies and arrays have been offered, few have
been tested empirically. Furthermore, the literature incorporates a widely stated but
untested notion that interactions between organizations can be placed on a “continuum”
of intensity or integration.
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Using insights from previously developed systems-based frameworks and arrays,
this research creates a generalized interorganizational interaction array (GIIA) that
conceptualizes and operationalizes three forms of interaction common in public
administration literature: cooperation, coordination and collaboration. From a sample of
over 200 interorganizational interactions between national and international defense
organizations, the GIIA is tested using cluster analysis to determine: the extent to which
collaboration, coordination and cooperation are observed; which variables are most
important in differentiating interaction states, and to explore the concept of a continuum
of interaction.
Results show the only interaction state clearly observed is collaboration in about
half of sample cases; the remaining cases cannot be easily classified as either cooperation
or coordination. Only variables relating to collective decision making structures and
processes are essential for identifying collaboration, but are not useful in distinguishing
between cooperation or coordination. Variables relating to the context or situation have
little influence on differentiating interaction states, and variables describing properties of
the organizations such as trust, autonomy and shared perspectives have more ability to
distinguish outcomes rather than form. Finally, the concept of a continuum of interaction
is not supported. The implications of this finding for future conceptualization and
operationalization and development of theory is considered.
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I dedicate this dissertation to Jenny and Éowyn, who have borne its burden more than
anyone, but never let me fall.
“…And he went on, and there was yellow light, and fire within; and the evening meal was
ready, and he was expected…
He drew a deep breath. ‘Well, I’m back,’ he said.”
J.R.R. Tolkein, Lord of the Rings
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of multiorganizational governance and implementation is of
considerable importance to the disciplines of public administration and policy. A growing
body of research and practice demonstrates that the landscape of public governance is
characterized increasingly by interdependence, multiorganizational action, network
governance and management, collaboration, and blurring public-private sector
boundaries. While many government organizations execute their missions via
hierarchically-structured bureaucracies, seldom is governance and implementation in any
given policy area the sole domain of a single organization. Collective action with
nonprofits, businesses, citizen groups and multiple levels of government to lead and
administrate programs is now a necessity for public organizations, rather than a choice.
There are many drivers behind this phenomenon. In response to political forces to
increase state legitimacy following the rapid expansion of centralized state power in the
early twentieth century, many nations adopted political and administrative
decentralization and regionalization policies (Joumard & Kongsrud, 2003; Kettl, 2002;
Rodiguez-Pose & Gill, 2003; Sorens, 2009). As part of this broader devolution trend,
fiscal conservatism in the 1980s and increasing calls for accountability in government led
to the “new public management” movement, which saw governments enact a variety of
strategies and policies based on results-orientated management principles and
marketization ideas derived from the private sector and public choice concepts (Dunleavy
& Hood, 1994; Hood, 1991). This “hollowing out the state” through privatization,
contracting, and other forms of indirect government increased the extent to which
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government programs were implemented via complex and interconnected networks of
public and private actors, rather than solely government bureaucracy (Kettl, 1993, 2000;
Milward & Provan, 2000). These various trends are overlain against the basic fact that the
growth in size and scope of government coupled with the complexity of contemporary
“wicked” societal issues (Head & Alford, 2013; Rittel & Webber, 1973), makes defining
boundaries of responsibility between government organizations challenging, and
increases the need for multiorganizational policy formulation and implementation (Kettl,
2006; O'Toole, 1997).
There is growing recognition that in this era the “the task of public problem
solving has become a team sport that has spilled well beyond the borders of government
agencies and now engages a far more extensive network of social actors...whose
participation must often be coaxed and coached, not commandeered and controlled”
(Salamon, 2002, p. 601). In the light of this new reality, scholars and practitioners face
fundamental questions (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Bevir, 2010; Haque, 2001): How to
lead and manage effectively in this new landscape? How to ensure democratic legitimacy
and accountability? And how to maintain the intrinsic “publicness” of public
administration and the public sphere? In response to these challenges, academic literature
has turned increasingly to topics such as policy networks, governance networks,
multiorganizational policy implementation, interorganizational relationships, collective
action, and collaboration.
The focus of this particular study is the manner in which the variety of
contemporary multiorganizational arrangements are conceptualized. Given the increased
focus on collective action in public administration, policy and management scholarship, a
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key research challenge lies in measurement of interorganizational interactions. Empirical
research in multiorganizational settings is notoriously demanding: Defining appropriate
units of analysis and the boundaries of research samples is often hard in network settings
(Freeman, White, & Romney, 1992; Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1992); the number
of potentially important independent variables often outnumbers the possible analytical
cases (Goggin, 1986); interorganizational structures and networks dynamically vary and
are often strongly influenced by subjective perceptions (Huxham & Vangen, 2000); and
while case study research is rich and varied, generalizability is low (O'Toole, 1997,
2000).
A particular problem—and the focus of this dissertation research—is a lack of
conceptual and definitional coherence across the literature: multiple understandings,
perspectives and definitions of interorganizational interactions exist, which prevents
coherent cumulative research (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009;
Wood & Gray, 1991). The past few decades have seen a variety of attempts to rectify this
issue, and some stability in understanding has been achieved, with scholars developing
definitions, constructs, typologies and scales of interorganizational interactions (Ansel &
Gash, 2007; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Simo & Bies, 2007; Thomson, 2001;
Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009; Varda, Shoup, & Miller, 2012). A
consistent thread through the literature, for example, is the notion that interorganizational
interaction exists on a scale or continuum from low intensity cooperation, to
coordination, to high intensity collaboration (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mandell &
Steelman, 2003; McNamara, 2012).

4
A small body of research develops operationalizations—in varying levels of
detail—of these three distinct states, by describing what certain dimensions “look like” at
each level of interaction. Dimensions can be related to the context in which the
interaction takes place, the participating organizations, or the emerging
interorganizational forms. While much of this literature has merit on its own terms, the
majority of definitions are established conceptually, rather than taxonomically generated
from empirical research (Bailey, 1994). A few case studies have developed and tested
definitional schemes (Margerum, 2008; McNamara, 2008, 2012), but in general, subtly
different interpretations of interorganizational forms persist.
An additional complexity to multiorganizational research is that often, context
affects process and outcomes. In a now landmark review of “collaboration” research in
the social sciences, Wood and Gray (1991) characterized the literature in terms of three
main groupings: preconditions to collaboration, collaborative processes, and outcomes.
They identified that while the preconditions had received much attention, the process
aspect was poorly understood as a result of the complexity of collective action and the
multiplicity of variables. In response to the challenge set by Wood and Gray, scholars
have since developed various frameworks, which seek to describe the process of
“collaboration” and its relationship with antecedent factors, context, and outcomes (Ansel
& Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Ring & Van de
Ven, 1994; Simo, 2009). While the term “collaboration” is used, in reality much of the
literature describes a spectrum of interorganizational interactions.
The framework literature, which generally takes a systems approach to the
antecedent—process—outcome linkages in interorganizational interaction, emphasizes
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the dynamic iterative nature of collective action. This view is somewhat at odds with the
more static interpretation offered by the continuum of interaction approach, which
conceives of cooperation, coordination and collaboration as distinct points along a
spectrum. These continuums do not consider process dynamics, but instead develop a
“snapshot” of what interorganizational interactions look like as they increase in intensity
or magnitude. This dissertation research refines the conceptualization and
operationalization of the continuum of interorganizational interaction, and offers an
survey-based test to determine if the particular states of “cooperation,” “coordination,”
and “collaboration” can be distinguished empirically.

Problem Statement
While generally there is a large number of terms describing the myriad
configurations of interorganizational interactions in the social sciences, within public
administration—and to some extent organizational science—a stable set of terms has
emerged in the past decade (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsay, 2001). Many scholars
work under the assumption that any particular form of interorganizational arrangement
can be placed on a “continuum of interaction,” which is divided typically into three
distinct states of cooperation, coordination and collaboration. While this concept is
unproblematic for informal usage, there are several issues that inhibit more refined,
empirical work on the subject of interorganizational interaction.
First, the literature employing a continuum approach assumes that collaboration,
or other levels of interaction, are repeatable or “standard” forms of interaction. Yet the
growing body of literature on the processes of interorganizational interaction
demonstrates the complexity inherent in these processes (Bardach, 2001; Emerson et al.,
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2012; Huxham & Vangen, 2000). Interorganizational forms grow and ebb with time,
membership, and contextual factors (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Given this complexity,
the notion that discrete “forms” of interaction exist on a linear scale is called into
question. Likewise, the scale may better be interpreted as a typology, which defines all
the possible combinations of dimensions. In a manner very similar to the debate
surrounding the applicability of the stages model of policy process (deLeon, 1999), the
continuum of interaction may be merely an abstraction, albeit a useful one, which masks
a more complex reality.
Second, the literature is ambiguous on basic conceptual issues regarding
constructs and operationalizations of states on the continuum. There is an unstated
assumption that “cooperation,” for example, is defined by the occurrence of all the
dimensional indicators at that level on the continuum. Yet it is unclear whether this state
could still be considered as cooperation if one or two of the dimensions were not
observed. Furthermore, the literature does not specify how to define simultaneous
observations of dimensions across levels of interaction. There is lack of understanding
about the basic conditions of necessity and sufficiency for dimensions and constructs
underlying the continuum of interaction (Goertz, 2006), or whether the states are better
distinguished based on less clear “familial resemblance” approaches (Wittgenstein,
1967).
Third, the literature to date poorly organizes and categorizes the dimensions
underlying the continuum. Much of the broader literature on collaboration, for example,
recognizes the importance of context, organization type, and history on how the
interorganizational interaction plays out (Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015; Margerum,
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2008; Morris, Gibson, Leavitt, & Jones, 2013). Yet the continuum of interaction research
often uses potentially non-mutually exclusive dimensions such as context, type or
historical factors, in the actual definition of levels of interaction. These dimensions could
apply equally to any interaction state. The literature also fails to recognize that
dimensions can be categorized by those relating to the participating organizations, and
those relating to the emergent interorganizational form.
Finally, there is limited empirical confirmation of constructs of
interorganizational interaction. One of the few notable examples is Thomson (2001), who
tests the construct validity of a multidimensional construct of “collaboration.” Building
on the work of Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Wood and Gray (1991), Thomson
identifies five unique dimensions of the process of collaboration: governance,
administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms of trust and reciprocity
(Thomson, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009). This construct was
tested via survey data from several hundred organizations, and was subsequently used in
several other studies to test both the definitional aspects of collaboration and the processoutcome relationship (Chen, 2006, 2008, 2010; Graddy & Chen, 2009; Thomson, Perry,
& Miller, 2008). The construct had mixed utility, however, in tests of the antecedentprocess and process-outcome relationships, indicating that further refinement is needed.
In another notable example, McNamara (2008, 2012) develops a detailed
operationalization of a three-level, cooperation—coordination—collaboration continuum
of interaction as part of a single case study. While the operationalizations are the most
detailed and comprehensive in the literature to date, the above problems are still present,
and the sample was a single multiorganizational arrangement. McNamara’s work was
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based on previous studies from the education and public administration literature that
employed similar approaches, but only on single case studies (Diehl, 2005; Edmondson,
2006; Thatcher, 2007).
Empirical studies of interorganizational arrangements can be found in other
disciplines such as health sciences and management, education, infometrics, business and
management. Several studies use multilevel confirmatory factor analysis in a manner
similar to Thomson (2001), but with much less refined survey instruments (Barile,
Darnell, Erickson, & Weaver, 2012; Brown, Hawkins, Arthur, Abbott, & Van Horn,
2008; Dedrick & Greenbaum, 2011). Others examine interaction at the individual or team
level of analysis such as: Scientific research collaboration (Chompalov, Genuth, &
Shrum, 2002; Cuijpers, Guenter, & Hussinger, 2011; Liao & Yen, 2012); health and
emergency care worker interactions (Brock & Doucette, 2004; Dougherty & Larson,
2010; Haraoka, Ojima, Murata, & Hayasaka, 2012; Nair, Fitzpatrick, McNulty, Click, &
Glembocki, 2012; Ushiro, 2009); or interprofessional interactions in teams (D'Amour,
Goulet, Labadie, Martín-Rodriguez, & Pineault, 2008; Kenaszchuk, Reeves, Nicholas, &
Zwarenstein, 2010; Orchard, King, Khalili, & Bezzina, 2012).
While much of this literature has merit and many of the survey scales have high
validity (Dougherty & Larson, 2010; Kenaszchuk et al., 2010), they tend to be based on
arbitrary definitions of collaboration or cooperation, are not grounded in the theoretical
literature from organizational science and public administration, or emphasize
partnerships or networks between private businesses (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011).
Furthermore, much of the focus is on individual—individual interactions in team settings,
which although provides an interesting comparison to interorganizational and
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organizational level research, is ultimately not applicable to multiorganizational research
in the public domain. In summary, there is a significant empirical gap in the literature
concerning the measurement of interorganizational arrangements.

Research Objectives and Questions
Research Purpose
The overall purpose of this research is to investigate conceptualizations and
operationalizations of common states of interorganizational interaction as described in the
public administration literature. There are 2 specific objectives: 1) develop and improve
the interorganizational interaction array1 that conceptualizes and operationalizes states
of multiorganizational interaction (such as cooperation, coordination and collaboration);
and 2) test the interorganizational interaction array using a survey sample of
multiorganizational interactions to determine if interaction states can be empirically
observed and distinguished from one another.
Research Questions
There are four research questions addressed in this dissertation. 1) To what extent
can the levels of interaction corresponding to the constructs of cooperation, coordination
and collaboration be empirically observed? 2) Are other constructs observed? 3) Which
dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array are most important for predicting
an organization’s level of interaction in a multiorganizational interaction? 4) To what
extent can dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array be conceptualized as
increasing along a continuum of interaction?

1

Interorganizational interaction array is a general term to describe both typologies of interorganizational
forms, and scales or continuums of interaction.
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Statement of Research Importance
The idea that governance is now more important than government is
commonplace in recent policy and administration literature, thus increasing the emphasis
on studying how organizations work together rather than solely how individual
organizations work (O'Leary & Bingham, 2009). Both practitioners and scholars of
public administration need to ask important questions about performance, effectiveness,
and outcomes in this new landscape. Interorganizational interaction is often a formal
requirement for organizations, and a developing stream of research looks at how to
evaluate joint efforts (Cross, Dickmann, Newman-Gonchar, & Fagan, 2009; Woodland &
Hutton, 2012). It is imperative for future empirical research and evaluation that suitable
tools exist to study the various forms of interorganizational interaction and its
antecedents, processes, and outcomes.
This dissertation develops further a construct and operationalizations of
interorganizational interaction at the interorganizational, organizational, and group levels
of analysis in order to improve future empirical study. This is important for several
reasons. First, with a few notable exceptions (McNamara, 2008; Thomson, 2001), there
has been little attempt at rigorous conceptualization of interorganizational interaction for
the purpose of empirical research. This has led to a multitude of conceptual frameworks,
typologies, definitions and interchangeable terminology, many of which were developed
in case studies. While many of these efforts have merit, cumulative empirical research
has suffered in the absence of standardized conceptualization and operationalization.
Second, with the multitude of frameworks and definitions available, cross-case
comparison is challenging. The development of a rigorous and valid construct, confirmed

11
with data, facilitates better comparative research. Lastly, the intermingled usage of
collaboration, cooperation and coordination is so widespread in general organizational
life that these terms are practically interchangeable for most practitioners. This results in
a loss of appreciation of the conceptual richness inherent in these constructs, and the
potential for unknown and unintentional confusion, or intentional political distortion. A
key role for academic research should be to establish a rigorous conceptual framework
and accompanying terminologies, based on empirical data, which can prevent
miscommunications or distortions in practice.

Theoretical Approach
This study can be considered as “descriptive” as it aims to create an empirical
taxonomy of interaction terms and confirm existing theory from the literature (Bailey,
1994; Neuman, 2003). This research operates in line with the assumptions of
organizational functionalism, which asserts that there is an objective reality “out there”
that can be studied independently (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This is key to the
development of an interorganizational array, which affirms that interorganizational
interactions can be objectively described by observable indicators. The level of analysis
at which inferences at the construct level are made is the interorganizational field
(Benson, 1975; Hjern & Porter, 1981; Warren, 1967), which emphasizes relationships
between organizations, rather than organizational or individual attributes.

Overview of Methodology
This primarily quantitative research is conducted utilizing a web-based survey of
individuals, representing their organizations, involved in multiorganizational projects
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convened by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The unit of analysis for the
research is the interorganizational interaction—organization dyad, which is defined as
the organization and the part of the organization that interacts or overlaps with the
collective group of organizations interacting as part of a single project. The
interorganizational interaction array dimensions are specified primarily by organizational
and interorganizational attributes, rather than individual attributes. The research involves
development and testing of an interorganizational interaction array, which defines
constructs of three common interaction terms and operationalizes them with observable
indicators across a set of common dimensions. There are several distinct stages of the
research.
The first stage conducts a detailed review of the literature on interorganizational
interaction arrays and systems frameworks to determine conceptualizations and
operationalizations of various interaction states, and more generally about the
construction of such arrays. Starting from an array created by McNamara (2008), a new
array is created with more detailed operationalizations, and more refined categorization
of dimensions into contextual, organizational and interorganizational groups. This
categorization is on theoretical grounds and allows identification of necessary and
sufficient dimensions as part of defining each interaction term.
The second stage involves development and deployment of a survey instrument,
which measures the observed operationalizations of dimensions in the interorganizational
interaction array. The third stage employs clustering analysis techniques to identify
whether, based on the surveyed sample of interorganizational interactions, three clusters
can be identified that correspond to the theoretically postulated levels of cooperation,
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coordination and collaboration (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Romesburg, 2004).
Different clustering solutions will be analyzed to determine necessary and sufficient
dimensions to each interaction term, and to select the best fit within each category of
dimension (contextual, organizational and interaction).

Organization of this Dissertation
This dissertation is presented in six chapters: Chapter 1 – Introduction; Chapter 2
– Literature Review and Theoretical Framework; Chapter 3 – Methodology and Survey
Instrument; Chapter 4 – Descriptive Data Analysis; Chapter 5 – Clustering and
Multivariate Analysis; and Chapter 6 – Conclusions.
This first chapter has introduced the research problem and study objectives,
outlined the general approach to the study, and discussed the importance of the research
and its relevance to the field of public administration. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and
theory on interorganizational interaction as it pertains to this study and develops a refined
interorganizational array to test the coordination, cooperation and collaboration terms.
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology and the operationalization of the construct into
indicators and a survey instrument. Chapter 4 presents the descriptive data analysis and
preparations for clustering analysis. Chapter 5 presents the results of the cluster and
multivariate analysis for each research question. Finally, chapter 6 draws overall
conclusions and implications from the results, considers the strengths and limitations of
the study, and suggests areas for future research.

14
CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter reviews the relevant literature and summarizes, organizes, and draws
conclusions on conceptualization and measurement of interorganizational interaction.
The review is organized as follows. First, the rationale for the study introduced in chapter
1 is recapped and the broader context to this dissertation research is explored. Second, the
scope, search parameters and approach to the literature review is described. Third,
relevant literature focusing on interorganizational interaction definitions, frameworks,
and conceptualization is summarized and reviewed. Finally, building from the work of
McNamara (2008, 2012), a set of dimensions are selected and operationalized for an
interorganizational interaction array, which will be tested via survey research.

The Context for Interorganizational Interaction Research
The foundational questions at the heart of political science, public administration,
and economics concern how social, political and economic institutions adapt and work
together to deal with problems, address conflicts, and create a stable and prosperous
society. These questions are increasing in significance, as a growing body of research in
multiple disciplines of social science suggests that we live in an increasingly complex
society, which requires ever more novel and innovative approaches to managing
problems and finding collective solutions (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). This context of
complexity provided, to a large extent, the impetus for increasing focus on collaboration
and networks in the literature.
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A number of factors drive this complexity: rapid technological changes (Gray,
1989); changing economic production modes, the decline of manufacturing in the West
and the rise of information technology and service industries (Alter & Hage, 1993);
increasing competitive pressures generating increasing rates of innovation; globalization
(Kettl, 2000, 2002); blurring of boundaries between public and private sectors (Ben-Ner,
2002; Dees & Anderson, 2003); increasing pressure on government revenues as
expenditures grow (Goldsmith & Kettl, 2009); and the expanding reach of the state
coupled with a shift away from direct government to devolution, decentralization, and
privatization (Loughlin, 2004).
The implications of this complexity for organizations are numerous. Greater
environmental complexity and turbulence increases the extent to which organizations
become interdependent (Emery & Trist, 1965; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Trist, 1977).
Interdependence is a situation where individual organizations cannot act unilaterally
without creating unanticipated and often unwanted consequences for other organizations
(Gray, 1989). Interdependence make boundaries of responsibility or jurisdiction for
organizational functions and structures challenging to define (Kettl, 2006). Given that
both problems and solutions are often conceived through the lens of organizational
boundaries, such conditions bound identification of problems with distributive or political
economy issues in society, and favor solution by “argumentation” rather than analysis (F.
Fisher & Forester, 1993). Societal problems are often intractably “wicked,” meaning
there are neither optimal solutions nor standards of judgment to know right from wrong
or good from bad (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Problems are rarely isolatable or divisible;
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instead there are “systems of problems” in which efforts to deal with any individual
problem generates unwanted consequences with others (Ackoff, 1974).
In response to this uncertain environment, organizations adapt and evolve in order
to reduce uncertainty, enhance legitimacy, maintain survival, and “negotiate order”
(Gray, 1989). While private business organizations are often able to rearrange their forms
and functions contingent on environmental conditions, government organizations find
adaptation challenging. Geopolitical boundaries between states, regions and cities, and
the jurisdictions of responsibility and function of the patchwork of bureaucracies that
implement policy, are developed and negotiated over long periods of time and are
relatively immovable. Interest-based politics when combined with the specialist nature of
bureaucracy and fixed budgetary cycles, generates stability in policy domains and favors
incremental forms of problem solving (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Wilson, 1989).
When wicked problems arise that traverse geographical and functional boundaries or
require rapid action, governments bureaucracies are challenged to act directly (Kettl,
2006). A feature of contemporary governance is that few organizations have the
resources and control over their functional domain to be able to accomplish their mission
alone (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011; Milward & Provan, 2000).
The difficulty faced by governments to address complex societal problems has
been extensively covered in the public administration and policy literatures, and provided
impetus for the development of three related strands of research and practice, which in
many ways precede the contemporary era of collaboration and network governance
(Bevir, 2010; Dunsire, 1995). The first strand considered factors affecting policy
implementation and whether top-down control or bottom-up adaptation explained
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implementation mechanisms (Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O'Toole, 1990). The second
strand focused on privatization and decentralization, underlain by political efforts to
shrink the state (Feigenbaum, Hening, & Hamnett, 1998). The third strand of “new public
management” (NPM) attempted to change the way government was run by introducing a
set of private sector techniques and concepts with the aim of increasing accountability
and focusing on results (Hood, 1995). These three bodies of literature developed roughly
in the same time period from the 1970’s onwards, however, with the exception of some
early work on implementation (Hjern & Porter, 1981), the literature developed in
isolation from interorganizational research occurring in the same time period.
The development of NPM and the growth of various privatization tools such as
vouchers, user charges, and direct contracting, signaled a transition away from the
“problem solving” paradigm of the early to mid-twentieth century where policy
formulation and policy implementation were led by government, to a paradigm of
“managerialism” (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Implementation was being “defined away,” and
made the responsibility of contracted “agents,” where government “principals” focused
instead on management and accountability (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Isett, Ines, LeRoux, &
Mischen, 2011). The practical consequence of these changes were a large increase in the
number of nonprofit and profit-making organizations involved in public service provision
(Salamon, 2002), a gradual growth in new governmental organizations with missions of
oversight and regulation (Hill & Hupe, 2009), and changing—although not completely
new—emphasis on networking and management skills of public managers (Agranoff,
2006). However, the privatization and NPM literature rarely considered the challenges of
multiorganizational implementation, given its basic assumption that contracts, monitoring
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schemes, and management would be sufficient for implementation, even when multiple
organizations were involved.
In contrast, implementation literature did recognize the complexity of joint action
and its importance in implementation success; however, this aspect was under-theorized
and conceptualized in research (McNamara, 2008). Multiorganizational implementation
literature took policy as a starting point for analysis while considering broad issues such
as: the top-down/bottom-up synthesis and the normative issues in this distinction (Barrett
& Fudge, 1981; Sabatier, 1986); the difference between policy formation and
implementation (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993); and the effects of
political contexts and policy content on implementation success (Matland, 1995).
Interorganizational interaction was considered indirectly by the extent to which policies
identify actors important to the implementation process, or more generally the
relationship between policy design and organizational interdependence (T. E. Hall &
O’Toole, 2000; O'Toole, 1986).
With the move away from direct government implementation to a complex mix of
governmental, private and nonprofit actors, scholars began to characterize this mix of
actors in terms of “network,” which required “network governance” to provide services
in a coherent manner towards public goals. By tracing the development of the public
administration, policy implementation, and NPM literatures, Head and Alford (2013)
identify three themes that emerged gradually, which are essential to dealing with the
contemporary network governance landscape: systems thinking, leadership, and the
subject of this research—collaboration. Public administration literature tends to
characterize the past two decades as a distinct “era” of collaborative or network

19
governance, which requires “new” collaborative or network public management
techniques (Hill & Hupe, 2009; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker,
2008). As the subsequent analysis reveals, however, the term “collaboration” is often
used to describe a broader range of interorganizational interactions including
deconfliction, coordination and cooperation.
In the same time frame as the development of policy implementation and NPM
literatures, an almost entirely separate body of organizational science literature
developed, which focused on interorganizational relations. Organizational science,
however, tended either to be related directly to business studies, or existed independently
without necessarily recognizing the public-private distinction. Consequently, the extent to
which findings from this body of work are generalizable to the public sector is unknown
(Isett & Provan, 2005). The development history of interorganizational research is similar
to that of collaboration and networks in public administration, and involved general
recognition about the importance of considering network relationships on firms’
operations, and the necessity for firms to adapt and change their structure to this new
landscape (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). Part of this literature review covers and
applies key findings from the literature on interorganizational relationships.
In the light of this wide recognition that contemporary society is characterized in
terms of networks, and that societal problems are ever more intractable, the importance of
interorganizational relationships has never been greater. A large body of research in
public administration, management and organizational science literatures has developed
on the topics of cooperation, coordination, collaboration and interorganizational
interaction. The disparate and broad nature of the literature has led to a multitude of
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conceptual frameworks, typologies, definitions and interchangeable terminology, many
of which were developed in case studies. While these efforts have merit, cumulative
empirical research has suffered in the absence of standardized conceptualization and
operationalization.
This dissertation aims to build cumulative knowledge in the conceptualization of
interorganizational interactions by developing an improved interorganizational
interaction array, which specifies a construct of different levels of interorganizational
interaction. A critical aspect for cumulative development in scholarly research is the need
for stable definitions and rigorous conceptualizations and operationalizations, which
permits valid empirical research such as organizational surveys, evaluations of
collaboration and comparative analyses. This is the main subject addressed in this
literature review.

Literature Review Approach
The literature on interorganizational interaction in public management and
administration is large, and when other disciplines are included such as business,
management, organizational science, psychology and sociology, the body of work is vast.
A problem encountered generally in this work is that interaction terms such as
“collaboration” are often used interchangeably or in combination with a wide variety of
related ideas that involve individuals or organizations working together in some manner:
coordination, cooperation, interorganizational interaction, joint action, alliances,
partnerships, networking, multiorganizational implementation, and governance, to name a
few. An important part of this research, therefore, is to disentangle interaction terms from
one another.
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The following paragraphs summarize the scoping, questions, search parameters,
and overall methods used for the review. The review is conducted and the findings
structured in accordance to guidance presented in Boote and Beile (2005); Galvan (2006);
and Randolph (2009).
Scope. Given the sizeable literature featuring variously-termed interorganizational
interactions, three scoping criteria are adopted from the outset to delineate and prioritize
the literature. First, only literature on voluntary interactions is considered; mandated
types of principal-agent interactions such as contracting or hierarchical interactions
internally in an organization are excluded. Second, a small body of recent work that
considers interorganizational interaction mandated by circumstance (e.g. where disaster
response compels organizations to work together (Bryson et al., 2006; Simo, 2009)) or
mandated by policy or organizational mission (Ivery, 2008; Rodríguez, Langley, Béland,
& Denis, 2007) is included. Third, only interorganizational interaction in the public
sphere is considered; business partnerships or industry alliances are excluded. However,
references from business and management literature that are listed in the reference
sections of primary search results are reviewed based on their theoretical merit. A small
body of organizational science literature is consulted to inform the theoretical sections,
mainly from well-known and classic textbooks.
Focusing questions. The main goal of this dissertation is to test and refine
existing definitional constructs of interaction terms. This chapter will neither recreate nor
update other recent appraisals of the interorganizational interaction literature from which
the constructs were derived. Instead, the aim is to understand more broadly how
interorganizational interaction is conceptualized and defined by other scholars, with a
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view to evaluating the results of empirical testing against the overall body of literature.
Several questions are adopted to guide the literature review.


How is interorganizational interaction defined and conceptualized?



Which theoretical perspectives inform these conceptualizations?



How are different forms of interorganizational or collective interaction
distinguished from one another?



How are interorganizational interactions operationalized and measured?
Search parameters. The initial literature search was conducted via the Old

Dominion University library “ProQuest” database for journals and dissertations by
searching using the search terms in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1: Search parameters used in the literature review
Search Term

Date Range

“Interorganizational; Organizational+[collaboration, coordination,
cooperation]”

Jan 2008 – Dec 2014

“Collaborative + [public management, governance, leadership, public
administration, implementation]”
“Network governance”

Jan 2008 – Dec 2012

“Policy networks”
“Collaboration; coordination; cooperation + [assessment, framework,
indicator, measure, measurement, metric, survey]”

Jan 1990 – Dec 2014

“[assessment, framework, indicator, measure, measurement, metric,
survey] + of collaboration; coordination; cooperation”

Method of review. A first pass through the collected literature identified articles
from the following categories: definitional research; collaboration frameworks;
interorganizational interaction arrays; applications or tests of frameworks and arrays;
empirical measurement of interorganizational interactions; network based research or
commentary; and policy implementation research. A second pass identified
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interorganizational research that focused on one or two variables of interest (e.g. trust,
boundary spanners, leadership), but that did not address broader definitional or
theoretical issues. Further “cross-cutting” categories were created for literature review
articles and dissertation research focused on collaboration, networks, interorganizational
relationships, or some combination (e.g. collaborative network management). Given that
the focus of this dissertation is testing and adjusting an existing construct, articles
concerning definitions, frameworks and typologies were prioritized. The reference
section of these articles were consulted, and a secondary “manual” literature search
gathered important books, older articles outside the original search date ranges, and nonacademic works.

Conceptualizing Interorganizational Interaction
This section lays the conceptual and theoretical scaffolding on which the literature
review and subsequent empirical research is conducted. First, the challenges of
conceptualizing and defining interorganizational interaction are explored. Second, the
meaning of the three most common interaction terms are reviewed. Finally, the
“language” necessary for theoretical analysis is established to guide and frame the
literature review: types of organizational theory, paradigms, and levels of analysis.
The Challenges of Conceptualizing Interorganizational Interaction
Many scholarly works in this field often refer to the challenge of defining
interorganizational interaction terms, but rarely specify exactly why this should be the
case. Creating a definition starts with building a conceptualization of interorganizational
interaction, which is challenging for a variety of reasons. First, as a fundamental aspect of
human society collective action has a long history both in terms of practice and theory.
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Some scholars have expressed interorganizational interaction in terms of the political
traditions of civic republicanism and classic liberalism in America (Perry & Thomson,
2004), whereas others identify American federalism and associated intergovernmental
cooperation as the crucible for multiorganizational practice (Agranoff, 2006; Agranoff &
McGuire, 2003; McGuire, 2006). Interorganizational interaction is a thread, although
often not explicitly mentioned, which runs through the broader disciplines of public
administration and policy implementation (O'Toole, 1986). This long history means that
interorganizational interaction is linked with many interrelated ideas and disciplines and
is part of our basic paradigms of thought and value systems, making it challenging to
isolate and objectively study.
Second, within this broader political and governmental context, the study of
multiorganizational interaction has incorporated various theoretical traditions through the
course of its development. For example, Ostrom’s (1990, 2007) institutional theory of
collective action relies on game theoretic and rational actor assumptions with a lineage
from Olsen’s (1965) Logic of Collective Action to Axelrod’s (1984) prisoner dilemma
theory of cooperation. Other related theoretical lineages can be found in conflict
resolution and management (R. Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Kriesberg, 2007), group
psychology and conflict (R. J. Fisher, 1990), stakeholder theory (Barringer & Harrison,
2000), and interorganizational relations (Alter & Hage, 1993). A basic issue is that
different theoretical areas use terminology inconsistently. A more fundamental problem
is that scholars have emphasized these different and often competing theoretical lineages
to varying extents in conceptualization of interorganizational interaction.
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Third, interorganizational interaction can be studied at different levels of analysis:
individual, group, organization, or society. Yet definitions rarely acknowledge the
conceptual level of inference. A related challenge is that interaction can occur on
different scales, depending on the particular “unit” involved (Emerson et al., 2012). A
large body of literature, for example, covers “collaboration” between individuals that
occurs in “teamwork,” although recent scholars have rejected defining this as
collaboration (Bedwell et al., 2012). Interorganizational interaction can be conceptualized
as interactions between groups, organizations, individuals or various combinations of the
units, yet this is rarely specified in definitions. While several definitions use general
terms such as “participants” or “actors,” or specifically refer to individuals, studies have
recognized the critical importance of identifying the extent to which an individual
represent themselves or an organization (Huxham & Vangen, 2005).
Fourth, any particular term used for interorganizational interaction is typically
nested among a set of related terms describing other forms of interorganizational
interaction—cooperation, coordination, partnering, and so on. Much of the literature
focuses on antecedents that support or hinder interaction in collaboration, for example,
yet many of these antecedents apply equally to other forms of interorganizational
interaction such as cooperation or coordination (McNamara, 2012). This issue stems from
the fact that the literature often describes a “continuum” of interaction, usually from
cooperation at the lower end to collaboration at the higher (Keast et al., 2007; Mandell &
Steelman, 2003; McNamara, 2008, 2012). Much of this literature attempts to separate out
the various meanings of each level of the continuum; however, as will be shown in the
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following review, the “continuum of interaction” is an abstraction that masks quite a
complex reality.
Finally, a problem relevant particularly in public administration literature where
one form of interorganizational interaction—collaboration—is more distinct as a concept,
is the overlap with “networks,” which also have a strong body of scholarship. For
example, some of the leading network scholars define networks using the same criteria
for collaboration developed below (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Provan & Kenis,
2008). Furthermore, many scholars cite findings from network research in studies of
collaboration, and vice versa, without necessarily acknowledging any difference (Isett et
al., 2011; Mandell, 1999). Given the importance of networks to theories of society and
collective action in general, defining “network” is as challenging—if not more so—as
defining collaboration, for many of the same reasons listed above. Network scholarship
has a long history of development in sociological analysis (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve,
& Wenpin, 2004; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Granovetter, 1973), policy studies (Adam &
Kriesi, 2007; Heclo, 1978; Heilman, Johnson, Morris, & O'Toole, 1994; Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith, 1993), organizational science (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Nohria & Eccles,
1992), and business and management (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011), and thus
inherits a complex theoretical lineage.
Cooperation, Coordination, and Collaboration
While the definitional challenge posed at the start of this chapter is still the case,
several advances have been made in the past decade with regard to terminology and
understanding is becoming increasingly stabilized. Many scholars have offered
definitions, which do not need further review here. Thomson (2001), for example,
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presents an exhaustive review of definitions offered up to date of publication, and much
of the interorganizational interaction array literature reviewed in this chapter, in effect,
offers definitions for various interaction terms. While there is a surprising lack of
rigorous “construct” definitions and operationalization of interaction terms, a short
overview of the differentiation between these three levels of interaction is instructive for
proceeding. More detail is provided on collaboration, mainly because understanding
collaboration aids understanding of the other interaction terms by defining what they are
not. At this stage, it is critical to note the empirical evidence that these three levels of
interaction can be empirically differentiated is fairly limited; a fact which underscores the
importance of this dissertation research.
Cooperation. As a widely used term both in academia and general usage, the lack
of definitional rigor is surprising. Much of the social science literature references
landmark works such as Axelrod (1984) and Ostrom (1990), which examine how
repeated interactions or “cooperation” between individuals and groups lead to stable
institutions of decision-making. In the interorganizational literature, cooperation has been
used as a general term to convey “working together” for mutual benefit (Alter & Hage,
1993) for which a typology of interorganizational arrangements is possible.
The notion of a continuum of interaction took hold in the public administration,
policy and program evaluation literatures, which placed cooperation at the lower end of
the scale. Scholars view cooperation as an interaction between organizations or
individuals that do not necessarily need to work together, but chose to do so for varying
reasons. Cooperative work may occur within existing organizational structures and
processes, and generally does not conflict with individual participants’ goals (Keast et al.,
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2007; Mattessich et al., 2001; McNamara, 2008, 2012). A succinct definition of
cooperation is provided in Keast et al. (2007, p. 17): “getting along with others so that
you c[an] both achieve your own goals.” Cooperative interactions may involve
information sharing, social networking, or de-conflicting work programs.
Coordination. The term coordination has been typically used in organizational
and administrative sciences to refer to the structuring, management and control of
different components of a complex body or process to enable the components to work
together effectively, usually in the case of a departmentalized organization (Fayol, 1949;
Gulick, 1937). Coordination, therefore, assumes some interdependence meaning that
individual organizations would not be as effective on their own without active
coordination. Furthermore, coordination—in the context of an individual organization—
requires some system of legal rational authority both to compel different departments to
work together when needed, and to facilitate independent action without having to
constantly communicate, by assigning clear domains of responsibility to departments. In
the case of interorganizational interaction, this legal rational authority may be formally
created by a collective group, or other dimensions such as trust may act as proxies for
authority (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).
Coordination is placed on the middle of the scale of interaction, for the reason that
mutual goals between participants may exist, but they do not conflict with individual
organizational goals (Keast et al., 2007; McNamara, 2008). The presence of shared goals
and interdependence to effectively achieve them necessitates some level of shared
planning, whether or not this occurs formally or informally depending on circumstances
(Kettl, 2003; Morris, Morris, & Jones, 2007).
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Collaboration. In the public administration literature in particular, collaboration
is the interorganizational form that has garnered most attention in recent decades,
although perhaps the term is often used to refer to a broader set of interactions. A group
of relatively stable common themes can be identified from the literature to distinguish
collaboration from other interaction forms, although definitions vary or overlap in the
extent to which these themes are emphasized (Mayer & Kenter, 2016).
A necessary prerequisite for collaboration is the condition of shared problem
interdependence between actors (a generic term for individuals, groups or organizations),
such that a certain problem affects actors in way that they cannot resolve it alone (Emery
& Trist, 1965; Gray, 1989). A conference of city managers from across the country
meeting to discuss how to resolve homelessness in cities, for example, would not qualify
as collaboration. While the problem is shared by all actors, each city manager could
resolve the problem individually in a way unique to a particular city and state. However,
a group of city managers from contiguous cities such as in Hampton Roads, may frame
homelessness in terms of the transient nature of people through the region and poor
geographic distribution of shelters. The case where city managers worked to pool
resources, create an intercity committee on the subject, and develop a coherent homeless
regional policy, would qualify as collaboration as the homelessness problem could not be
resolved individually by one city.
If collaboration forms around situations of interdependent problem-solution sets,
typically the group will adopt a common goal—the next key discerning characteristic of
collaboration (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Conley & Margaret, 2003; Frey, Lohmeier, Lee, &
Tollefson, 2006; Mattessich et al., 2001; McNamara, 2012; Vangen & Huxham, 2012).
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This distinguishes collaboration from other forms of interaction such as coordination in
which actors may “review goals for compatibility” (Mattessich et al., 2001, p. 61), or
deconfliction, in which actors simply inform each other about their respective missions
(Williams, 2010). Related to the common goal characteristic is the requirement for
mutual benefit; it is unlikely an actor would agree to a goal that was wholly incompatible
with its interests, thus all participants to a collaboration must gain something (Gray,
1989; Morris et al., 2013). Often, the link between interdependence, common goals and
mutual benefit is expressed in terms of shared purpose (Woodland & Hutton, 2012).
Collaboration can be identified by several process conditions. First, collaboration
requires the development of trust between actors (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Johnston, Hicks,
Nan, & Auer, 2011; Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2010; Kocoglu, Imamoglu, & Ince, 2011;
Lundin, 2007; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Tsasis, 2009). Other lesser forms of interaction
such as coordination can occur in the absence of trust (Raymond, 2006). Trust is critical
given the related condition that participation in the collaboration is voluntary (R. H. Hall,
Clark, Giordano, Johnson, & Roekel, 1977; Morris et al., 2013). In the absence of formal
organizational authority and legitimacy, collective action must emerge initially through
informal relationship development (Thomson et al., 2009). While informal relationships
eventually become institutionalized in governance structures, trust is a prerequisite to
their development (Emerson et al., 2012).
The second process condition required for collaboration is a specific type of
multidirectional communication that emphasizes conflict resolution, shared perspectives,
consideration of power dynamics, and equality (Gray, 1985, 1989; Huxham, 2003;
Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Imperial, 2005). The voluntary nature of collaboration means

31
there is no external arbiter of disputes nor formal organizational tools to end conflicts via
authoritative measures, thus communication between actors is essential. In other forms of
interorganizational interaction in which actors do not have common goals, conflicts may
go unresolved between actors or communications may be via intermediary bodies and is
of lesser importance.
Third, collaboration is defined by a situation where actors share resources (Guo
& Acar, 2005; Kanter, 1994; Tschirhart, Amezcua, & Anker, 2009). Resources may
include personnel, expertise, funding or materials. Sharing or pooling resources requires
an assumption of shared risk, and a distribution of organizational authority over
resources. This distinguishes collaboration from lesser forms of interaction in which
resources may be offered, but are strictly controlled by a sending organization or must
prioritize only the sending organization’s goals (Williams, 2010).
Finally, collaboration is defined by collaborative rationality, where “rationality”
means the normative conception of reasoning. Hierarchical organizational forms tend to
develop “instrumental” rationality, in which individuals are conceived as reasoning on
the basis of objective information to attain clear organizational goals, and “true”
knowledge is defined by that which permits prediction and thus control (Fay, 1975). The
implication of this conception of rationality for organizations is the tendency to assume
that “solutions” can be engineered or discovered and thus “planned” in order to attain
goals or solve problems.
Instrumental rationality is distinct from that which is used in collaboration.
Habermas (1981) described a “communicative rationality,” in which rational reasoning is
conceived as a discursive process to uncover realities hidden by socially constructed
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understandings, thus rationality is defined by process rather than knowledge outcome. In
their landmark text on collaboration in urban planning, Innes and Booher (2010) detail
“collaborative rationality,” which like Habermas’ theory is defined by process conditions
of a diversity of participants with interdependent interests engaging in authentic dialogue
to develop shared meanings and “heuristic” solutions (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 35).
While this set of common themes provides some stability to the definition of
collaboration and its respective empirical study, points of disagreement and ambiguity
remain in the literature. For example, some contend that a key feature of collaboration is
a flat (or no) hierarchical structure organizing participants (Gray, 1989). Others present
evidence, however, of complex organizational forms emerging in collaborations that in
many respects resemble, if not replicate, features of organizational hierarchy (Bardach,
1998; Thacher, 2004).
Other contended distinctions involve whether collaboration can be defined by the
type of participants involved, the organizational level of participants (leadership,
management or working level), the extent to which individuals represent themselves or
an organization, the reason for the collaboration forming or its intended goal, the time
duration of the activity, the extent to which a stable set of participants is required, and the
extent to which participant’s commitment is legally formalized. Another major source of
ambiguity lies in distinguishing collaboration from network concepts (Isett et al., 2011;
Provan & Kenis, 2008). These issues are explored in the empirical data analysis in
chapters four through six.
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Theoretical Language of Interorganizational Interaction
This short review of current understandings of common interaction terms
illustrates the complexity of establishing rigorous conceptualizations and thus definitions.
Definitions allow us to determine what is and what is not included as part of the
definiendum—the “thing” being defined. Yet for complex, multidimensional phenomena
such as collaboration, definitions often hide more than they convey. As
interorganizational interaction involves a complex mix of variables interacting at
different levels of analysis, single paragraph definitions cannot fully capture the true
meaning nor allow sufficient distinction between other similar cases (Bailey, 1994). An
analytical approach to understanding the phenomena is required, which involves
specification of constructs built from dimensions, and detailed operationalization of those
dimensions. This section presents the theoretical grounding for defining states of
interorganizational interaction.
Interorganizational Interaction and Organizational Science
Whether occurring between organizations, groups, or individuals,
interorganizational interactions are social groupings or collectivities that come together to
pursue goals (Bedwell et al., 2012). In the most general sense—and with some important
caveats—interorganizational interaction and the various social structures that emerge
during the process can be analyzed through the lens of organizational science.
Surprisingly, contemporary interorganizational literature in public administration pays
little reference to classic organizational science work. Partly, this may be because early
literature already incorporated key organizational science tenets, however, the
definitional problems concerning interorganizational interactions stem from the challenge
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of defining the boundaries of interorganizational forms and the level of analysis. Much
contemporary interorganizational literature glosses over these issues (Klein & Kozlowski,
2000), thus it is pertinent to review the fundamental definitional and theoretical concepts
in organizational science to start on a solid foundation.
Organizations as a general class of social collectivity are ubiquitous in modern
societies (Parsons, 1960). Scholars have identified several common features of any
organization whether bureaucracy or network: social structure, participants, goals,
technology, and environment (Rainey, 2003; W. R. Scott, 2003). Social structure refers to
the patterns of relationships among participants in a collectivity and features normative,
cultural, and behavioral elements. While a long tradition of organizational research
conceives of structures as objective, separate from participants, and largely static, some
suggest structure should be replaced with the dynamic concept of “structuration,” where
social structures are “virtual” indicators of dynamic human activity (Giddens, 1984;
Weick, 1985).
Participants are the social actors, whether individuals or groups, that contribute to
the organization in return for inducements. It is a matter of debate, however, the extent to
which participants can be used to define the boundaries of an organization (Pfeffer,
1982). Goals are the desired ends of the organization or the reason why the organization
came into being. Again, debate surrounds whether individual participants’ goals, shared
organizational goals, or the basic goal of organizational self-sustainment are more
important (Pfeffer, 1997). Technology is a general term for the process, systems or
objects that translate inputs into outputs; the “work” that the organization conducts (W.
R. Scott, 2003). Finally, all organizations exist in a “specific physical, technological,
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cultural, and social environment” (W. R. Scott, 2003, p. 23). A large part of
organizational study examines how goals, technologies, participants and structures adapt
to and with the environment.
The ongoing debates about the nature and relative importance of these core
organizational features result from the differing sociological paradigms of thought
underpinning any organizational analysis. Depending on one’s ontological and
epistemological perspectives, there are several possible paradigms. Burrell and Morgan
(1979) contrast subjectivity-objectivity debates in social science methodology, with
consensus-conflict debates in the “theory of society” (Hassard, 1991) to identify four
main paradigms: functionalism, interpretivism, radical humanism, and radical
structuralism. Each paradigm focuses on different elements of organizations and
incorporates very different explanatory frameworks (Vibert, 2004). While individual
interpretation of organizational phenomenon is critical in how organizations operate and
how organizational reality is constructed, extensive research on institutionalist logic tells
us that individual perspectives are shaped greatly by objective structures such as
organizational design, policies, processes, and resources (J. P. Olsen, 2007).
Consequently, organizational science is dominated by functionalism, which searches for
regularities and patterns leading to generalizable and universal principles (Gioia & Pitre,
1990).
In addition to these core paradigmatic positions, key debates in organization
science revolve around the choice of level of analysis and assumptions about the extent to
which participants’ behaviors are self-determined or dictated by organizational structure
(Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). Thus depending on the level of analysis and assumptions,
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organizational theories come to varying conclusions about key questions such as whether
organizations should be viewed as functionally rational or socially constructed, whether
structural change is driven by internal or external factors, and whether organizationallevel behavior is determined by individual or collective action.
This short probe into organizational science serves to prime the analysis on
interorganizational interaction by highlighting several important considerations. First, a
researcher’s choice of ontological and epistemological positions affects fundamentally
how theories of organization and thus interorganizational interaction are conceptualized.
Recent investigations show that, similarly to organizational science, the dominant
paradigm in public administration research is functionalism, yet rarely is there discussion
about the implications of this choice (Raadschelders, 2011; Raadschelders & Lee, 2011).
The remainder of this literature review periodically questions the paradigm aspects of
various interorganizational interaction frameworks and theories. Second, the level of
analysis at which theoretical inferences are made has an equally large impact on
understanding, yet this aspect remains generally underspecified in interorganizational
public administration literature. Third, defining the core features of organizations is
important to determine the scope of inquiry. This aspect is well covered in the literature,
although part of the definitional problem lies in different choices for core variables.
Levels of Analysis in Interorganizational Interaction
The “level of analysis” is the level of social reality at which theoretical inferences
or explanations are made and is usually determined by the nature of the dependent
variable (Neuman, 2003; Rousseau, 1985; Yurdusev, 1993). Levels of analysis are often
described as micro, meso, and macro, which generally correspond to individual, group,
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and societal levels. Levels of analysis are distinct from “units of analysis,” which refer to
the unit with which data are directly attached (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007).
Correct specification of levels and units of analysis is critical in empirical research, as
inappropriate combination of different levels and units risks biases of misspecification
and aggregation (Rousseau, 1985). While many of the interorganizational interaction
frameworks described in the following review group variables at different levels of
analysis and show interactions, they do not typically specify rigorous theoretical
relationships—a task necessary for development of a multilevel measurement and
construct model (Hitt et al., 2007).
Scott’s (2003) categorization of levels of analysis as social psychological,
organizational structure, and ecological, is particularly suited to organizational research.
The social psychological level focuses on the behavior and characteristics of individuals,
interpersonal relations between individuals, and the impact of context or environment on
individual attributes. Group or organizational characteristics are viewed as the
environment or context. While interorganizational interaction is a multilevel
phenomenon, much of the process dynamics occurs between individuals thus basic
social-psychological theories about decision making, trust building or sensemaking are
important, as are their basic models of the individual. Axelrod’s (1984) theory of
cooperation, for example, employs a rational self-interested actor model and shows that
under the right context of repeated interactions, group level cooperation emerges. This
emergent property, however, is explained by the individual self-interest.
The organizational structure level encapsulates structural and process
characteristics of an organization or its sub-units including department structure,
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authority ranks, hierarchy, specialization and division of labor, or communication
networks. Examples of this level in the interorganizational interaction literature include a
large body of work on governance structures in collaboration (Ansel & Gash, 2007;
Emerson et al., 2012; Hardy & Koontz, 2009; Hodges, Ferreira, Mowery, & Novicki,
2013; Huxham, 2000; Johnston et al., 2011; C. Lewis & Marsh, 2012).
The ecological level examines relationships between an organization and its
environment, viewing the organization as a single entity. Examples of ecological level
literature include studies that treat an interorganizational form as a single unit and ask, for
example, whether collaboration reduces service delivery costs (Bel, Fageda, & Mur,
2014), or whether performance or outcomes are affected (Chen, 2010; Gulati, Lavie, &
Madhavan, 2011). Scott also defines three further graduations of the ecological level:
organizational sets, which views the environment from the perspective of one particular
organization; organizational populations, which examines populations of organizations
with similar structures or functions; and interorganizational fields, which highlights the
competitive and cooperative relationships between organizations in the same policy or
business domain.
The construct in this dissertation research is theorized at the level of
interorganizational field, reflecting the fact that interaction between organizations is
affected by the broader collectivities or networks of organizations in which the
interacting organizations are embedded (Warren, 1967). Interorganizational interaction is
an emergent phenomenon with a set of characteristics distinct from the participating
organizations and individuals. This is analogous to the idea that the social network in
which an individual is embedded—what one might call the “inter-individual” field—can
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be characterized by emergent properties such as centrality, complexity or differentiation,
which are not attributes of an individual. As a multilevel construct, however,
interorganizational interaction features lower level constructs at the structural and
individual levels of analysis.
Distinguishing between Frameworks, Theories, Models, and Heuristics
In order to compare the various conceptualizations, frameworks and theories of
interorganizational interaction, a set of comparison criteria is required. “Theory” is a
word appearing with high frequency in social science literature and is used with several
understandings. Ostrom (2005, 2007) distinguishes between “frameworks,” “theories,”
and “models” as three levels of specificity to the term “theory” in its most broad sense.
According to Ostrom, frameworks “help to identify the elements and relationships…that
one needs to consider…Frameworks organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry…,
provide the most general list of variables…(and) provide a metatheoretical language that
can be used to compare theories” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 25). A framework, therefore, is the
broadest organizing construct with which to begin “theory” development.
A framework focuses theories—the next level of specificity—on the general
classes of variable necessary to explain phenomena (Ostrom, 2005). According to
Schlager (2007), theories “place values on some of the variables identified as important
in a framework, posit relationships among the variables, and make predictions about
likely outcomes” (p. 296). Theory is always bound by assumptions, either explicitly
defined or implicitly received from the theorist’s paradigm (Miner, 2005). The criteria
that define a scientific theory are well known (Sabatier, 2007). In order to achieve the
criteria of falsifiability variables should be logically coherent, show a clear sense of
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causality and explicit drivers of causal processes. Finally, theories should clearly identify
their boundaries and scope of application. In order for theories to meet these scientific
requirements in multilevel multiorganizational fields such as collaborative governance,
policy implementation and policy process studies, theories should specify: boundaries
and scope of inquiry; a model of, or assumptions about the individual; a mechanism for
collective groupings and organizations to emerge; wider environmental contexts or
institutional structures; and an explanation about how the system changes (Blomquist,
2007).
Models are one step more in specificity from theories and make “precise
assumptions about a limited set of parameter and variables” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 26).
Although the difference between models and theories is somewhat contrived, models can
be considered as the first level abstraction of operationalized variables. By fixing a
limited number of variables at specific values in certain settings, models can test, revise
and further develop theory (Schlager, 2007).
A final category of “theory” is termed a heuristic, which means a “short-hand” aid
to learning, problem solving or discovery. Heuristics display certain features of
frameworks in terms of organizing concepts, certain features of models in terms of
focusing on a limited set of variables, and sometimes may verge into metaphor. An
example is the policy stages heuristic (deLeon, 1999), the garbage-can “heuristic” of
organizational decision-making (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972), and the policy streams
framework (Kingdon, 1995). Rather than make predictions or specify causal links, these
heuristics provide us with a starting point to sort through and understand very complex
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organizational and social systems. Given their limited Theoretical scope, heuristics are
not considered further.
The interorganizational literature leans heavily on the use of frameworks—
reviewed in the following sections—that order important variables at various levels, and
to some extent develop more specific models, which focus on one or two key
relationships of interest. In the terms described above there are few theories, and
approaches using frameworks and models generally gloss over important theoretical
aspects such as levels of analysis, boundaries, paradigms, and units. The following
sections review the literature to date on the development of frameworks and theories of
interorganizational interactions. The term “Theory” with a capital “T” is used to describe
to describe the collective group of framework, theories and models.

Review of Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks and Theory
Interpretation of empirical results gained from testing interorganizational
interaction arrays would likely benefit from a greater understanding of the numerous
threads of thought that form the interorganizational relations discipline’s knowledge base.
This section unravels several such threads by focusing on two important bodies of
literature. First, the mainstay of contemporary interorganizational interaction Theory in
the public administration literature is analyzed, which exists in the form of systems-based
frameworks. Second, literature on interorganizational arrays is reviewed. The arrays
specify constructs and operationalizations of interorganizational interaction terms in the
forms of scales or continuums of interaction, or in the form of classification typologies,
which enumerate the possible ways to arrange different dimensions. Finally, the analysis
compares and contrasts these two bodies of knowledge, discusses the link with network
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research, and sets the scene for the development of the interorganizational array to be
tested in this dissertation research.
Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks
Given that interorganizational interactions occur as dynamic processes in complex
organizational and institutional settings, there are many variables to consider (Emerson et
al., 2012). Scholars have made a variety of attempts to describe these variables and their
interactions. Most attempts are examples of frameworks, as Ostrom termed them, which
strive to organize, order, and prioritize key variables for further theoretical refinement.
For example, an influential early attempt by Wood and Gray (1991) organizes key
variables into three separate, but sequentially linked, categories: antecedents
(preconditions), processes, and outcomes. They do not specify hypotheses between these
categories but instead investigate important factors in each category as determined by
various organizational theories.
Early Systems-Based Frameworks
Attempts such as Wood and Gray’s to order basic components of sociological
knowledge stem from work of early system theorists, who recognized that social systems
could be represented in the form of input—process—output frameworks. Easton’s (1957)
political system framework, for example, describes a general political system as one that
converts inputs into outputs, with a feedback loop connecting back to the inputs, and
nested within a wider contextual environment. While this approach was critiqued as
overly general, it laid the foundation for a way of thinking about and ordering research on
complex organizational systems; the vast majority framework literature adopts this basic
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systems approach. The purpose of this section is to review key interorganizational
interaction frameworks from the past two decades.
Frameworks vary in their level of detail and specificity. Some simply organize
important variables in the categories of inputs, processes, and outcomes, and suggest
basic associations between them at the level of category (e.g. that processes affect
outcomes). Some propose hypotheses that a variable in one category affects another
category overall (e.g. continuous trust building (a variable in the “process” category)
leads to greater collaboration outcomes (Bryson et al., 2006)). Others specify causal paths
directly between variables in different categories, causally linking for example a specific
antecedent variable to a specific process variable (e.g. interdependence between
stakeholders (antecedent variable) leads to greater interorganizational communications
(process variable) (Gray, 1985)). Furthermore, some frameworks operate at an individual
level of analysis, while others—the majority in fact—are multi-level. While all
frameworks employ the basic systems template categories of inputs—processes—
outputs, some frameworks emphasize the process aspect more so than others.
One of the early and influential frameworks, developed by Gray (1985, 1989),
shows association between antecedent factors, collaborative forms, and outcomes. For
example, if the antecedent factor behind collaboration is conflict and the expected
outcome is a joint agreement, then the collaborative process will likely take the form of a
negotiated settlement. Gray also elaborates “collaborative forms” to specify a sequential
process conducted during collaboration: problem setting  direction setting 
implementation. Each of these stages are described by specific activities performed by
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collaborative groups such as stakeholder or resource identification, establishing ground
rules, and searching for information jointly (Gray, 1989).
Gray is explicit about the boundary of application of her framework. Its level of
analysis is the interorganizational domain, where domain is the “set of actors that become
joined by a common problem or interest” (Gray, 1985, p. 921) and the problem is one
that cannot be dealt with unilaterally by any single organization. The framework applies
only to “underorganized systems,” meaning that domains are characterized by loosely
connected networks, rather than well-established collaborations. Thus the three stage
process of “collaboration” conveys moving from a state of low intensity to higher
intensity interorganizational interaction. The framework is not intended to apply only to a
particular level of interaction such as a well-developed stable collaborative situation, but
captures the full development process from initial conditions to full collaboration. Gray’s
framework is also not strictly limited to organizational interaction, as some of the actors
may be individual citizens.
Gray emphasizes the process aspect of interorganizational interaction, which was
recognized to be under-theorized (Gray & Wood, 1991). In another similar framework
that emphasizes process but omits inputs and outputs, Ring and Van de Ven (1994)
analyze how interorganizational relationships develop and dissolve over time. They
describe an iterative and cyclical process of negotiation, developing commitment, and
implementation, with assessments of each stage (Figure 2-1). If organizations negotiate
and then develop certain expectations about necessary collective action, they will then
commit to certain steps of implementation. If organizations assess that commitments are
met, then they will increase their mutual commitments to further implementation. If
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commitments are not met, then corrective measures will be taken to potentially deescalate their commitment or the implementation overall (Thomson & Perry, 2006)
Figure 2-1: Ring and Van der Ven’s (1994) cyclical collaboration process, adapted from
Thomson and Perry (2006)

Ring and Van de Ven’s framework is multi-level. The overall framework
explains, at the interorganizational domain level, how organizations develop
interorganizational relationships involving mutual commitments and trust at the
organizational level; however, the explanatory variables are all individual or group level
phenomena such as trust, sensemaking, and motivation. Ring and Van de Ven
hypothesize that as interorganizational relationships become more “institutionalized,”
informal relationships become initially more important than formalized organizational
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structures and rules, but eventually formal agreements such as rules, policies and
contracts then start to mirror the informal relationships. Thus organizational level
characteristics are driven partially by individual level variables.
There is broad consensus that the process aspect of interorganizational interaction
is intrinsic to the very nature of phenomenon; indeed, as Weick (1985) considered
“organizing” a more appropriate way to discuss “organization,” the literature on
“collaboration,” for example, could be better described by “collaborating.” Many of the
key frameworks in the interorganizational interaction literature emphasize this dynamic
and self-reinforcing process aspect and specify causal pathways involving individual
level variables in a manner similar to Ring and Van de Ven (1994).
Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks in the Public Administration Literature
In the context of public administration, the process of governance is an important
consideration. “Governance” is a slippery concept like its interorganizational interaction
cousin (Pollitt & Hupe, 2011), however, broadly speaking it refers to the manner by
which collective impacts are produced in a social system (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Using a
major review of the collaboration literature, Ansel and Gash (2007) derive a
“collaborative governance” framework that describes “a governing arrangement where
one or more public agencies directly engage nonstate stakeholders in a collective
decision-making process that is formal, consensus-orientated, and deliberative and that
aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (pg. 544).
This differentiation between state and nonstate actors implies that multiorganizational
collaboration between only state agencies is somehow different from when nonstate
organizations are included. While Ansel and Gash do not elaborate on the extent to which
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actor type affects the nature of collaboration, other scholars have explored this question
in typologies, described in the next section (Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015;
Margerum, 2008; Moore & Koontz, 2003; Morris et al., 2013), and in research on the
mechanisms of collective action in networks (Herranz, 2008).
Ansel and Gash’s collaborative governance framework incorporates multiple
levels of analysis. At the individual and group levels of analysis, they describe a cyclical
positive feedback process that is very similar to the Ring and Van de Ven framework.
Face-to-face dialogue leads to trust building, which in turn enhances participants’
commitment to the process. Commitment is characterized by mutual recognition of
interdependence, shared ownership of processes, and understanding of mutual gains.
Trust and commitment allows shared understanding to develop. Depending on the context
and the activity undertaken by the interorganizational form, partners may work on
problem definition, mission planning, and identification of mindsets and values. These
intermediate outcomes reinforce further face-to-face dialogue and further trust building,
and a positive feedback loop is created.
Ansel and Gash recognize that the interorganizational interaction process is highly
dynamic and cyclical, but is affected by broader institutional factors such as the formal or
informal governance and administrative structures created by interacting organizations.
Part of the interaction process involves creating such organizational level structures,
which then in turn interact with the individual level variables. Positive feedback loops at
the individual levels then reinforce the development and subsequent stability of
organizational or institutional level structures and rules.
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Emerson et al. (2012) refine the Ansel and Gash framework by removing the
emphasis on government as the convener of interorganizational interaction. They
describe a “collaborative governance regime” as the:
processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that
engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of
government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a
public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished (Emerson et al., 2012, p.
2).
Thus they do not limit collaboration to only formal state-initiated arrangements.
Emerson et al.’s framework is in the form of input—process—output, but with
some key differences to many other frameworks of this form. First, they distinguish
between two types of inputs/antecedents to collaboration: the general system context,
which describes situational aspects that are often present in collaborations such as
turbulence and complexity; and specific drivers of collaboration, which are necessary
conditions to collaboration forming (leadership, consequential incentives,
interdependence, and uncertainty). Second, they distinguish between the immediate
outputs of collaboration (e.g. getting resources, enacting policy) and the longer term
impacts that are described in reference to the system context. Finally, they specify
adaptation as a separate outcome of collaboration, in that collaborations that adapt to
system contexts and changes in rule structures are more likely to be sustainable and selfreinforcing. In a manner similar to Ansel and Gash, they identify the positive feedback
between individual level factors such as motivation and engagement, with the creation
and sustainment of more formalized institutional rules and processes.
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While the Emerson et al. and Ansel and Gash frameworks are widely cited in
recent collaboration literature, a closer look reveals some potential issues. First, both
frameworks clearly focus on the “governance” level of organizations and thus are more
applicable to organizational leadership responsible for negotiating and authorizing
collaborations; it is not clear if these frameworks apply at all levels of the organization
including at the “street level” where much actual collaborative implementation happens.
Second, the frameworks do not elaborate on important organizational factors such as
authority to commit resources, organizational size, goals, and structure. As the following
review of interorganizational interaction arrays reveals, hierarchical structure and the
distribution of authority within an organization are of key importance to determining the
intensity of interorganizational interaction. While the Emerson et al. and Ansel and Gash
frameworks are clearly multilevel, it is not clear how to overlay the frameworks on the
recognized levels of analysis of individual, structural-organizational, interorganizational
domain, and ecological. This reflects the challenging nature of identifying levels of
analysis at which conceptual or statistical inferences are made in networks and
collaboration research.
The frameworks covered so far have placed great emphasis on the process of
interorganizational interaction, but lesser focus on the surrounding context, antecedent
conditions, and outcomes. A framework developed by Bryson et al. (2006) expands more
on the other dimensions2 in addition to the process. The framework links antecedents—
which they call “starting conditions”—to outcomes, via two related dimensions: process,
and structure and governance. The process dimension identifies both formal and informal
2

Note: Up to this point, category was used to refer to a collection of variables organized in input, process
or output categories. As subsequent frameworks create separate groupings of variables within categories,
they are referred to as dimensions.
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mechanisms for developing interorganizational agreements, leadership, legitimacy, and
trust. They identify that managing interorganizational conflict (e.g. disagreement over
goals, strategy, or use of resources) and planning are key elements of any
interorganizational interaction (Bryson et al., 2006; Lai, 2012).
In contrast to other frameworks covered, they separate out the
structure/governance dimension from the process dimension, although a bi-directional
arrow between the two dimensions conveys a close relationship. The structure dimension
considers how partnering organizations are structurally arranged in their collective work,
such as the linkages between levels of organization, or whether their interdependence is
sequential or pooled (O'Toole, 1986). While other frameworks emphasize the selfreinforcing relationship between individual motivation and trust, and institutional
governance structures created in the collaboration, Bryson et al. point out the connection
between antecedents and context. The governance structure in a collaboration could take
one of a number of forms: hierarchically flat inclusive deliberative panels; via a powerful
lead agency such as a government agency or major nonprofit; or via a “network
organization” created especially for the collaboration. Bryson et al. contend that the
matching between antecedent factors (such as stability of the policy context, turbulence
of situation, and participants) and the particular governance structure has a major effect
on collaborative outcomes.
In a modification to the Bryson et al. framework, Simo and Bies (2007) look at
the particular nature of cross-sector collaborations as an explanatory dimension for
collaborative outcomes. Simo and Bies identify the importance of “informal sector
involvement,” in which out of a sense of community spirit individuals and local groups
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spontaneously organize. This localized emergent collaboration often becomes formalized,
or strengthens the collaborative initiatives of formal organizations including government
agencies and established nonprofits. Morris et al. (2013) pick up on this theme by
introducing the dimension of social capital to the input—process—output framework. In
the context of local grassroots collaborations, social capital is considered as an
antecedent, process, and output and thus is a key explanatory factor in the self-reinforcing
nature of the collaborative process (Wagner & Fernandez-Gimenez, 2008).
The concept of social capital is fundamental to Thomson’s (2001) framework,
which seeks to conceptualize and operationalize interorganizational interaction—or
“collaboration” as she terms it—rather than describe the dynamics of interaction as other
frameworks do. Thomson describes two competing views of collaboration in the
literature: aggregative, in which collaboration translates private preferences into
collective choices via a mechanism of rational utility maximization (Ostrom, 1990); and
integrative, in which collaboration creates new shared understandings and consensus over
compromise (March & Olsen, 2010). Underlying these collaboration mechanisms are two
perspectives of social capital, described by Morris et al. (2013). One views social capital
as a transactional mechanism between actors that requires mutual exchange to establish
norms of trust and reciprocity. Another views social capital as generated in a generalized
way from social interactions across a network (Putnam, 2000).
Linking Back to Foundations – Ostrom’s Institutional Framework
Social capital as the basis of collective action is also at the heart of Ostrom’s
institutionalist framework, which is one of the most refined and general frameworks
derived from a systems approach. Institutional approaches to political science analyze
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how a wide variety of social interactions found in hierarchies, markets, political systems
and societies can be described by a set of underlying components universal to all
situations. One such component is that of the institution—formal and informal rules,
prescriptions and structures that individuals use to organize a variety of structured
interactions. Institutions affect the behavior of individuals by affecting the various
incentives and constraints confronting an individual (Ostrom, 2005, 2007), and the
development of reciprocity, reputation, and trust, which are the drivers of collective
action (Ostrom, 1998). By adopting the basic assumptions of institutionalism and systems
theory, Ostrom led a research effort to develop multilevel frameworks and conceptual
language to describe the fundamental components of social interactions, whether market
or hierarchy (Seidl, Becker, & Luhmann, 2005).
The basic conceptual template is a systems framework that describes a process of
social interaction affected by inputs and contexts, and leading to certain outcomes, which
then become part of the inputs in a cyclical fashion (Figure 2-2). In true systems fashion,
this template is “nested” at different levels depending on the scale of the participants (e.g.
from individual to nation state) and the type of rules governing the situation (from
“operational rules” to “constitutional rules”). The most important part of the framework
is arguably the basic process unit of social interaction called an “action arena,” which
refers to the social space in which individuals interact, exchange resources, and enact or
resolve conflicts. Using a rational actor assumption and game-theoretic reasoning where
actors rationally evaluate costs and benefits of their actions and expected outcomes,
Ostrom surmised that any collective interaction situation could be generalized by looking
at seven core variables: the involved participants; their positions; their potential
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outcomes; the link between their actions and outcomes; the various controls that
participants exercise; the types of information generated; and the costs and benefits
assigned to actions and outcomes (Ostrom, 2007).
Figure 2-2: Ostrom's institutional analysis and development framework

New institutionalism is a foundation of Ostrom’s collective action framework.
This theory presumes that actors are rational and self-interested, but that their perception
of what is optimal is affected by a surrounding institutional context. Moreover, in
situations where no external authority is present to resolve problems or coordinate action,
actors create new institutions in the form of rules, sanctions and monitoring systems in
order to govern self-organized collective action (Ostrom, 2007). A problem with previous
rational theories and economically-focused game theoretical models of collective action,
was that they failed to explain why rational actors create self-governing systems in the
first place, when in many cases a better option would be to “defect” and act purely in
their own self-interest (M. Olsen, 1965; Ostrom, 1990).
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Ostrom showed that this “institutional supply” problem, coupled with the
interrelated problems of development mutual monitoring and credible commitments,
could be solved by face-to-face communications involving discussion about the
governance system of rules and monitoring. Face-to-face communication builds trust,
which increases the propensity of actors to commit to a governance system. Once the
governance system of joint-decision making, mutual monitoring, and administrative
implementation is established and continued, participants experience joint benefits.
Successful governance systems continue, while others are either discarded or adapted.
This evolutionary adaptation of governance systems, in effect, increases trust between
participants. Ostrom found that, providing a minimal amount of face-to-face
communication occurred, governance systems transform into trusted institutions. This
explains why, in general, stronger governance and administrative systems in
interorganizational interactions are associated with great norms of trust and reciprocity.
Likewise, while an antecedent to interorganizational interaction is known to be
“problem” interdependence (Emerson et al., 2012; Gray, 1985; Trist, 1977), once
participants jointly develop governance and administration arrangements a new form of
interdependence emerges. First, as a governance system is created, participants face
increasing psychological sanctions for defection from a collective action, where breaking
commitments is viewed very negatively in a group setting (Ostrom, 2007). Second,
entering into a shared governance and administration system involves transaction costs,
which represent a deterrent to leaving the system especially when significant time and
resources have been committed. Finally, increasing development of joint decision making
and administrative processes enables participants to better identify opportunities where
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resources can be shared. Thus interorganizational interaction is stimulated by resource
dependence; however, in order to be activated, this dependence requires collective
governance processes to enable resource sharing rather than purely economic
considerations of resource exchange (Tschirhart et al., 2009).
These basic theoretical mechanisms explained by Ostrom underpin much of the
more recent work on interorganizational interaction frameworks. Emerson et al. (2012),
for example, describe a “collaborative governance regime,” meaning the implicit and
explicit principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that govern actors’
behaviors. The collaborative governance regime is bolstered by an iterative interactive
process in which “principled engagement” (communication), “shared motivation” (trust,
commitment and mutuality), and “capacity for joint action” (administrative procedures)
reinforce each other in a positive feedback loop to strengthen the institutional regime of
collaboration. Based on this logic, Emerson et al. (2012) hypothesize that “the quality and
extent of collaborative dynamics depends on the productive and self-reinforcing
interactions among principled engagement, shared motivation, and the capacity for joint
action” (p. 17).
Ostrom’s framework works well for common-pool resource problems where the
costs of not participating are often greater than participation. The framework relies upon
the assumption that the above list of core variables such as costs and benefits are
explicitly known, and that the boundaries of the collective interaction situation can be
defined; indeed, a core prediction of the game-theoretic logic behind the framework is
that collective action is more effective when costs are known, information is available,
and participants can expect repeated and routinized interactions thus increasing incentive
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to cooperate (Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1990). Much of the interorganizational public
administration literature, however, takes different starting assumptions due to the
previously identified “wickedness” of public problems where costs and benefits are much
harder to calculate and the constituent factors and participants of the problem situation
are rarely stable and identified.
While there are interorganizational interaction cases where Ostrom’s framework
likely can be applied, public domain problems require different incentives to participate
in collective action such as high levels of interdependence (Emery & Trist, 1965;
Logsdon, 1991; Trist, 1977, 1983), turbulence (Bryson et al., 2006; Gray, 1989) and a
favorable social and political climate (Mattessich et al., 2001). Furthermore,
interorganizational interaction mechanisms, which mirror “action situations” in Ostrom’s
framework, can be described in different ways by variables derived from other bodies of
literature such as conflict resolution, leadership, management and stakeholder theory.
This does not mean that the list of core variables of action situations identified by Ostrom
are incorrect or do not apply, but that given the wicked problem situations encountered in
public domain interorganizational research, the core variables rarely can be objectively
identified in a useful manner.
Theme-Based Frameworks of Interorganizational Interaction
Other scholars do not use a systems-based approach to develop Theory of
interorganizational interaction. The final framework covered, developed by Huxham
(2003, 1996) and Huxham and Vangen (2000, 2005), is a “theme-based” framework. The
core of the framework is a collection of “practitioner-generated” themes created from
extensive grounded theory case study work of participants in interorganizational
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interactions, which Huxham and Vangen term “collaborations.” They subsequently
identify “cross-cutting” themes that are part of all the practitioner themes, “policy-maker”
themes identified by policy researchers and policy makers not necessarily directly
involved in the collaborations, and “researcher-generated” themes such as social capital,
which academic researchers identify as important but are not necessarily identified by
practitioners. The work by Huxham and Vangen does not specify detailed dynamic
processes nor suggest causal linkages, but instead intuitively maps out the conceptual
landscape of interorganizational interaction by identifying and describing key variables of
interest.
One particular variable of interest with respect to the present study is that of
membership structure in the interorganizational interaction; Huxham and Vangen identify
three issues of ambiguity, complexity, and dynamics. They note that interactions are
often characterized by ambiguity in membership and status, meaning that participants’
perceptions about the extent to which other participants are involved may vary.
Furthermore, participants exhibit ambiguity over the extent to which an individual
participant is acting individually or representing an organization. While many other
frameworks and arrays define interorganizational forms, in part, by membership structure
and type, (Keast et al., 2007), Huxham and Vangen present evidence to suggest
otherwise. For the purposes of this study, as interorganizational interaction may be
intrinsically different depending on the extent to which individual citizens are involved
versus individuals acting on behalf of organizations, or citizen groups, it is important to
sample only one kind; in this case, interaction between organizations.
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Another key observation is the complexity of interorganizational structures,
especially within a single policy domain. Huxham and Vangen show that often multiple
interactions exist within any policy domain, and most have overlapping goals, structures,
and participants. Often, interorganizational interactions evolve complex hierarchies of
structure such as working groups, committees, and network organizations—a fact
identified in other frameworks. Different departments within an organization may
participate independently in the same interaction, or are involved in many different ones.
This creates difficult sampling issues in terms of whether individuals, departments,
organizations or collaborative groupings are the unit of analysis. This point is addressed
in chapter 3.
Finally, Huxham and Vangen note the dynamic nature of membership. Many
scholars identify increasing membership stability as a feature of increasing
interorganizational interaction (Keast et al., 2007; McNamara, 2012), or assume stable
membership in the cyclical trust-commitment feedback loops (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Ring
& Van de Ven, 1994). Huxham and Vangen point out that inevitably, people change jobs,
organizations send different staff to the interaction on different days, and organizations
face other pressures that affect their involvement. They contend that dynamic variation in
membership affects the interorganizational interaction purpose and creates a situation of
continual negotiation and renegotiation of aims and goals. While interorganizational
interactions with stable memberships can be found, care is needed in research as
application of many of the systems frameworks requires an assumption of stable
membership.
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Conclusions – Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks
Several conclusions can be drawn from this review of interorganizational
interaction frameworks. First, they reflect a fundamental point about the complexity of
collective action. Most frameworks are constructed in input—process—output form with
multiple possible hypotheses linking variables and feedback loops between dimensions,
demonstrating that collective action situations are complex adaptive systems. Various
scholars have considered the implications of this in organizational terms (Anderson,
1999; Bovaird, 2008; Buijs, 2010; Innes & Booher, 2010; Thietart & Forgues, 1995).
Multiorganizational systems tend to exhibit chaotic (unpredictable but not random)
behavior as a result of counteracting forces such as the autonomy tension between
individual or organizational goals and those of the interorganizational form (Thietart &
Forgues, 1995). Positive feedback loops between interorganizational dimensions and
variables creates nonlinear relationships, meaning caution must be applied when
attempting to use linear regression modeling to test hypotheses (Aydinoglu, 2010). Stable
equilibrium states such as regular stakeholder meetings may develop but are highly
sensitive to contextual conditions (Bryson et al., 2006; Van Buuren & Gerrits, 2008)
Consequently, as a result of the multiplicity of variables, their potential
combinations and dynamic iteration, organizations and derivative interorganizational
groupings exhibit action irreversibility such that encountering the same situation and
combination of factors more than once is unlikely (Thietart & Forgues, 1995). This
emphasizes the importance of rigorous case study research, however, as was realized in
earlier strands of policy implementation research (Goggin, 1986; O'Toole, 2000),
complexity and an abundance of variables does not make cumulative and generalized
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research a hopeless endeavor as the various frameworks show broadly similar findings
and prioritize important factors.
Second, in conceptual terms all frameworks suggest relationships between levels
of analysis. In many cases, positive feedback loops generate emergent characteristics in
which aggregate, higher level characteristics are generated from a complex interactions of
individual level factors such as the link between individual trust and organizational level
structures created during interorganizational interaction. However, this is also an
indication of institutionalism. Apart from the special case of conflicts over common pool
resources, which have particular dynamics and outcomes (Ostrom, 1990), in situations
where stakeholders are interdependent and face a common and individually unresolvable
problem, certain interorganizational interactions tend to develop features of organization
(regular meetings, aspects of hierarchy, division of labor) reflecting the pervasive
institutional norm of organization as a way to achieve collective goals in unstable or
unordered situations (Thacher, 2004).
Third, inherent in the basic systems structure of most frameworks is adaptation
and iteration, allowing for changes in processes, participants and governance structures as
a situation changes. While the frameworks specify little about how this adaptation might
unfold, other scholars have described a series of first, second, and third order effects that
result from higher intensity interaction (collaborative) activities. Innes and Booher
(1999), for example, describe first order effects as collaborative outputs as per many of
the frameworks: creation of social capital, robust agreements, innovative solutions, or
stable collaborative organizations. Second order effects are similar to the collaborative
impacts described by Emerson et al. (2012): changes in original contexts, offshoot
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partnerships arising as a result of increasing network density, or changes in practices and
perceptions (Bryson et al., 2006). Finally, third order effects may emerge after some time
and include new cultural or societal norms about conflict resolution and deliberative
planning. This suggests that second and third order effects may be an “indicator” of
collaboration, an observation that is missing from the interorganizational interaction
literature reviewed in the next section.
Fourth, the frameworks have little utility in defining interorganizational
interaction terms, with the exception of Thomson (2001). All the frameworks could apply
at different levels of interorganizational interaction, and some are explicitly intended to
capture the whole life cycle of interorganizational interaction from birth to dissolution.
The basic self-reinforcing feedback loops show how these collective action situations
form with limited levels of interaction (i.e. “deconfliction” or “cooperation”) and then
ratchet up all the way to full collaboration—a much higher intensity of interaction. While
this is not necessarily a problem in terms of the frameworks, there is an inconsistency
with the body of work on interorganizational interaction arrays, which ascribe specific
operationalizations to common terms such as coordination, cooperation or collaboration.
In some cases, a more appropriate and general name for many of the “collaboration”
frameworks reviewed may be “interorganizational interaction” framework.
Fifth, while most frameworks intend to be general, the dynamic of
interorganizational interaction is affected by context, specifically the nature and
organizational level of participants, the scale of the policy problem, and the membership
size of the interaction. For interactions involving organizations rather than individual
citizens, the organizational hierarchical level at which a framework applies is not
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specified. In the array literature, for example, lower levels of interaction (cooperation) are
distinguished from higher levels (collaboration) by the involvement of more senior staff
or denser interactions from working level up to leadership level. Some frameworks may
apply only to leadership (Ansel & Gash, 2007), but then other frameworks explicitly spell
out roles for all participants (Gray, 1989). While there is no conclusive evidence from the
literature and further research is needed, the case may be that regardless of level in the
hierarchy, drivers and mechanisms of interorganizational interaction are similar, with the
exception that higher up levels tend to have greater authority to commit resources.
Another issue affecting interorganizational interaction dynamics is the importance
of the scale of the policy problem and the way participants “interface” with the problem.
Morris et al. (2013), for example, points out that the failures of collaborative efforts in
Chesapeake Bay restoration projects may stem from the large number of organizations
involved, the large geographic area over which the problem exists, and the very broad
policy problem. This is in contrast to successful efforts to restore the rivers in the
Hampton Roads area, which involved locally-based groups, smaller numbers of
organizations and individuals, and thus allowed social capital to be a “gluing” mechanism
of collaboration. While some of the array literature has attempted to include
characteristics of the policy problem into a definition of interorganizational interactions,
it is unclear the extent to which the frameworks reviewed apply across varying
geographic, financial or impact scales of policy problems.
The final conclusion concerns the state of Theory in collaboration literature. This
review started out by selecting “frameworks,” with a general observation that most do not
meet the set of five criteria for theory presented by Blomquist (2007) and Schlager
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(2007): specification of boundaries and scope of inquiry; assumptions about individual
actors; a mechanism for collective grouping; links to the wider context / environment;
and a mechanism for system change. A closer inspection shows that while none of the
frameworks other than Ostrom’s meets the five criteria, some do come close, as
illustrated in Table 2-2. Ostrom’s framework is not considered as theory, however, as it is
“empty” of specific hypotheses linking variables (Ostrom, 2007).
Table 2-2: Assessment of theoretical potential of interorganizational interaction
frameworks

Boundaries / scope
of inquiry

X

Assumption about
individual

X

Mechanism for
collective action

X

X

Link to wider
context

X

X

Mechanisms for
system change

X

X

X

Ostrom (2005)

Huxham and
Vangen
(2005)

Bryson et al.
(2006)

Ring and Van
de Ven (1994)

Gray (1989)

Emerson et al.
(2012)

Criteria for Theory

Ansel and Gash
(2007)

Selection of frameworks reviewed

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Several scholars note that the particular type of collaboration (Gray, 1989) or the
particular organizational forms that emerge from the process (Bryson et al., 2006) depend
strongly on the localized context such as the nature of the participants or the stability of
the policy domain. Thus for a framework or theory to meet the above five-fold criteria
would require a typology of cases, pairing up combinations of participants, situation type,
policy domain, and other contextual factors, with different forms of frameworks. This
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conclusion points towards the tension between creating generalized mechanisms of
interorganizational interaction versus highly specific cases that enumerate all possible
combinations of inputs, processes, and outputs. This may explain why many scholars
either develop high level frameworks, or pick out specific variables for study and create
highly specific “models,” which look at one or two particular relationships from a
framework under particular cases. In sum, developing Theory of interorganizational
interaction is very challenging.
Another related Theory aspect concerns the paradigmatic basis of the frameworks.
With the exception of Huxham’s, all are generally functionalist—they assume objective
reality and tangible variables. Huxham, however, opens the door for a social
constructivist perspective, noting that interorganizational interactive dynamics depends
largely on the perceptions of participants. All the frameworks treat interorganizational
forms as an open system, as defined by W. R. Scott (2003), yet they emphasize natural
and rational aspects to varying extents. While Thomson (2001), for example, specifies
explicit operationalizations of governance and administration structures as intrinsic to the
collaborative process, Gray (1989) emphasizes human relations aspects such as the
legitimacy and power balance of participants, and the importance of the convener and
mediator roles in collaboration.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) postulate that the reasons for such diversity of
Theory lie in the different backgrounds and experiences of the theoreticians: rational
theorists typically have managerial or engineering backgrounds, while natural theorists
tend to be academics. W. R. Scott (2003) notes that the type of organization that theorists
study is important. Rational theorists typically study business firms or government
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bureaucracies, while natural theorists study voluntary, service or community
organizations. Continuing the example above, Thomson, who trained at a mainstream
public administration school, developed her framework by studying a major nationwide
nonprofit organization; Gray, who was an organizational behavior theorist, developed her
work from studying conflict situations in local community problems.
While these observations may be unsurprising, they highlight an important point
with regard to the interorganizational interaction frameworks. Rational paradigms are
intuitively applicable to stable interorganizational forms, while natural paradigms fit with
dynamically varying or less-structured groupings. The interorganizational interaction
frameworks do not specify their limits of applicability in terms of the various actors
constituting the interaction, the stability of participation, or the dynamic variation in
system context. The case may be that interorganizational interactions between
government bureaucracies, with all other things equal, are more likely to recreate
signatures of hierarchy during the interaction as observed by Bardach (1998), in
comparison to interactions between local community groups and individuals. This
highlights the limits of generalized frameworks, as the dynamic unfolding of a
interorganizational interaction over time may vary quite considerably depending on the
history, experiences and identities of the participants. This conclusion will be revisited
when the sample for this particular study is defined.
Interorganizational Interaction Arrays
Organizations are intricate systems composed of multiple social structures,
participants, goals, and technologies, interacting with the external environment and
exhibiting complex individual and group behaviors. From this initial description, scholars
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have identified many distinct “dimensions” of organizations that merit study and often
form the basis of entire disciplines. Rainey (2003), for example, identifies key
dimensions as: goals, values, leadership, strategy, culture, organization type, hierarchical
structure, processes, tasks, technologies, performance, incentives, individuals, and
groups. Each of these dimensions can be further broken down; the dimension “structure”
is composed of: specialization, division of responsibility, departmentalization,
centralization, hierarchy, and formalization.
While this list of dimensions describes a single organization, the
interorganizational literature recognized that when organizations interact and form
interorganizational relationships and structures, these dimensions are generally affected
by the interaction (Whetten, 1981). Efforts to define interorganizational interaction terms
can be considered part of this broader body of interorganizational literature, which
attempts to create typologies and arrays of interorganizational forms using the
organizational dimensions—with some additions particular to interorganizational
structures—as discriminating characteristics. This section reviews important
interorganizational interaction array work from the interorganizational and collaboration
literatures.
Table 2-3: Generic structure of an interorganizational interaction array
Dimensions
(distinguishing
characteristics)

Interorganizational Form
Form Type A

Form Type B

Dimension 1

Indicator of Dimension
1 for Form Type A

Indicator of Dimension
1 for Form Type B.

Dimension 2

Indicator of Dimension
2 for Form Type A

Etc.

Dimension 3

Form Type C…
Etc.
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From the literature reviewed, the scale forms of interorganizational interaction
arrays generally have two axes as illustrated in Table 2-3. The first (horizontal) axis
defines names for a particular interorganizational interaction, form or relationship, for
example: collaboration, cooperation, or partnership. The second (vertical) axis contains
the discriminating characteristics or “dimension,” for example: information, structure,
resource, or decision-making. Each cell of the typology then describes what that
particular dimension looks like for each interorganizational form.
Early scholars realized that different interorganizational forms exhibit different
processes, depending on their purpose and how they operate. As shown in Table 2-4,
Astley and Fombrun (1983) create a typology of “forms of internal interdependence”
based on three dimensions: resource flow through the network; form of control; and
emergent structures of coordination. They define four general types of interorganizational
forms or “collectives:” agglomerate, confederate, conjugate, and organic. The organic
collective, for example, is characterized by an “indirect symbiosis” form of internal
interdependence, where diverse types of organizations depend on the same resource pool
for existence, such as vast spectrum of medical providers depending on the supply of sick
people. An organic’s forms of institutional control (second dimension) is “political,”
where the dominant regulative force between organizational interactions is the political
system in a state.
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Table 2-4: A typology of "ideal type" interorganizational forms adapted from Astley and
Fombrun (1983)
Forms of Internal Interdependence
Agglomerate
(indirect
commensualism)

Confederate
(direct
commensualism)

Conjugate (direct
symbiosis)

Organic (indirect
symbiosis)

Resource flow
through
network

Information flows

Personnel flows

Work flows

Influence flows

Form of
institutional
control

Economic

Social

Legal

Political

Emergent
structure of
coordination

Cartels

Collusion

Contract

Professional
associations

Informal
leadership

Joint venture

Network
organizations’
institutionalized
rule structures

Dimensions

While this typology presents “ideal types” of interorganizational forms, a problem
with this approach is that the four forms are not mutually exclusive, meaning the same
dimension indicator can be repeated for multiple interorganizational forms (Gueguen,
Pellegrin-Boucher, & Torres, 2006). For example, it is likely that “information flows”
and “influence flows” would both be seen in the organic form. Categorizing
interorganizational forms aims to support theoretical development and empirical study by
analyzing which forms lead to certain outcomes or behaviors, yet non-mutually exclusive
independent variables (the interorganizational forms) negatively impact a typology’s
empirical utility (Smith & Larimer, 2009). While Astely and Fombrun describe the cells
as representing “dominant” aspects of each interorganizational form, the dimensions are
not practicable for rigorous empirical research.
Gray (1989), in her influential book on interorganizational relationships, which
she terms as “collaborations,” again emphasizes that the characteristics of
interorganizational forms vary depending on context, and that the form eventually affects
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outcomes. As show in Table 2-5, she defines four interorganizational forms or
“collaborations” first by the function that they perform, and secondly by the possible
outcomes that may result.
Table 2-5: Interorganizational forms and their functions, adapted from Gray (1989), p.
241
Interorganizational Form
Dimension
Function

Exploratory
Acknowledge
interdependence
Establish trust

Advisory
Analyze problem
Draft
recommendations

Clarify parameters
of problem
domain
Possible
Outcomes

Shared problem
definition
Initial policy
analysis

Confederative
Draft and adopt
recommendations
for ongoing
interaction

Contractual
Operational
agreements
Resource
exchanges
Nonbinding
agreements

Policy
recommendations

Formally regulate
interactions

Contractual legal
agreements

Institutionalize
relationships

Binding agreements

Focusing of issues

An “exploratory” collaboration may occur as one of the first activities between
organizations in order to acknowledge interdependence between actors, establish trust
and conduct initial problem scoping to “formulate the mess” (Ackoff, 1974). “Advisory”
collaborations extend these functions and identify solutions. “Confederative”
collaborations consider implementation of solutions, and may start to exchange resources
to do so and develop increasingly formalized agreements. Finally, “contractual”
collaborations see a high level of formalized solution implementation with legally
binding contracts. A research and development consortia of industry and academic
organizations is an example of a contractual collaborative, in which participants develop
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legal contracts about profits and copyright, but also complex formal and informal rules
about how participating organizations interaction.
Employing the function or purpose to discriminate interorganizational forms such
as in the Gray typology is useful to allow a researcher to relate interorganizational
interaction directly to the context of the situation or environment, and this approach has
been employed in many typologies and scales of interaction. From a review of 36
environmental management case studies, Margerum (2008) constructs a typology of three
interorganizational forms: action, organizational, and policy “collaboratives,” according
to whether the main reason for interaction between organizations is to act directly, change
organizations’ policies about a collective problem, or attempt to change government
policy concerning the problem. In a similar vein, Alter and Hage (1993) identify different
“coordination methods” depending on whether the interaction is for policy making,
administration, or operations. In a more detailed analysis, Aiken et al. (1985) note that the
comprehensiveness, accessibility and compatibility of an interorganizational form
depends on whether the purpose of interaction is for coordinating programs, resources,
suppliers, consumers or information. More recently, Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011)
organize their analysis on whether collaboration is for the purpose of improving
productivity, gaining information, increasing legitimacy, or sharing resources. As will be
discussed later, however, while this approach is useful in some respects, attempting to
define interaction terms using dimensions of function, purpose or outcomes introduces
logical errors.
Gray, Aiken and Margerum do not elaborate further on the discriminating
dimensions of interorganizational forms, making it challenging to use their typologies
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other than for initial theory development. Gray, however, introduces the notion that
interorganizational interactions become “progressively more institutionalized” (Gray,
1989, p. 240) proceeding from exploratory to contractual forms. That different
interorganizational forms exhibit different “intensities” of interaction is the foundation
for another influential early work on interorganizational theory: Organizations Working
Together by Alter and Hage (1993).
Building from the Astley and Fombrun (1983) typology, Alter and Hage (1993)
start with a “form of interdependence” dimension with two values of competitive and
symbiotic—the justification being that organizations in symbiotic relationships have
much different logics and more opportunity for interaction compared to competitive
relationships. As shown in Table 2-6 they add another dimension with two categories
based on the number of partnering organizations (dyadic / triadic interactions, or
multisectoral / networks), given strong findings from interorganizational relations
literature noting that collectivities with few members exhibit much greater tendency for
self-interested behaviors. They use these four basic combinations to define the nature of
three types of interorganizational forms: limited, moderate, and broad “cooperation.”
Alter and Hage’s work, which established the idea that interorganizational interaction
occurred on a scale of “intensity” or magnitude, led to subsequent efforts to classify
interorganizational forms based on level of interaction.
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Table 2-6: A typology of interorganizational interaction adapted from Alter and Hage
(1993)
Dimensions

Extent of Interorganizational Interaction

Form of
Interdependence

# of Interacting
Organizations

Limited
Cooperation

Competitive

Dyadic / Triadic

Descriptors of Interorganizational forms such as: joint
ventures, partnerships, contractual relationships, social
networks, systematic production networks,

Multisectoral
Symbiotic

Dyadic / Triadic

Moderate
Cooperation

Broad
Cooperation

Multisectoral

Empirical research on interorganizational interaction is challenging because
interorganizational forms evolve considerably with time and many organizational
behaviors are affected by social constructions (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Lincoln, 1985).
Many of the typologies reviewed attempt to classify interorganizational forms into
categories based on simple characteristics with qualitative values (e.g. network strength
as “high” or “low”), yet network strength may vary considerably over time, or may be
measured in different ways by different observers. Such inconsistencies diminish the
empirical utility of the early interorganizational interaction arrays.
Later efforts by McNamara (2012), Williams (2010), and Keast et al. (2007) for
example, include mixes of objective organizational characteristics in addition to more
general qualitative dimensions. These interorganizational interaction arrays, in effect,
provide “snapshots” of complex and dynamic interaction processes and give reasonable
indicators about the level of interaction, without overly specifying structural details. In
reality, the particular choice of name for an interorganizational form—whether
“cooperation” or “collaboration”—is largely arbitrary; what is important is how the
dimensions change for that particular form, and what this signifies for an organization.
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While the arrays do not spell out these implications in detail, they provide a starting
point.
The most developed interorganizational interaction array to date is McNamara
(2012), from her Ph.D. dissertation (McNamara, 2008) building on prior work by Fagan
(1997), Mattessich et al. (2001), Diehl (2005); Edmondson (2006); Thatcher (2007).
McNamara defines three levels of interaction—cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration—and ten dimensions: design of administrative structures supporting the
collective efforts; formality of the agreement determining roles and responsibilities;
organizational autonomy; key personnel who have responsibility for implementing the
partnership; information sharing; decision making; the extent to which there is a process
for resolution of turf issues; resource allocation; systems thinking; and trust.
Some scholars use characteristics of the context or situation in which
interorganizational interaction takes place to define the extent of interaction. For
example, the McNamara (2008) typology has additional dimensions over her later 2012
version, including: duration of interaction (time); difficulty of task; and impetus for
collective action. Moore and Koontz (2003) create a typology based on the type of
participant to the interaction: agency, citizen, or mixed. While these dimensions have
descriptive utility, using them to define the interorganizational form is a logical fallacy—
equivalent to defining a river by the presence of a valley: a valley is a sufficient condition
for a river, but it is not necessary. Similarly, those typologies that incorporate antecedents
and outcomes of interorganizational interaction suffer from the same logic error. For
example, the Margerum typology discriminates interorganizational forms on the basis of
whether the goal of participating organizations is to act directly, change organizations’
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policies about a collective problem, or change government policy concerning the problem
area. It stands to reason that any collective effort could have all three or none of these
goals. A more rigorous approach may involve restricting definitions to those dimensions
relating to the interorganizational form itself, and those relating to the organizations
involved in the partnership.
Comparing the interorganizational interaction arrays reviewed, it is possible to
classify the various dimensions used into three categories: dimensions relating to the
context or environment in which the interorganizational interaction occurs; dimensions
relating to the interacting organizations; and dimensions relating to the actual
interorganizational form itself. For example, the dimensions of “organizational
autonomy” and “key personnel” are clearly from the perspective of the organization,
whereas “formalized agreements” relates only to the interorganizational form. Table 2-7
arranges the dimensions in the interorganizational interaction arrays reviewed according
to these three categorizations. In effect, Table 2-7 lays out all the various dimensions by
which any interorganizational form such as collaboration could be defined.
Conclusions – Interorganizational Interaction Arrays
Several conclusions can be drawn from this review of interorganizational
interaction arrays. First, as observed in the comparison in Table 2-8 the terms chosen for
various forms of interorganizational interaction are arbitrary and their acceptance is a
matter of convention. This explains, for example, how Himmelman (2002) considers
networking as the most informal and limited interorganizational interaction, whereas
Mandell and Steelman (2003) define it almost oppositely as the most intense and
comprehensive interaction.
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Table 2-7: Summary of interorganizational interaction array dimensions arranged in
three categories
Dimensions Relating to Context,
Situation, Antecedents or
Outcomes

Dimensions Relating to
Structural and Behavioral
Aspects of Participating
OrganizationsA

Dimensions Relating to
Interorganizational Interaction
(II)B

Time required for problem
solution

Level of staff participating in II
(e.g. leadership, junior,
working level)

Time duration of II

Length of time problem has
existed
Complexity of problem domain
Antecedents to collective action
(e.g. extent of history of prior
work together; extent to which
an organization is well-known
in problem domain)
Function of II (e.g. information
exchange, production,
resolving conflict, planning,
analysis, evaluation)
Type of goods produced by II
(public, private, commonpool)

Type of interdependence
between organizations (e.g.
organizations could achieve
goals without II, or require II
to achieve goals)
Organizational autonomy

Frequency of II
Differential of level of staff
engaged in interaction (e.g.
manager-manager; CEOmanager; CEO-CEO)
Design of interorganizational
infrastructure

Authority over goals, resources

Formality of interorganizational
agreement

Key personnel

Extent of information sharing

Decision making

C

Decision Making

Resource allocation

Resource allocation

Systems thinking

Resolution of turf issues

Incentives

Culture

Commitment

Intended outcomes of II (e.g.
policy change, rule change,
direct action)

Willingness to change

Type of organization involved
(e.g. government, nonprofit,
private company, coalition,
charity)D

Culture

Trust
Risk taking

Number of participating
organizations
A. Organization is understood in a conventional “rational” perspective with boundaries defined by the hierarchical
structure (i.e. org chart).
B. The dimensions belonging under the II column are those that emerge out of the interaction, and are not
something that can be measured meaningfully in the participating organizations.
C. Italic text denotes that the dimension can be categorized under two columns, depending on how it is defined.
D. This dimension is not placed in the “organization” column as it is not a structural or behavioral characteristic.
That is, while different types of organization will vary in structural forms, the impact of organization type on II is
minimal or random.
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Apart from the recent exceptions of McNamara (2008), Thatcher (2007) and
Thomson et al. (2009), definitions created by dictionary writers and many scholars are
generally conceptually constructed by thinking, rather than taxonomically generated from
categorization based on empirical observations (Bailey, 1994; Smith, 2002). What is
more important is understanding how the various dimensions pair together in certain
combinations and what effects these have on outcomes. It is useful for future research,
however, to create standardization in the usage of terms.
Second, a repeated notion is that interorganizational interactions exist on a
“continuum” characterized by both increasing magnitude of implications for partnering
organizations and increasing formalization and interdependence of the emergent
interorganizational form. In most cases, however, this continuum is “quantized” such
that, with some exceptions, dimensions have a discrete number of values. While some
continuum approaches have used the term “maturity” to describe the increasing
interorganizational interactions that occur from cooperation to collaboration (Alberts &
Hayes, 2007; NATO, 2006), “maturity” suggests both elements of quality and superiority
and implies that moving up the scale of interaction is preferable. Many studies suggest,
however, that operating at the highest level is not appropriate for all situations (Chisholm,
1992; Mattessich et al., 2001). Although the term magnitude can be misconstrued to
imply quantity, this is not the intent. Interaction magnitude is meant to convey that the
magnitude of the impact on partnering organizations will be greater at higher levels of
interaction.
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Table 2-8: Comparison of terminology used for interorganizational forms in typologies
Author

Terminology Used for
Interorganizational Forms
(presented in order of lower
to higher intensity)

Discriminating Dimensions

Alter and Hage
(1993)

Limited cooperation

Form of interdependence (competitive or
symbiotic); number of partnering organizations (2
– 3 or >3 “multisectoral”); objectives; power;
resources

Moderate cooperation
Broad cooperation

Mattessich et
al. (2001)

Cooperation
Coordination
Collaboration

Himmelman
(2002)

Networking
Coordinating

Vision and relationships; structure, responsibilities
and communication; authority and accountability;
resources and rewards
Formality of relationship; qualitative description of
characteristics; resources

Cooperating
Collaborating
Mandell and
Steelman
(2003)

Intermittent coordination
Temporary task force
Permanent / regular
coordination

Extent to which problem orientation is individual or
shared; commitment to goal (common or
separate); intensity of linkages (loose or tight);
breadth of effort (narrow or comprehensive);
complexity of purpose; scope of effort

Coalition
Network structure
Gajda (2004)

Networking
Cooperating
Partnering
Merging

Purpose; strategies and tasks; leadership and
decision making; interpersonal and
communication.
Note – Gajda consider all these levels as forms of
collaboration

Unifying
Frey et al.
(2006)

Coexistence
Communication

Not specified; the spectrum of interaction is used to
compare a several other typologies (cite).

Cooperation
Coordination
Coalition
Collaboration
Coadunation
Keast et al.
(2007)

Cooperation
Coordination
Collaboration

Goals of interaction; perspectives of participants
about these goals; stability of structural linkages;
formality of connections; risks and rewards of
participation
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Author

Terminology Used for
Interorganizational Forms
(presented in order of lower
to higher intensity)

Discriminating Dimensions

Carrasco
(2009)

Cooperation
Collaboration

Reciprocity; extent of interaction between
organizations; purpose of interaction; decision
making format; types of relationships between
organizations and individuals; action; skills;
participation (nature of leadership); mechanism of
leadership; technology of communications

Networking

Purpose; structure; process

Cross et al.
(2009)

Coordination

Alliance
Partnership
Coalition
Collaboration

Williams
(2010)

Conflicted interactions
Deconflicted interactions
Coordinated interactions

Organizational structure; communications;
information sharing; decision making; operating
procedures; authority and accountability; culture
and values; planning and evaluation

Collaborative interactions
McNamara
(2012)

Cooperation
Coordination
Collaboration

Design of administrative structures; formality of
agreements; organizational autonomy; key
personnel; information sharing; decision making;
resolution of turf issues; resource allocation;
systems thinking; trust

Third, an observation unexamined in the literature is that interorganizational
arrays represent a morphological field, that is, a way of displaying all the possible
combinations of dimensions that could occur (Ritchey, 2006, 2011). Continuums of
interaction lead to the conclusion that cooperation is defined by the occurrence of all the
dimensional indicators at that level, yet this may not be the case. Many situations could
occur where dimensions A and B indicate a high level of interaction (i.e. collaboration),
but dimensions C and D indicate a low level of interaction (i.e. coordination). The
interorganizational interaction arrays do not tell us how to define this state. Furthermore,
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the evolution of an interorganizational interaction through time may see ebbs and flows
of interaction intensity, a fact not captured by arrays.
While arrays represent a useful abstraction or conceptual tool, they mask the
complex reality of interorganizational interaction, as hinted at by the framework
literature. Other research has suggested that cross-level combinations are indeed possible.
In an emerging field of research on interorganizational team working, scholars have
developed a theory of knotworking—a combination of networks and tight collaborative
“knots”—in which collaboration exists but only for short timescales and with
fragmentary ties between participants (Engestrom, 2005). In other research using a
network perspective, Herranz defines a typology of “network coordination” (Herranz,
2008, 2009, 2010a). He shows that depending on the “strategic orientation” of network
actors (the extent to which actors prefer collective action to be conducted
bureaucratically, entrepreneurially, or community-focused), the form of “coordination”
displays differing combinations of dimension, which do not correspond with the levels of
interaction reviewed thus far. Further research is needed about the possible combinations
that could occur in reality, versus those that are theoretically or logically excluded
(McNamara, 2012).
The final conclusion concerns the paradigm of interorganizational interaction
arrays. Given the basic purpose of an array is to classify concepts and generate rigorous
definitions for terms, all the arrays assume an objective functionalist paradigm. They aim
to give descriptive indicators or “snapshots” of how various levels or forms of
interorganizational interaction are operationalized in terms of key organizational
dimensions, in addition to some emergent characters of the interorganizational form.
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Typologies and continuums of interaction cannot be considered as “theory” per se, as
they say little about the particular level of analysis—although most seem to cover
multiple levels—and cannot be easily classified as rational or natural systems. They
provide a starting point, however, for the organization of key variables and suggest some
important hypotheses, when examined with the collaboration framework literature in
mind.
Comparing Frameworks and Arrays
The main body of this literature review has focused on interorganizational
interaction frameworks and definitional arrays from contemporary public administration
scholarship and antecedent works in organizational science. For this chapter, three
questions guided the review: how is interorganizational interaction defined and
conceptualized; which theoretical perspectives inform these conceptualizations; and how
are different interorganizational forms distinguished from each other? The following
conclusions first compare the literature on frameworks and typologies, then reflect on the
broader aspects of the definitional questions by applying organizational and network
lenses.
As the mainstay of contemporary interorganizational interaction research in
public administration relies either on frameworks or arrays, a comparison between the
two is pertinent. This comparison, which is summarized in Table 2-9, highlights the
strengths and limitations of each approach. It is not intended to be evaluative as both the
framework and typological approaches have theoretical and practical utility depending on
the circumstances and particular research questions.
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Table 2-9: Comparison of conclusions from review of frameworks and arrays
Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks

Interorganizational Interaction Arrays

Illustrate the complexity of collective action:
chaotic, nonlinear processes, with action
irreversibility

Portray linear steps between stages or levels of
interaction; assumes collaboration or other
levels are repeatable or standard forms of
interaction

Postulate causal relationships between levels of
analysis, and between multiple variables

Causality is not directly specified

Interorganizational interaction processes adapt to
context and lead to broader impacts

Adaptation is not considered

Definition of interorganizational interaction levels
remain ambiguous

Very specific about definitions of interaction
terms, though the choice of term is ultimately
arbitrary

Dimension indicators for each stage of interaction
are correlated as a result of the typology
structure

Present a “quantized” continuum of interaction,
but in reality represent a morphological field
with multiple possible combinations
Ambiguous about the extent to which frameworks
can be applied at different organizational levels
(e.g. leadership level or street level), or in
different contexts (e.g. for policy change,
implementation, temporary emergencies)

Very specific, in certain cases, about applicability
to different organizational levels and contexts

First, as a basic consequence of systems-based construction with feedback loops
and adaptation, frameworks emphasize the complexity of collective action. While certain
patterns in interorganizational interaction processes can be observed and predicted,
emergent behavior and the fact that each case of interorganizational interaction is slightly
different makes theoretical generalizability and conceptual operationalization
challenging. In contrast, many arrays assume that stable—and thus presumably
repeatable—characteristics of interorganizational interaction exist. Furthermore, while
frameworks stress the dynamic, iterative and adaptive nature of interorganizational
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interaction, arrays say little about adaptation, nor the conditions under which a shift from
one level of interaction to another would occur. This does not intend to imply that
developers of arrays fail to recognize this important point, but simply that arrays are
limited by their structure in what can be represented.
Second, frameworks and arrays differ in the extent to which they capture
relationships between interorganizational interaction input, process and output variables.
Arrays suggest relationships between variables in the sense that “collaboration” or other
interaction terms are defined by the simultaneous presence of disparate indicators of
variables (i.e. dimensions) at the same level of interaction. In contrast, frameworks
hypothesize specific relationships between variables, often at different levels of analysis.
Frameworks offer descriptions of process, while in general, arrays cannot capture the
process aspect of interorganizational interaction particularly well.
Third, frameworks are ambiguous about the extent of their applicability to
different organizational levels (from the leadership level where interorganizational
interaction is governed, to the “street-level” where implementation actually happens), or
in different contexts such as situation type or the purpose of interorganizational
interaction (e.g. for policy change, implementation, temporary emergencies). In contrast,
arrays clearly specify the level of applicability in organizational terms, and often build
context into the construction of the array—even though this creates situations of nonmutually exclusive distinctions between different levels of interaction.
Finally, while arrays offer definitional operationalizations of interaction terms as
a result of their intrinsic purpose, frameworks have less utility in this area. Many of the
frameworks specify processes that span multiple levels of interaction, meaning they apply
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equally to coordination and collaboration. Furthermore, some frameworks imply
dynamically varying combinations of dimensions across interaction terms that are
undefined by the arrays, such a combination of several dimensions of cooperation with
several of collaboration.
A Sidebar on Networks
The Theoretical findings developed so far in this literature review permit a short
diversion, which, while not explicitly related to the main aim of this research, is
important enough in the grand scheme of the literature to consider. One of the major
difficulties in scholarly research on interorganizational interaction in general, and
collaboration in particular, is that a significant parallel literature exists on networks. This
parallel literature develops many of the same conclusions and employs similar research
tools, yet often creates confusion due to overlapping perspectives on interorganizational
interaction and general use of terminology. A further difficulty is that both network and
collaboration literatures draw from organizational theory. One of the guiding questions
presented at the start of this literature review asked how different forms of
interorganizational or collective interaction can be distinguished from one another. The
analysis presented so far allows us to consider how “network” can be reconciled with the
continuum of interaction, focusing on collaboration first. This analysis will be reflected
upon again later, in the conclusions for the overall study.
Differentiating between collaboration and network is challenging: both concepts
share an intertwined development with significant interchange of terminology in the
literature (Börzel, 1998; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008). Similarly, the underpinning
paradigmatic and theoretical perspectives of both collaboration and networks overlap
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considerably. Networks can be defined and characterized by the same set of dimensions
presented in Table 2-7, however, additional characteristics are required, such as whether
connections are between different levels of government (federal, state, local),
organizational hierarchy (leadership, management, working level), sectors (private,
nonprofit, government), or policy domain (T. E. Hall & O'Toole, 2004). To distinguish
fully between network and collaboration concepts in a rigorous manner would require
another analysis of similar length to the present study; nevertheless, some key conceptual
overlaps can be observed. It should be noted that given the lack of synthesis of
collaboration and network perspectives in the literature, the following is primarily an
exercise in conceptual scoping; an effort to identify some basic conceptual similarities.
Recently, several reviews have summarized the literature from the perspective of
networks and presented several categories of approaches to network research (Borgatti &
Foster, 2003). In one approach, networks are viewed as structure: a framework of
connections between actors, either organizations or individuals, often in the context of a
particular policy domain such as water or climate policy (Ingold, 2011). Network
topology is examined as an explanatory variable in how actors, groups and the network
overall behaves (Coleman, 1990). Another approach emphasizes the connections between
network actors by focusing on the resources, both physical and social that flow within the
network, as an explanatory factor (Borgatti & Cross, 2003). In collaboration, or
interorganizational interaction more generally, both structural and connectionist
perspectives are important and are required as an intrinsic part of collaboration
frameworks and associated theory.
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It is possible to characterize the continuum of interorganizational interaction
covered in this chapter in terms of structural and connectionist network parameters, with
an important caveat. Given the inherent construction of interorganizational interaction
arrays, descriptors such as “coordination,” “cooperation” and “collaboration” cannot be
applied to networks in the same way as averaged network parameters such as centrality,
density or complexity. Interorganizational interaction arrays and the terms that they
define are applicable either from the perspective of a single actor (i.e. how any given
organization views dyadic relationships with other organizations), or generally to a
collectivity of first-degree network connections. They do not describe the general
behavior of a total network, and thus apply only to a specific part of a network—the part
engaging in collaboration, cooperation, or otherwise. Unfortunately, network scholars
often confuse this issue by using “collaborative network” to refer to both a group of first
degree connected network actors engaging in collaboration, and the broader web of nthdegree connected actors (For examples of this usage see: Agranoff, 2006; Rethemeyer,
2005; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008).
In any given policy domain, a “latent” (Heilman et al., 1994) or “serendipitous”
(Herranz, 2010b) network may be present in which actors with a variety of functional
specialties are connected via first, second and third degree ties, but without centralized
organizing forces such as formalized relationships or common problems. For any given
group of first-degree network actors, this state can be viewed as a lower level of
interorganizational interaction such as cooperation, where actors are not necessarily
“working together” but are in “informal networks” that exchange resources such as
information, without identifying common problems or losing independence (Isett et al.,
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2011). This situation is illustrated by the bottom cell in Figure 2-3. Structurally, this
situation is characterized by an average low centrality and density across the network.
If network actors begin to be affected by a common problem, the latent network
may “activate” to produce a higher degree of interaction such as coordination,
characterized by increasing formalization of relationships, more regular contacts,
involvement of leadership and some joint decision making. As the density and strength of
network ties increases, varieties of network governance emerge. Provan and Kenis (2008)
describe three different forms: participant, lead organization, and network organizationgovernance. Participant-governed networks do not have a separate governance entity, but
instead rely on decentralized and individual actors to coordinate collective action in small
groups in the network. In general, participants are equal in terms of power and are
connected by trust. This state corresponds to the level of coordination in Figure 2-3,
where structurally, the network is characterized by low centrality, but high density.
Lead organization network governance occurs when a single organization—often
a government department or nonprofit—acts as a decision focal point for the network.
Provan and Milward (1995), for example, describe the concept of “core agency
centrality,” in which a central government agency, a community mental health center in
their study, “coordinates” all services of actors in a network. While a lead organization
may provide overall network “coordination” as an output, they will likely engage in
collaboration with first-order network actors. This network state, characterized by high
centrality and high density corresponds with collaboration in Figure 2-3.
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Figure 2-3: Comparison of network types and levels of interaction
Level of
Interaction
Collaboration

Network
Characteristics

Pictoral Representation of Network

High centrality
High density (formal
and informal
connections)
Common problem
affecting all actors
Formalized
governance system
among first degree
network ties

Coordination

Low centrality
High density (mainly
informal
connections)
Common problem
affecting all actors
Informal governance
systems

Cooperation

Low centrality
Low density of
informal connections
Common problem may
affect all actors, but
no collective
approach is present

In certain cases, first degree network actors may decide to form an entirely new
organizational structure to govern the activities of the network, often called a “network
administration organization” (NAO) (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Saz-Carranza & Ospina,
2011). In terms of network structure, the NAO-governed network is analogous to the lead
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organization-governed network with high centrality and density, however, the NAO can
be interpreted as the maximum level of interorganizational interaction, which several
scholars define as “integration” (Gajda, 2004; NATO, 2010).
The concept of governance is especially important in the NAO-governed and lead
organization-governed networks that display collaborative activities, which echoes the
concern of governance in study of collaboration (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al.,
2012). Network scholars have created various qualifier terms to attach to “network” to
describe these states. Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 231) define “goal-directed” networks as
“three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only
their own goals but also a collective goal.” They contend that such networks require
centralized governance, whether by lead organization or NAO, to ensure that actors
“engage in collective and mutually supportive action, that conflict is addressed, and that
network resources are acquired and utilized efficiently and effectively” (231), in other
words, that collaboration occurs.
Similarly, Isett et al. (2011, p. 162) describe “formal networks” as “multiactor
arrangements explicitly constituted by public managers to produce and deliver public
services.” Formal networks are governed by a variety of formalized mechanisms
including contracts, legislation, memoranda of understanding, or joint agreements. In
descriptive terms, it is challenging to differentiate between a collaboration and a formal
network as described by Isett et al.
While collaboration can be used to describe a structural configuration of actors
bounded by a common problem situation, it is inherently a process. One possible way to
integrate collaboration and network terminology is to view collaboration as a process
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between a subset of first degree actors embedded in a network. Labeling networks as
“collaborative” as many scholars have done (Agranoff, 2006; Isett et al., 2011; Milward
& Provan, 2006) should be discouraged, as collaboration can only occur in a small subset
of a network (first degree ties) rather than more generally. If we permit the notion of
“collaborative networks,” then presumably “cooperative networks” or “coordinative
networks” should also be permitted: a terminological situation that could hardly be
described as parsimonious.
Terminology aside, collaboration and network literature draw identical findings
when considering the connectionist approach to network analysis. Certain features of
networks “generate” the conditions for collaboration recognized in the literature such as a
previous history of working relations or the development of trust between actors. As Isett
et al. (2011) note, in certain cases such as mandated interactions or emergency crisis
situations, collaboration can occur in the absence of a network, yet in most cases,
collaboration will have emerged from an existing network structure.
In conclusion, collaboration can be interpreted as an organization in a state of
organizing overlain on a network. In other words, collaboration occurs in a network, but
is not a characteristic of a network. As the level of interaction increases between network
actors and collective activity moves from cooperation to collaboration, organization
within the network becomes more defined, though not necessarily in terms of hierarchy.
The lead organization or NAO governance concepts described by Provan and Kenis
(2008), or the formal networks of Isett et al. (2011), reflect this increasing “organization”
at higher levels of interaction, exhibited in stronger governance mechanisms requiring
increased trust between participants. Lower down the level of interaction, the network is
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less centralized and dense. There is a pleasing symmetry with Scott’s (2003) definition of
organizations as consisting of social structure, participants, technology, goals and
environment. Cooperation in informal networks has all the elements in some form, with
the exception of a shared goal. At the other end of the spectrum, collaborations or leadorganization networks require shared goals, thus can be conceptually equated with an
organization.
Summary – Review of Frameworks and Arrays
This literature review focused on how interorganizational interaction can be
defined and conceptualized. The review highlighted the basic problems of defining
interaction terms, then analyzed two main bodies of literature in public administration:
frameworks, which emphasize input-process-outcome relationships and process
dynamics; and interorganizational interaction arrays—typologies of interorganizational
forms and scales or continuums of interaction—which describe specific construct and
operationalizations of collaboration and interorganizational interaction more generally. A
conclusion is drawn that while both literatures have strengths, the framework literature
fails to incorporate the importance of context, while the array literature may oversimplify
the true nature of interorganizational interaction. The review highlights the important
facets of each literature and demonstrates the complexity and challenge of developing
theory in this area.
The purpose was not to enumerate all the possible definitions and
conceptualizations, but to establish a “meta-theoretical” language that underlies the
various approaches in the literature. Using these tools and the various findings from the
review, the main subject of research can now be addressed.
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Development of an Interorganizational Interaction Array (IIA)
The overall purpose of this dissertation research is to investigate
conceptualizations and operationalizations of common states of interorganizational
interaction as described in the public administration literature, and to question the idea
that interaction states lie on a “continuum of interaction” as presented in Figure 2-4. This
requires the development and testing of an interorganizational interaction array
(hereafter, IIA) that conceptualizes and operationalizes states of interaction. While the
literature conceives of numerous possible conceptualizations of interaction states from
two to nine distinct levels (Frey et al., 2006), this research addresses the most prevalent in
the public administration literature, namely cooperation, coordination and collaboration.
However, while the public administration literature uses the terminology of cooperationcoordination-collaboration relatively consistently, there is still great variation in how the
constructs of those interaction levels are defined. This final section of this chapter derives
the interorganizational interaction array (IIA) used to test the research questions.
Figure 2-4: Example continuum of interaction

There are four research questions addressed in this dissertation:
1. To what extent can the levels of interaction corresponding to the
constructs of cooperation, coordination and collaboration be empirically
observed?
2. Are other constructs observed?
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3. Which dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array are most
important for predicting an organization’s level of interaction in a
multiorganizational interaction?
4. To what extent can dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array
be conceptualized as increasing along a continuum of interaction?
The first research question involves empirical testing of an IIA. The most
developed IIA to date in the literature is by McNamara (2008, 2012), which is used as a
starting point and refined based on findings from the literature review in this chapter. The
McNamara IIA is refined into a generalized interorganizational interaction array or
“GIIA.” The McNamara IIA—and the GIIA refinement—specify constructs of three
interorganizational interaction levels: cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. The
analysis will determine whether observed clusters correspond with the interaction levels
specified in the GIIA. In other words, will clusters corresponding to cooperation,
coordination and collaboration be empirically observed? If the public administration
literature is correct, then from a large sample of interorganizational interactions we would
expect to see clusters appear as in Figure 2-5. If, however, other interaction states are
possible, then we may see interaction states that do not correspond to the cooperation—
coordination—collaboration continuum, as presented in Figure 2-6. Such a finding would
call into the question the basic idea of a “continuum of interaction” that is so prevalent in
the literature.
The second research question involves analyzing the extent to which other
constructs of interaction levels emerge from the empirical data. In this case, an inductive
approach will be taken to allow clustering to emerge freely from the data. The third
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research question asks to what extent certain dimensions of the GIIA are important in
distinguishing clear constructs of interaction levels. Various sensitivity analysis
techniques will be employed to the clustering solutions obtained in both research
questions one and two. The final research question examines whether a “continuum of
interaction” exists by reviewing clustering of dimensional indicators for each
interorganizational interaction sampled.
This section is organized as follows. First McNamara’s IIA—the
“Multiorganizational Implementation Model” (MIM)—is described and evaluated.
Second, the conceptual lens for the study is presented, which places the MIM in a wider
systems context of interorganizational interaction. Finally, each dimension in the model
is described justified.
Figure 2-5: Expected clustering of interorganizational interactions assuming a continuum
of interaction
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Figure 2-6: Potential configuration of an interorganizational interaction departing from
the continuum

McNamara’s Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM)
The starting point for the MIM, development by McNamara (2008), was a model
developed in the health education literature by Intriligator (1994), called the
Interorganizational Arrangement Model (IAM). The IAM is not strictly a “model,” as
specified by the criteria earlier in this literature review, but in fact an IIA that describes
three levels of interaction (cooperative arrangement, coordinative arrangement, and
collaborative arrangement) in terms of 15 dimensions arranged in three constructs
(collaborative infrastructure, collaborative procedures, and collaborative leadership). The
IAM has been employed in several case studies such as Thatcher (2007), however, the
IAM was typically used as a framework of analysis for studying interorganizational
interactions, rather than as the specific focus of study.
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McNamara (2008) used the IAM as the basis for her dissertation work, and made
several refinements in accordance with findings from the policy implementation and
interorganizational literatures. The multiorganizational implementation model made some
improvements on the IAM including clarifying terminology, refining the
operationalizations of dimension, and organizing dimensions into constructs more
appropriate for interorganizational public administration literature. In McNamara’s study,
the MIM was the object of analysis, and was developed and tested in a single case study
of 15 federal and state agencies, local governments, and nongovernmental organizations,
implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. The MIM, which is displayed in
full in Appendix A, contends that four constructs impact the level of interaction between
organizations on the continuum of interaction between cooperation, coordination and
collaboration.
The interorganizational policy objective construct describes the collective policy
goal that organizations work together to achieve. Four dimensions are used to
operationalize this construct: time, difficulty, role of single organizations, and the
impetus for collective action (McNamara, 2008; Thatcher, 2007). The interorganizational
infrastructure construct describes the manner by which organizations structure and
formalize relationships in the interorganizational interaction. Five dimensions
operationalize this construct: design, the formality of the agreement, organizational
autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel (McNamara, 2008; Thatcher, 2007). The
interorganizational procedures construct describes the various procedures used to
support operations of the collective group and sustain interorganizational relationships
during collective action. Five dimensions are used to operationalize the construct:
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information sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues, resource allocation, and
systems thinking (McNamara, 2008; Thatcher, 2007). Finally, the organizational
management construct describes key factors which organizational management would
need to develop to support interorganizational relationships. This construct was originally
operationalized by five dimensions: incentives, commitment, trust, risk taking, and
willingness to change; however, after testing the MIM, the risk-taking dimension was
removed as it was not supported by empirical findings (McNamara, 2008; Thatcher,
2007).
While the MIM represents a good example of cumulative Theory development
and the most detailed IIA to date, several issues can be identified in the light of the
literature review on frameworks and IIAs carried out in the previous sections. The
following issues are addressed in the refinement of the MIM into a revised IIA called the
generalized interorganizational interaction array (GIIA), which will be the object of
testing in this dissertation to examine the research questions posed earlier.
First, the reason for the choice of the four MIM constructs (interorganizational
policy objective, infrastructure, and procedures, and organization management) is not
fully explained, nor are we sure about how to interpret the MIM in terms of interaction
process and the wider system context. The literature review in this chapter identifies that
a general deficiency in the way IIAs are formulated is their lack of ability to be set in a
wider systems context—a pitfall that the MIM has not avoided. Thus we are unsure of
how system-wide input and output variables could affect the MIM. One refinement to the
MIM, therefore, will be additional “input” variables that allow a better understanding of
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the impact of contextual and environmental factors, and better appreciation of the range
of applicability of the MIM.
Second, as the MIM is an incremental development from the IAM, the choice of
MIM constructs and dimensions is restricted by the original formulation of the IAM. As
the IAM has been employed successfully in several studies, this is not a major criticism,
but a review of other IIAs from the literature sheds light on alternative ways to
operationalize interaction states using different dimensions and indicators. A second
modification to the MIM, therefore, is refinement of dimensions through either deleting,
combining, separating out, or adding new dimensions, based on recent IIA literature
(Bedwell et al., 2012; Cross et al., 2009; D'Amour et al., 2008; Woodland & Hutton,
2012). Furthermore, the grouping of dimensions into the four constructs will be revisited,
using recent research on the internal processes of interorganizational interaction and
collaboration frameworks (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009).
Finally, while the MIM contains detailed operationalized indicators of the
dimensions, there is room for improvement. Some dimensions appear to have duplicate
indicators across levels, while others have highly composite descriptions or rely on
particulars combination with indicators of other dimensions, rather than unique
indicators.
At the end of this process of refinement, a new version of the MIM is produced,
which is named the Generalized Interorganizational Interaction Array (GIIA). Note that
that McNamara’s original work sought to use the MIM to recast the top-down / bottomup debate in the policy implementation literature, hence the “I” stands for the
“implementation,” and her empirical case study focused on an implementation setting. I
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choose the more general term “interaction,” to allow the GIIA to apply to other purposes
of collective action such as policy formulation or joint evaluations (Andersen &
Broegaard, 2012; Beck & Buchanan-Smith, 2008; OECD, 2005). The process to move
from the MIM to the GIIA is described in Table 2-10. The final version of the GIIA is
presented at the end of this chapter in Table 2-11.
Table 2-10: Derivation process of the GIIA
Analysis Process

Description

Selection of
Interorganizational
Interaction Arrays
(IIA)

The process began with McNamara (2008; 2012), which is the greatest effort to
date to develop an IIA. This study was based on three main sources (Thatcher
2007; Keast et al 2007; and Mandell et al 2003). Reference lists were consulted
from these sources, in addition to the wider literature review in Chapter 2.
A review process gathered a core set of IIA, and eliminated duplications from the
list. The process overall was cross-checked with the original dissertation
literature review, described in Table 2-1.

Define dimensions

The core set of IIAs were transcribed into Excel tables and each dimension
defined. In some cases, authors provided their own definitions of dimensions,
in other cases they did not and definitions had to be inferred from the article.
This is identified by noting [*Author* Definition] or [Inferred Definition] in
each dimension.

Construct analysis

The four constructs from the McNamara IIA were reviewed in light on the more
recent literature on interorganizational interaction (namely Thomson et al.,
2009; Emerson et al., 2012; Ansel and Gash, 2007). Several of the original
McNamara constructs could be revised, and additional constructs added.
While this change has little effect on the way in which interaction levels are
defined, it may be important during the analysis phase when necessary and
sufficient conditions for levels of interaction are identified.

Dimensional analysis

The set of IIA were reviewed to identify, in particular, contextual dimensions
that were omitted in the original McNamara IIA. This is important because
many other IIAs use contextual dimensions as part of the definition of
interaction levels.

Modification of
dimensions

In many cases, IIA dimensions described more than one component of an
organization or interorganizational form. Such dimensions were decomposed
into two or more new dimensions, and dimensional indicators were adjusted as
necessary.
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Analysis Process

Description

Modification of
interaction levels

Many of the IIAs reviewed used more than three levels of interaction. As the
purpose of the dissertation research is to examine primarily the three level
continuum, IIAs with greater than three levels were inspected to determine if
they could be 'collapsed' into three levels. This process was aided by the
dimensional decomposition stage.
Three criteria showed that interaction levels could be collapsed: first, dimensions
with duplicate indicators across levels; second, dimensions with composite
descriptions; third, dimensional indicators relying on a particular combination
with indicators of other dimensions, rather than unique indicators.

Classification of
dimensions

Dimensions were classified into 3 categories:
1) Contextual dimensions: Antecedent factors, inputs or outcomes that belong to,
or originate directly from, the surrounding context or environment in which the
interorganizational interaction is set.
2) Organizational dimensions: Factors relating to structural or behavioral aspects
of participating organizations, understood in a conventional “rational”
perspective with boundaries defined by the hierarchical structure.
3) Interorganizational dimensions: Factors that emerge out of the interaction, and
are not something that can be measured meaningfully in the participating
organizations.

Refinement from
survey instrument
development

A final set of refinements were made during the process of operationalizing the
GIIA into a survey instrument. This process revealed areas in which the
understandability of wording was challenging, and where indicators were not
mutually exclusive.

Conceptual Lens for Refinement of MIM
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a downfall of the IIA approach is its inability
to link to wider systems contexts and dynamic, adaptive processes. An IIA shows
“snapshots” of particular interaction states. Using the findings from the systems
framework and IIA literature, an approach to reformulating the MIM is presented: first
focusing on the system nature of frameworks, and second on the specific “black box”
processes of interorganizational interaction.
The framework literature shows, in general, that interorganizational interactions
are set in complex adaptive systems. Input conditions drive interaction processes that
produce outcomes, which then change the original system state and lead to positive or
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negative feedback, such as reinforcing trust between participants as a result of stable
institutions of interaction (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012). The original MIM
describes how four constructs determine the position on the continuum of interaction, but
does not provide any rationale for the choice of these constructs or how they should link
to the wider system context. Using Emerson et al., (2012) as guide, the MIM—or the
reformulated GIIA—can be placed in the center of the “collaborative3 governance
regime,” thus showing how the GIIA constructs link in systems terms. For example, as
shown in Figure 2-7, the Interorganizational Policy Objective construct spans the
“system context” area, the “inputs” box and the “process box” to show that it shares
elements with these three components as described by Emerson et al. (2012).
The implication of this simple linkage is to justify inclusion of more contextual
variables in the GIIA, as the framework literature demonstrates the importance of
contextual variables on the interorganizational interactive process. In terms of the level of
interaction and IIA literature, however, there is logical ground for avoiding using
contextual variables as necessary components of a defining interaction states. This
underlines the importance of empirical testing of contextual variables on the observed
levels of dimensions in interorganizational interactions. If inclusion of contextual
variables allow interaction states to be discerned, then this shows convergence between
the framework and IIA literature and support the utility of the idea of a continuum of
interaction. If, however, discernable interaction states cannot be observed with the
inclusion of contextual variables, then this shows that the continuum of interaction is not

3

While Emerson et al. use the term “collaboration,” their framework is much broader that the definition of
collaboration presented in the GIIA and thus can apply across the continuum of interaction.
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meaningful, as variation across dimensions in any interorganizational interaction process
is strongly context-dependent.
The second part of the conceptual lens looks inside the interorganizational
interaction process. In recent work, Thomson (2001); Thomson and Perry (2006);
Thomson et al. (2009) undertook a major effort to go inside the “black box” of
collaborative process, and from an empirical survey of over 400 organizations, defined a
higher-level construct of collaboration. The construct, however, is arguably broader than
just collaboration and most likely covered lower level states of interaction. The higherorder construct is composed of five higher-level (latent) factors: governance,
administration, mutuality, norms of trust and reciprocity, and autonomy. Thomson
contends that these five factors constitute the interorganizational interactive process.
Figure 2-7: GIIA constructs (ovals) overlain on a systems framework (rectangles)
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A review at the indicator level of both the MIM and Thomson’s construct show
that there is significant overlap between dimensions, thus allowing some of the original
MIM constructs to be recast in terms of the Thomson factors (lower level constructs). As
the MIM constructs and dimensions were reformulated, not all MIM constructs were
required to be recast. For example, the interorganizational infrastructure and
interorganizational procedure construct definitions of the MIM strongly overlap with the
governance and administration factors in the Thomson construct, thus there is no
requirement to change them. Some of the lower level operationalizations, however, were
rearranged. The major difference between the MIM and the GIIA at the construct level is
the inclusion of norms of trust and reciprocity, and organizational autonomy, as separate
constructs. The purpose of this change is to ensure closer consistency with the current
interorganizational interaction literature.
The Generalized Interorganizational Interaction Array (GIIA)
In this section, the constructs and dimensions of the GIIA are defined. While
grouping the dimensions into constructs is primarily for organizing purposes, both
McNamara (2008) and Intriligator (1994) believed that each construct would
independently impact the level of interorganizational interaction. A similar finding was
replicated by Thomson (2001), who found five independent constructs. Identifying
separate constructs will facilitate further empirical testing focusing on individual
constructs.
Constructs consist of one or more dimensions, which form the main objects of the
analysis in the research. Each dimension is assigned a label of contextual, organizational,
or interorganizational. Contextual dimensions are not properties of the organization or
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interorganizational interaction, but instead relate to the context or environment in which
the interorganizational interaction occurs. Organizational dimensions refer to properties
of the organization or an organizational perspective on the interaction. Interorganizational
dimensions refer to the emergent properties of the interorganizational interaction; such
properties cannot exist independently in a single organization. These dimension labels are
not variables in the analysis process, but will help in the interpretation of results.
Interorganizational policy objective construct
The interorganizational policy objective construct characterizes the external
system conditions in which the multiorganizational interaction is set. While McNamara
(2008) limited this construct to the policy goal that organizations work together to
achieve, the GIIA broadens the construct to include the wider systems variables that
affect the policy goal. The dimensions in this construct are defined as follows; their
category (contextual, organizational, or interorganizational) is given in brackets after the
name:
Purpose of interorganizational interaction. (Contextual). The overall purpose
of the interorganizational interaction. This dimension is adapted from Mandell &
Steelman (2003) and Keast et al. (2007).
Time. (Contextual). The length of time that the interorganizational interaction is
expected to work together to accomplish the policy objective. This definition is adapted
from McNamara (2008).
Difficulty. (Contextual). The complexity of tasks that the interorganizational
interaction undertakes to accomplish the policy objective. This definition is adapted from
McNamara (2008).
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Role of single organization. (Contextual). The roles individual organizations
assume to accomplish the policy objective (McNamara, 2008)
Impetus for collective action. (Contextual). The reason for developing the
interorganizational interaction and the way in which it was developed. This dimension is
adapted from McNamara (2008).
Numbers of participating organizations. (Contextual). The number of
organizations with first degree network ties participating in the interorganizational
interaction. The inclusion of this dimension is justified from recent research indicating
that the complexity—and thus governability—of an interorganizational interaction is
affected by the number of direct participants (T. Scott & Thomas, 2013). It is important
to distinguish cases where organizations involved in a partnership do not actually interact
at all. This is the reason for the level of interaction called "deconfliction" in Williams
(2010) where organizations are simply aware of one another rather than directly
interacting. This dimension should capture first-degree network ties only, which relates to
the choice of unit for the study (interorganizational-organizational dyad).
Category of participating organizations. (Contextual). The sector and/or type of
organization: federal government, state government, local government, international
organization, intergovernmental organization, nongovernmental organization, private
sector, academia, think tank, and so forth. The inclusion of this dimension is warranted
by observations that the type of organization may affect the governance and
administrative procedures of the interorganizational interaction (Ansel & Gash, 2007;
Thomson, 2001).
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Organizational management construct
This construct describes key factors which organizational management would
need to develop to support interorganizational relationships. In the original McNamara
(2008) MIM this construct included the additional dimensions of “commitment” and
“willingness to change,” however, they were removed in the GIIA as they overlapped
considerably with other dimensions. “Trust” was also included in the MIM, however, this
was separated out into its own construct. The dimensions are as follows:
History of previous interaction in the problem domain. (Contextual). The
extent to which organizations and participants from those organization have worked
previously together on other projects in the problem domain. This dimension is included
as previous history of working together is indicated as predictor of effective interaction in
the future (Bronstein, 2003; Bryson et al., 2006; Simo, 2009). This definition adapted
from Mattesich et al. (2001).
Participant's Problem Orientation. (Organizational). This dimension reflects
the degree to which members of interorganizational interaction view the problem from a
shared or individual perspective. This has to do with members' values and perceptions.
This dimension is adapted from Mandell & Steelman (2003).
Resource allocation. (Organizational). The contributions allocated by individual
organizations to the interorganizational interaction in support of the policy objective. This
dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008).
Incentives. (Organizational). The intrinsic and extrinsic rewards provided to
individuals and participating organizations to encourage support for the
interorganizational interaction. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008).
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Interorganizational infrastructure construct
This construct captures the manner by which organizations structure and
formalize relationships in the interorganizational interaction. In the original MIM, this
construct included the dimension “autonomy,” which is separated out in the GIIA into a
new construct. Another dimension, “policy authority” was deleted due to overlaps with
other dimensions. The dimensions of this construct are as follows.
Time to establish multiorganizational arrangement. (Contextual). The length
of time, relative to the time for implementation of the interaction, that the partnership
takes to establish. This dimension is adapted from Keast et al. (2007).
Key personnel. (Organizational). Personnel who are responsible for bringing
together and implementing the interorganizational interaction. This dimension is adapted
from McNamara (2008).
Orientation of policy objective. (Interorganizational). The agreed and
comprehensive nature of goals between interacting organizations. This dimension is
adapted from D'Amour et al. (2008).
Design. (Interorganizational). The administrative structure emerging from the
interorganizational interaction. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008).
Formality of the agreement. (Interorganizational). The way in which individual
organizations agree on their roles and responsibilities within the interorganizational
interaction. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008).
Interorganizational procedures construct
This construct describes the various features that emerge out of the
interorganizational interaction, namely information sharing and communications,
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decision making and conflict resolution processes. In the original MIM, this construct
contained dimension such as “systems thinking” and “resource allocation.” Systems
thinking was deleted due to strong overlap with the “information sharing and
communication” dimension, and “resource allocation” was moved to the organizational
management construct. The dimensions in this construct are as follows:
Information sharing and communications. (Interorganizational). The ways in
which personnel within the interorganizational interaction use information and
communication processes to attain the policy objective. This dimension is adapted from
McNamara (2008).
Decision making. (Interorganizational). The ways in which the organizations
within the interorganizational interaction make implementation decisions pertaining to
the policy objective. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008).
Resolution of turf issues. (Interorganizational). The process used for solving
conflicts between organizations within the interorganizational interaction. This dimension
is adapted from McNamara (2008).
Organizational autonomy construct
This construct is composed of a single dimension (organizational) in the GIIA and
is defined as the degree to which each partnering organization independently operates, in
terms of the extent that their operating procedures and policies are adapted by the
interorganizational interaction, and the extent of authority given to the interorganizational
interaction to develop policies that guide operations of the collective. This dimension is
adapted from McNamara (2008). McNamara originally had this dimension as part of the
interorganizational infrastructure construct, however, Thomson (2001) found evidence

108
that it existed as an independent factor, which supported other theoretical perspectives
concerning the tension between individual and collective interests in interorganizational
relationships (Wood & Gray, 1991).
Norms of trust and reciprocity construct
This construct consists of one dimension (organizational) defined as the extent to
which trustworthy relationships between organizations within the interorganizational
interaction are built. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008). As explained in
the earlier review of framework literature, this dimension is separated out into its own
construct because it is a fundamental component underlying the mechanisms of the
development of interorganizational relationships (Ostrom, 1990).

Table 2-11: The Generalized Interorganizational Interaction Array (GIIA)
Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Purpose of
Interorganizational
interaction

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The overall purpose of the
interorganizational
interaction [Adapted from
Mandell & Steelman
(2003), and Keast et al.
(2007)]

Create an informal network
of communication among
stakeholders

Joint work with other
organizations to ensure
tasks are done

Share material, personnel or
financial resources to
address common issues

Generate support for an
initiative

Leverage or raise money

Commit for a year or more
to achieve short- and
long-term outcomes

To explore interests

Organizations remain
autonomous but support
something new
To reach predetermined
mutual goals together

Time

Difficulty

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

Context

The length of time that the
interorganizational
interaction is expected to
work together to
accomplish the policy
objective [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Short-term

The complexity of tasks
that the
interorganizational
interaction undertakes to
accomplish the policy
objective [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Simple tasks that are low in
number, very similar,
known and clearly
defined, independent
from each other, routine,
agreed by all participants

Longer-term

Create institutional and
system change in a policy
area
Long-term, evolutionary
nature
Indefinite duration

Multifaceted tasks
Repeatable

Complex tasks that are high
in number, very different,
ambiguous and
undefined,
interdependent, irregular,
highly contested by
participants, or
Situations of crisis
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Role of single
organization

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The roles individual
organizations assume to
accomplish the policy
objective [McNamara,
2008]

Organizations are
independent; it is possible
for them to accomplish
the objective individually

Organizations require some
assistance from other
organizations to
accomplish the policy
objective

No organization can
achieve the objective
independently;
organizations are
interdependent; each
organization is one
element of the larger
system

Numbers of
participating
organizations

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The number of
organizations with first
degree network ties
participating in the
interorganizational
interaction [Author
definition]

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Impetus for
collective action

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The reason for developing
the interorganizational
interaction and the way in
which it was developed
[modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Typically voluntary
(initiated by working
level staff)

Voluntary, or mandated
(directly tasked by a
higher authority or law to
participate, or where not
participating would result
in either severe loss of
reputation or an inability
to meet organization
goals)

Voluntary (initiated by
senior leadership or
management) or
mandated (directly tasked
by a higher authority or
law to participate, or
where not participating
would result in either
severe loss of reputation
or an inability to meet
organization goals)

Organizations initiate
collective action because
it is helpful to their world
of work and it builds
capacity that serves the
individual organization

Linkages are mobilized
because compatible
mission areas mutually
increase abilities to
achieve same goal
An interagency liaison or
boundary spanner may
forge these relationships
to meet resource needs or
shared interests
Legislative mandate or
grant contracts may
enhance cohesion or
minimize duplication

Organizations with mutual
or complementary
interests come together
because they cannot
achieve the desired goal
or address the identified
problem without working
together
Organizations share
responsibility for tasks
that are connected or
cannot be accomplished
individually
A lead agency or convening
organization brings
relevant stakeholders
together and legitimizes
collective action
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Category of
participating
organizations

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The sector and/or type of
organization: federal
government, state
government, local
government, international
organization,
intergovernmental
organization,
nongovernmental
organization, private
sector, academia, think
tank, etc.

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

History of previous
interaction in the
problem domain

Organizational
Management

Context

The extent to which
organizations and
participants from those
organization have worked
previously together on
other projects in the
problem domain
[definition adapted from
Mattesich et al., 2001]

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Participant's
Problem
Orientation

Organizational
Management

Org

Reflects the degree to
which the members view
the problem from a
shared or individual
perspective. This has to
do with members' values
and perceptions [Mandell
& Steelman, 2003]

Mainly individual
perspectives dominate

Individual and shared
perspectives coexist

Mainly shared perspectives
dominate
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Resource allocation

Organizational
Management

Org

The contributions allocated
by individual
organizations to the
interorganizational
interaction in support of
the policy objective
[modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Organization's discretionary
funds may be used to
contribute to the
collective action, in the
pursuit of individual
goals

Organizations exchange
resources to increase each
organization's abilities to
achieve individual goals;
the time and expertise of
personnel is the main
resource shared

Pooled resources; allocation
is based on balancing
evolving needs of the
collective group with
individual constraints

Resources are not pooled,
information is the main
resource that is shared
Staff contribute to the
interorganizational
interaction outside of
their regular duties

Partner organizations
allocate resources from
core operating/annual
budgets to finance
collective action
Mandates or grant
arrangements may
provide resources
Resource needs may be
satisfied by a preexisting
program within an
individual organization;
staff contribute to the
interorganizational
interaction as part of
ongoing projects internal
to their organization that
are leveraged for the
benefit of the group

Organizational resources
are allocated to support
the activities of the
collective unit
Independent operating
budget, based on shared
financial contributions,
may be established for
collective action
Staff contribution to the
interorganizational
interaction is considered
as part of their regular
duties
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Incentives

Organizational
Management

Org

The intrinsic and extrinsic
rewards provided to
individuals and
participating
organizations to
encourage support for the
interorganizational
interaction [modified
from McNamara, 2008]

Opportunities for
synergistic benefits are
realized based on the
desire to avoid negative
impacts resulting from
changes in external
factors

Grant contracts may
provide funding or
resource incentives to
support the collective
effort

Incentives are provided by
the collective group and
individual organizations
to encourage individuals
to stay involved in the
collective effort

Time to establish
multiorganizational
arrangement

Interorg.
Infrastructure

Context

The length of time, relative
to the time for
implementation of the
interaction, that the
partnership takes to
establish. [Inferred from
Keast et al., 2007]

Staff involved receive
intrinsic rewards from
participation in the
interaction

Short term

Leaders identify benefits in
working together and
emphasize the importance
of these benefits to
subordinates
Staff involved receive
intrinsic and extrinsic
rewards from
participation in the
interaction
Medium term

Leadership and staff in
participating
organizations receive
extrinsic rewards for
participation in collective
action
Staff responsibilities begin
to change based on
participation in collective
action
Longer term
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Key personnel

Interorg.
Infrastructure

Org

Personnel who are
responsible for bringing
together and
implementing the
interorganizational
interaction [Modified
McNamara, 2008]

Organizational leadership is
not involved in decisions
to work together

Leadership establish
commitment by stressing
the importance of
collective action

Although no one is
typically in charge, a lead
organization may propose
policies/rules to which
the collective group must
mutually agree to
implement

Interaction occurs through
lower levels of
organizations

Mid-level management
implement and administer
organization's
involvement in
interaction
A facilitator may be
identified to coordinate
actions at the local level

Organizational leadership is
openly supportive AND
is involved in planning
contributions to the
interorganizational
interaction
Membership, role
definitions, and
responsibilities adapt to
the task at hand
Each role is considered
equally important

Orientation of
policy objective
(Goals)

Interorg.
Infrastructure

Interorg

The agreed and
comprehensive nature of
goals between interacting
organizations [Adapted
from D'Amour et al.,
2008]

Conflicting goals or
absence of shared goals

Some shared goals, in
addition to individual
organizational goals

Shared goals agreed
between all participants
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Design

Interorg.
Infrastructure

Interorg

The administrative structure
emerging from the
interorganizational
interaction [Modified
McNamara, 2008]

Individuals work
independently within
existing organizational
structures, without
changes to their job
description or
administrative procedure
(rules, policies, hierarchy)

Each organization's
hierarchical structure is
used to centrally manage
specialized roles and
responsibilities relating to
interorganizational
interaction

Partner organizations
jointly develop shared
power arrangements to
support mutually
beneficial interests, by
creating new governance
structures such as
leadership boards or
executive steering
committees

An organization's
centralized control of
participation in the
interorganizational
interaction may involve
reorganization or
consolidation of
programs/activities

New program structures
(within each
organization) are
developed based on the
needs of a specific
policy/goal
An administrative staff
element is present to
sustain collective efforts.
This staff may work full
time on the interaction,
either virtually, through
regular meetings, or in a
co-located office
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Formality of the
agreement

Interorg.
Infrastructure

Interorg

The way in which
individual organizations
agree on their roles and
responsibilities within the
interorganizational
interaction [modified
from McNamara, 2008]

Individual organizations
informally agree to work
together to achieve
individual or mutuallybeneficial goals

Mechanisms, such as
contractual or
nonfinancial agreements,
formalize relationships
between organizations

Key stakeholders, often
leadership, jointly draft a
shared purpose and
develop a course of action
based on mutually agreed
upon roles and
responsibilities, rules,
goals, and organizational
members

Information sharing
and
communications

Interorg.
Procedures

Interorg

The ways in which
personnel within the
interorganizational
interaction use
information and
communication processes
to attain the policy
objective [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Agreements, clearly
identifying each
organization's roles and
responsibilities, are often
developed and/or
reviewed by a higher
authority

Information is shared
through informal
channels and
relationships between
participants (e.g. staff
email)

Formalized agreements are
supported by extensive
informal agreements
between interacting staff
members

Formal (official documents)
and informal
communication channels
are used

Open and frequent
communication through
formal and informal
channels

Interorganizational
communication is
formalized, with staff
given mandate to share
information

Interorganizational
communication is
institutionalized in
organizational policies
and processes (e.g. policy
requirements to share
information with partner
organizations)

Formalized
communications
infrastructures begin to
develop (group email
lists, shared web-based
information repositories
etc.)
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Understanding enhanced by
a willingness to share
information about
individual organizations
and what can/cannot be
offered to the collective
group

Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Decision making

Interorg.
Procedures

Interorg

The ways in which the
organizations within the
interorganizational
interaction make
implementation decisions
pertaining to the policy
objective [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Decisions are made
independently by each
organization; rules that
guide collective decision
making are not necessary

Centralized decision
making is practiced; a
lead organization(s)
dominates the decision
making process

Participative decision
making based on
consensus and
compromise; generates
rules to govern activities
and relationships between
organizations

Senior leadership may
conduct collective
decision making about
the interorganizational
interaction

Organizational
representatives have
latitude to negotiate rules
and deliberate agreements
to identify common
ground
Joint decision making
occurs at all levels of
organization

Resolution of turf
issues

Interorg.
Procedures

Interorg

The process used for
solving conflicts between
organizations within the
interorganizational
interaction [modified
from McNamara, 2008]

Turf issues between
participating
organizations are avoided
based on organizational
tendencies to function
independently

A neutral facilitator, outside
convener, or full-time
coordinator is employed
to resolve turf issues

Conflicting roles based on
incongruent demands
from individual
organization and group
A formalized conflict
resolution process occur
to adjust policies and
procedures to reduce
conflict while
maximizing common
ground
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Cooperation

Coordination

Collaboration

Organizational
autonomy

Autonomy

Org

The degree to which each
partnering organization
independently operates,
in terms of the extent that
their operating procedures
and policies are adapted
by the interorganizational
interaction, and the extent
of authority given to the
collective to develop
policies that guide
operations of the
collective. [Modified
from McNamara, 2008]

Organizations are fully
autonomous

Organizations are semiautonomous;

Organizations are not
autonomous;

No interorganizational
policy decisions are
made; policies to govern
the collective
arrangement are not
developed

Organizations maintain
individual authority over
the policies that govern
their respective
organizations

Partner organizations
jointly develop policies
and procedures that
govern the collective
arrangement

Policies pertaining to the
collective arrangement
may be developed by
higher authorities, but
they are compatible with
the policies already
established within the
individual organizations

Interorganizational policies
and procedures include
working rules that specify
which stakeholders can
make decisions, who will
guide collective actions,
and the distribution of
cost/benefits

The extent to which
trustworthy relationships
between organizations
within the
interorganizational
interaction are built
[modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Trust relationships are not
required

Leaders work closely to
create relationships based
on trust

Trust between
organizations is
necessary; in all levels of
staff

Trust

Norms of trust
and
reciprocity

Org

Preexisting policies,
established by the
individual organizations
are followed

Trust is based on reciprocal
behaviors

Partners reinforce trust in
each other by sharing
information through open
communication
A history of supportive
interactions sustains and
legitimizes relationships;
reciprocal trust is
institutionalized as a
norm
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CHAPTER 3:
METHODOLOGY

Chapter 1 presented an introduction to the research area, described the problem
statement, and provided justification for the importance of this dissertation research.
Chapter 2 reviewed relevant scholarship on interorganizational interaction in the social
sciences, emphasizing the public administration literature. The generalized
interorganizational interaction array (GIIA) was introduced as the object of analysis for
this research. This chapter recaps the research purpose and research questions, then
presents the research design, methodology, data collection and analysis, and finally
evaluates the limitations, reliability and validity of the study.

Research Purpose and Framework
Research Purpose
The overall purpose of this research is to investigate conceptualizations and
operationalizations of common states of interorganizational interaction as described in the
public administration literature. There are two specific objectives: 1) develop and
improve the interorganizational interaction array that conceptualizes and operationalizes
states of multiorganizational interaction (such as cooperation, coordination and
collaboration); and 2) test the interorganizational interaction array from a survey sample
of multiorganizational interactions to determine if interaction states can be empirically
observed and distinguished from one another.
Research Questions
There are four research questions addressed in this dissertation.
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1. To what extent can the levels of interaction corresponding to the
constructs of cooperation, coordination and collaboration be empirically
observed?
2. Are other constructs observed?
3. Which dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array are most
important for predicting an organization’s level of interaction in a
multiorganizational interaction?
4. To what extent can dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array
be conceptualized as increasing along a continuum of interaction?
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework for this study is a combination of a systems-based
framework derived from the “collaborative governance regime” of Emerson et al. (2012)
and precursor frameworks, and the interorganizational interaction array developed by
McNamara (2008). The systems framework implies that interorganizational interaction is
affected by inputs and leads to outcomes. The inputs (the “context” dimensions in the
GIIA) reflect the basic environment in which the interaction takes place, in addition to
certain characteristics about the policy problem that brought organizations together in the
first place. The outcomes are not the focus of this research, but several dimensions
capture basic indicators about impact of the interaction on participating organizations.
The interorganizational interaction array—the GIIA in this case—focuses on the
process of interorganizational interaction and can be considered as a way to take a
“snapshot” at a given time. The GIIA is located at the center of the systems framework
(as illustrated in Figure 2-7). The GIIA characterizes the level of interaction for any one
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particular organization involved in the interaction. Furthermore, the status of the inputs
affects the level of interaction, which in turn affects outcomes. In addition to observing
the levels of interaction from the sample, the research will also examine the relationship
between level of interactions and outcomes—a feature that is not well-studied in the
literature (Thomson et al., 2009).

Research Design
Research Philosophy
A key but often overlooked requirement in any research is to identify the
researcher’s assumptions and beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality and of
knowledge production, as these fundamentals dramatically affect the methodological
approach (Neuman, 2003; Raadschelders, 2011). Organizational scholars use many
possible theoretical and paradigmatic lenses to study and understand organizations
(Lincoln, 1985). Each lens focuses on very different elements of organizations and
incorporates very different explanatory frameworks.
This research begins by assuming an explicitly realist ontology, where an
objective reality “out there” can be discovered through empirical study. This reality is
relatively independent of the observer. The corresponding epistemological assumption is
that of researcher-object duality, in which the object of research is external to and free
from influence of the researcher (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). A counter-argument to this
position is that any interorganizational interaction is ultimately dependent upon
individual perceptions and transient common perspectives that are co-created through
interactions between members of the various organizations, implying that study of
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“objective” organizational elements is misleading (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Indeed, a
substantial body of knowledge examines organizations as socially constructed entities
and considers how individual perceptions are critical in how organizations operate and
how organizational reality is constructed (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Weick, 1995).
While there is reason to support this view (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), even basic
systematic study using a constructivist approach requires a consistent set of terminologies
and meanings to be established. The identified construct and terminology problems in the
public administration collaboration literature may result in disparities and ambiguities
being concealed by inconsistent and interchangeable terminology, thus preventing theory
building (Imperial, 2005). Furthermore, extensive research using institutionalist logic
tells us that individual perspectives are shaped greatly by objective structures such as
organizational design, policies, processes, resources and cultural rules (J. P. Olsen, 2007).
Thus understanding the phenomenon of interaction between organizations can
legitimately start by examining “objective” organizational structure.
Some may argue that objectivist and epistemological assumptions are akin to
“universal” values held by a researcher, which should apply to all areas of social inquiry.
Yet others suggest there are different levels of reality that lend themselves to different
approaches, and that depending on the type of understanding required, different
approaches are valid. As Gioia and Pitre (Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 587) observe:
Approaches to theory building that are grounded in appropriate paradigmatic
assumptions are better suited to the study of those organizational phenomena that
are consistent with such ground assumptions (e.g., attempts to describe the
efficacy of one production process over another are better represented by theories
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grounded in objectivist/functional assumptions, whereas attempts to describe the
social construction of cultural norms are better represented by theories rooted in
subjectivist/interpretive assumptions).
While there are many limitations to a functionalist approach, explored later in the
chapter, adopting this paradigm is key to the development of an interorganizational array,
which affirms that interorganizational interactions can be objectively described by
observable indicators.
These ontological and epistemological assumptions lead to a primarily
quantitative methodology using a web-based survey of individuals, representing their
organizations, involved in multiorganizational projects. This research is both
“exploratory” and “descriptive” in that it aims to explore the clustering of interaction
states and describe an empirical taxonomy of interaction terms (Bailey, 1994; Neuman,
2003).
Justification of Research Design
As highlighted in chapters 1 and 2, the basic research problem stems from the fact
that while the terminology of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration is widely used,
the underlying constructs to these terms are not well-specified. Furthermore, there are
few attempts in the literature to create rigorous construct definitions of these interaction
terms. An appropriate way to fill this knowledge gap is to conduct studies of multiple
different cases of interorganizational interaction and determine the extent to which
interaction states can be observed. While a qualitative research design using interviews
and document analysis would certainly lead to rich comparative data set, this approach is
very time consuming and cross-case comparison is challenging (Yin, 2009). A survey of
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approach offers the possibility to scrutinize interaction states across many hundreds of
samples thus supporting the search for generalized interorganizational interaction
constructs, providing attempts are made to ensure reliable and valid survey procedures.
Unit of Analysis
The “units of analysis” refers to the unit with which data are directly attached,
sometimes called the “level of measurement” (Hitt et al., 2007). In this research, the unit
is the interorganizational-organizational dyad (Graddy & Chen, 2009; Klein, Palmer, &
Conn, 2000). Typically, units of analysis are a whole organizational unit, a group, a
department in the organization, or an individual. In the case of interorganizational
relationships, however, defining standard units is challenging as a result of two problems
(Klein & Kozlowski, 2000).
The first problem is that for interorganizational relationships the extent to which a
boundary of an “interorganizational unit” can be defined depends on the type of research
problem. If the problem is simply to map structural connections, then a distinct boundary
could be drawn around an interorganizational unit. If, however, the research problem
considers how the collective unit operates, then typically different organizations are
likely to experience the interorganizational interaction in different ways. Thus we cannot
assume homogeneity across an interorganizational unit, without expecting some loss of
information when the characteristics of the collective unit—“supplied” by the
contributing organizations—are averaged across the group. Choosing the
interorganizational unit for unit of analysis would require that a fully representative
sample of all participating organizations is gathered—and then averaged for the
interorganizational unit. This implies that “level of interaction” is an averaged property of
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the collective unit. It is for this reason that the interorganizational-organizational dyad is
chosen, which allows for variations in level of participation across different
organizations. The implication of this choice is that placement along the continuum of
interaction is from each organization’s perspective.
The second problem is that with the exception of highly integrated levels of
interaction, individuals involved in interorganizational interactions are likely to be
representative of their organizations first, rather than the interorganizational unit. A
survey question outlined later, for example, tests the extent of “shared perspective,”
which captures the extent to which an individual (as representative of their organization)
takes an organizational view or a collective view. The implication is that
interorganizational research is dominated by the perspective of single organizations’
experiences in the interaction, rather than a collective view.
In the context of this research, the unit of analysis is neither the individual
organization nor the interorganizational unit; it is the “dyad,” which captures the
experience of the interaction from the perspective of one organization. As highlighted in
chapter 2, a full characterization of an interorganizational interaction relies on many
dimensions, some of which “belong” to the contributing organizations, and some of
which “emerge” from the interaction. The extent to which the emergent properties
appear, however, depends on the level of interaction. Thus if the unit was restricted to
either an organization or the interorganizational unit, attempting to study the level of
interaction across a large sample would result in loss of information. Table 3-1 captures
the various possible choices of unit and their implications on how “level of interaction” is
understood.
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Table 3-1: Implications of choice of units of analysis in interorganizational studies of
levels of interaction
Unit of Analysis

Implication for Level of
Interaction (LOI)

Implication for choice of sample and
inferences made

Interorganizational
unit

LOI is a property of the unit

Sample is unrestricted

Different LOIs across different
units can be directly compared

Averaged values of dimensions of the LOI
cannot be applied to individual
organizations; some dimensions of the
GIIA cannot be applied
Contextual dependencies need to be
controlled

Interorganizational
unit (with
restriction that all
organizations
operate at the
same level)

LOI is a property of the unit
LOIs across units can only be
compared if all organizations
across all units are at the same
LOI

Sample must be carefully designed to
stratify organizations across LOI, and to
ensure that all organizational
representatives refer to the same
timeframe (as features about the
interorganizational interaction may vary
significantly with time)
Averaged values of dimensions of the LOI
do apply directly to individual
organizations

Organizational unit

LOI is a property of the
organization
Emergent features of the
collective unit cannot be
analyzed

Interorganizationorganization dyad

LOI is a property of the
organization
Emergent features of the
collective unit can be analyzed,
with the caveat that they are
from the perspective of one
organization

Sample is unrestricted
Conclusions about LOI cannot be
generalized to interorganizational units

Sample is unrestricted
Conclusions about LOI can be generalized
to interorganizational units in some cases
(dimensions relating to emergent
properties)

A related problem that must be addressed in the survey instrument reliability and
validity, is that individuals represent their organization in the interorganizational
interaction. In some cases, only one individual from an organization is involved, in other
cases a team or several individuals from different departments are involved (Huxham &
Vangen, 2005). The implication is that attempting to collect data on an organization’s
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experience in the interorganizational interaction assumes that the individual is
representative of the whole organization and is able to answer a survey question as such.
Level of Analysis
The level of analysis at which inferences at the construct level are made is the
interorganizational field (Benson, 1975; Hjern & Porter, 1981; Warren, 1967), which
emphasizes relationships between organizations, rather than organizational or individual
attributes. Interorganizational interaction is an emergent phenomenon with a set of
characteristics distinct from the participating organizations and individuals. This is
analogous to the idea that the social network in which an individual is embedded—what
one might call the “inter-individual” field—can be characterized by emergent properties
such as centrality, complexity or differentiation, which are not attributes of an individual.
As a multilevel construct, however, interorganizational interaction features lower level
constructs at the structural and individual levels of analysis.
Research Approach
The research approach is a nonexperimental nonprobability quantitative design,
featuring self-administered survey-based data collection and employing clustering
analysis with follow on statistical testing to profile and validate cluster solutions. Cluster
analysis is a primarily exploratory procedure that identifies and creates classifications in
data, although it can be used in confirmatory approaches. Cluster analysis empirically
forms clusters of highly similar entities by maximizing within group similarity and
minimizing between group similarity (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Follow on
statistical testing can then determine if cluster membership predicts certain dependent
variables not used to create the clusters, or to compare the means of variables used in the
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solutions (Romesburg, 2004). Cluster analysis relies heavily upon researcher
interpretation of the clusters and inspection of the original underlying data. As such,
cluster solutions are strongly dependent on dimensions used to calculate similarity
measures and the data set (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006).
The selected sample was surveyed using the instrument described below. The
objective of the survey was to rate—across the dimensions specified in the GIIA—a
sample of organizations’ experiences in participating in an interorganizational interaction.
Cluster analysis grouped similar cases with the aim to determine if clustered groups
exhibited averaged dimensional values that correspond to the three-level of interaction
description in the GIIA. A second analysis allowed a range of cluster solutions to emerge
freely to determine of other possible forms of interaction are possible, outside the
expected cooperation-coordination-collaboration scale. ANOVA and MANOVA tests
checked the criterion and predictive validity of cluster solutions by profiling clusters
against continuous and interval data variables not used in the cluster solutions. Chisquare tests conducted similar profiling using nominal variables. Finally, multiple
discriminant analysis further examined cluster distinctiveness and evaluated which
dimensions had the greatest impact on cluster membership.

Research Methods
In this section, the research methods are presented. First, the survey instrument is
described and operationalization of GIIA dimensions into survey items is explained.
Second, the data selection and collection is described. Finally, the data analysis
procedures are explained. Reliability and validity issues are addressed at each stage and
summarized in the last section of this chapter.
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Overview of Survey Instrument
The survey instrument contained 35 questions including three open response
questions and 32 closed response questions using a mixture of Likert scales, multiple
choice and forced choice. The survey opened with the necessary statements about
informed consent, followed by instructions to the respondent to answer all questions from
an organizational perspective rather than their own individual perspective, in order to be
consistent with the interorganizational-organizational unit of analysis. Furthermore,
respondents were asked to answer all survey questions with the same familiar
multiorganizational interaction in mind, in which their organization participated in the
past five years. The time criteria was given to reduce bias caused by variations in the
effects of information communications technology (such as virtual meetings, social
media etc.) on interorganizational interaction (Madlberger & Roztocki, 2009; Sanders,
2007; Vaccaro, Parente, & Veloso, 2010).
The survey was “self-administered” using a commercially available online
software package, Questions Pro. Online surveys solicited by email are a preferable
choice over mailed surveys due to the convenience, multinational sample of respondents,
and to facilitate ease of data capture and analysis (Ritter & Sue, 2007a). There were no
foreseen issues with respondents’ accessibility to computers (Fowler, 2009). The use of
professional software also ensures that the questionnaire is well-designed and presented
and confirms to recognized best practice (Ritter & Sue, 2007b). The survey required
users to answer all items on the page in order to proceed. The survey closed with a final
open question asking respondents to give any further information they feel relevant, and
then thanked respondents for their time and gave contact information for the researchers.
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Only limited data about the organization and multiorganizational interaction was
collected to comply with confidentiality requirements. Limited demographic data
(gender, nationality, years of professional experience) was collected to check the sample
for response biases. No email tracking or IP address data was collected to ensure that
questionnaire responses are not attributable back to respondents.
The questions was organized in terms of constructs and dimensions of the GIIA,
although this was not apparent to the respondent. Where possible, responses were
randomized in the order that they appear on the screen to minimize primary bias (picking
earlier options first), learning bias (e.g. realizing that responses matching “collaboration”
go together), and fatigue bias (not fully reading the entire responses) (Choi & Pak, 2005).
A full description of the survey is presented in Appendix A.
Survey instrument development process
Start point – GIIA. The first stage of survey development began with the GIIA
framework developed as part of chapter 2. The GIIA is the object of analysis for the
research and the primary objective of the survey instrument is to test the GIIA.
Literature search for previously developed scales. The second stage involved a
literature search for previously developed scales. In most cases these were already
attained in the chapter 2 review, but some scales required additional searches. The
primary materials gathered included the following:


A 56-item collaboration survey developed by Thomson (2001), of which 17 items
were determined to be valid. Five additional “outcome” items were also included.
The 17-item collaboration survey plus the five outcome items were used by
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Thomson et al. (2008) and Chen (2008, 2010), and were shown to be reliable in
those cases.


A 45-item scale developed by Fleishman (2009) assessing the motivations for
collaboration.



The 40-item “Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory” developed by Mattessich
et al. (2001) to assess factors contributing to the success of collaborative groups.



The 45-item “Interorganizational Arrangement Model Partnership Survey”
developed by Intriligator (1994) and used by Thatcher (2007).



A 26-item “Team Collaboration Assessment Rubric” developed by Woodland and
Hutton (2012).



A 32-item survey developed by Alter and Hage (1993) developed to study
interorganizational networks.



An interview protocol developed by McNamara (2008) in development of her
Multiorganizational Implementation Model—the precursor to the GIIA.



An interview protocol developed by D’Amour et al. (2008) to construct a
typology of collaboration between professionals in healthcare organizations.



An interview protocol development by Gajda and Koliba (2007) to evaluate
interorganizational collaboration.
The surveys and interview protocols above feature a mix of organizational-unit

and individual-unit data items, and are not uniform with respect to their use of
terminology such as collaboration. Appropriate care was taken when the surveys and
interviews were reviewed and compared with the GIIA to determine any opportunities to
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use the previously developed items. The results of this matching are explained in the
following main section.
Turn GIIA dimensional indicators into questions. The next stage involved
systematically moving through the GIIA and either using a pre-existing item or creating a
new question based on the dimensional indicators in the GIIA. In some cases, more than
one item is used for each dimensional indicator for reliability and validity purposes. An
unintended benefit of this process was additional refinements to the GIIA, as the process
of trying to turn the GIIA into a survey revealed areas of ambiguity. In some cases, the
dimensions of the GIIA were not mutually exclusive and overlapped. Either the
dimensions were refined, or the opportunity was used to eliminate a survey question as
the information for that dimension was already captured elsewhere. A detailed mapping
of GIIA dimensional indicator to survey item was produced, to facilitate post-survey
analysis.
Distribute first draft of survey. A first draft of the survey was given to
dissertation committee members who made recommendations for changes. Several
rounds of corrections and revisions occurred.
Develop into Question Pro survey. Once a final draft was agreed by the
dissertation committee, the survey was entered into the Question Pro software and tested
several times.
Pilot testing. While the survey contains some previously tested items, much of
the content is new. For this reason a pilot testing process was necessary. Several personal
connections, family members, faculty, and fellow PhD students were recruited to pilot
test the survey. The subjects recruited all had either relevant experience working in an
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organization and/or relevant theoretical knowledge in the field of collaboration or
organizational science. Their responses are not included in the main analysis of this
dissertation. The pilot testing consisted of three stages.


Stage 1: The survey was sent to 20 subjects with a deadline for completion and
some basic instructions and explanation about the project in the email.



Stage 2: Within one week of taking the survey, five subjects were interviewed for
one to two hours about their experience of taking the survey and any
misunderstandings in wording was discussed. Subjects were offered a paid meal
or beverage, depending on the time of day and location.



Stage 3: Five subjects were sent the revised survey and questioned about the
improvements made. The dissertation committee also made several
recommendations for changes at this stage.
Submission to Institutional Review Board. Once the survey development was

completed and following a final check by the dissertation committee, the survey and
relevant information were sent to the Old Dominion University, College of Arts and
Letters review committee for research involving human subjects.
Operationalization of Dimensional Indicators – Scale Development
In this section, the survey items used to measure the dimensions of the GIIA are
described, and the initial analysis process used for each item is explained. Detailed
explanations of the calculations made are presented in chapter 4.
Interorganizational policy objective construct
Purpose of interorganizational interaction. (Contextual). This dimension is
measured by a single multiple choice question that uses the indicators in the GIIA as
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items in the multiple choice list; respondents can check all purposes that apply to their
case of interorganizational interaction. The GIIA allocates indicators to levels of
interaction, thus a minimum criteria stepped cumulative scale was used to calculate a
score for this item. For a respondent to indicate that their case is at a level of
collaboration, for example, they would have to select only one item from the list at that
level, regardless of other choices made. Any additional items selected at the level of
collaboration would cumulatively add one point to the scale. This dimension is further
corroborated by a free-text field earlier in the survey asking the respondent to state the
purposes of the multiorganizational interaction. This free text field allowed better
inspection of outliers and interpretation of results.
Time. (Contextual). This dimension is measured in months; the respondent could
also select “indefinitely.”
Difficulty. (Contextual). The complexity of tasks that the interorganizational
interaction undertakes to accomplish the policy objective. A six-item scale of
organizational task complexity was developed from the work of Liu and Li (2012); Xia,
Becerra-Fernandez, Gudi, and Rocha-Mier (2011). As no survey instrument was
developed in these previous studies, the items for this dimension were tested for
reliability using Cronbach’s Alpha, followed by an factor analysis to check the
dimensionality of the scale. The scale failed the dimensionality check and had low
reliability scores, thus each item was retained for individual analysis. The results are
explained in detailed in chapter 4.
Role of single organization. (Contextual). The roles individual organizations
assume to accomplish the policy objective (McNamara, 2008). This dimension is
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measured by a single multiple choice question that uses the indicators in the GIIA as
items in the multiple choice list. Respondents can check select one of three choices,
which correspond directly to one of three levels of interaction.
Impetus for collective action. (Contextual). The reason for developing the
interorganizational interaction and the way in which it was developed. There are
potentially many reasons under a variety of different contexts why an interaction started,
thus this dimension is one of the more challenging to operationalize. A current focus in
the literature is the difference between voluntary and mandated interorganizational
interactions (Brummel, 2010; Ivery, 2008; Rodríguez et al., 2007), thus a survey item
captures this essential point. Respondents select from a multiple choice list that describes
the particular circumstances under which an interaction was mandated or voluntary.
A second survey item presents a list of seven reasons and asks respondents to rate
the importance of each one to their organization. This scale is taken from Fleishman
(2009) and Thomson (2001). As the various reason are too diverse to suggest an
underlying set of factors, a cumulative composite metric added the Likert score from each
of the seven items. This is justified from the literature, which tends to recognize that
more complex underlying problems will require higher levels of interaction (Gray, 1989).
Numbers of participating organizations. (Contextual). The number of
organizations with first degree network ties participating in the interorganizational
interaction. This dimension is captured by a single whole unit number of organizations.
Category of participating organizations. (Contextual). The sector and/or type of
organization. Respondents selected all that apply from a list adapted from Thomson
(2001).
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Organizational management construct
History of previous interaction in the problem domain. (Contextual). The
extent to which organizations and participants from those organization have worked
previously together on other projects in the problem domain. This dimension is captured
by two items taken from Mattesich et al. (2001), who recommended creating an averaged
composite metric.
Participant's Problem Orientation. (Organizational). This dimension reflects
the degree to which members of interorganizational interaction view the problem from a
shared or individual perspective. This has to do with members' values and perceptions.
This dimension is captured by two items taken from Mattesich et al. (2001), who
recommended creating an averaged composite metric.
Resource allocation. (Organizational). The contributions allocated by individual
organizations to the interorganizational interaction in support of the policy objective. This
dimension is measured by a three multiple choice questions that use the indicators in the
GIIA as items in the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one of three choices
for each of the three questions, which correspond directly to one of three levels of
interaction. The GIIA allocates indicators to levels of interaction, thus a minimum criteria
stepped cumulative scale was used for analysis.
Incentives. (Organizational). The intrinsic and extrinsic rewards provided to
individuals and participating organizations to encourage support for the
interorganizational interaction. This dimension requires capturing an organizational-level
description of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, which can only be attained by a statistically
representative sample of individuals for that organization. As only one individual from
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each organization answers the survey, it was not possible to capture this data. However,
the GIIA specifies that leadership give incentives, thus a single survey item asked
respondents to rate the extent to which leadership recognized the benefits of participating.
Interorganizational infrastructure construct
Time to establish multiorganizational arrangement. (Contextual). The length
of time, relative to the time for implementation of the interaction, that the partnership
takes to establish. Respondents enter a whole number of months.
Key personnel. (Organizational). Personnel who are responsible for bringing
together and implementing the interorganizational interaction. This dimension is
measured by a three multiple choice questions that use the indicators in the GIIA as items
in the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one of three choices for each of the
three questions, which correspond directly to one of three levels of interaction. The GIIA
allocates indicators to levels of interaction, thus a minimum criteria stepped cumulative
scale was used for analysis.
Orientation of policy objective. (Interorganizational). The agreed and
comprehensive nature of goals between interacting organizations. This dimension is
measured by a single multiple choice question that uses indicators in the GIIA as items in
the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one of three choices, which correspond
directly to one of three levels of interaction.
Design. (Interorganizational). The administrative structure emerging from the
interorganizational interaction. Respondents were presented with a list of six possible
options derived from the GIIA and could select all that apply. A minimum criteria
cumulative scale calculated a score.
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Formality of the agreement. (Interorganizational). The way in which individual
organizations agree on their roles and responsibilities within the interorganizational
interaction. This dimension is measured by a single multiple choice question that uses the
indicators in the GIIA as items in the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one
of three choices, which correspond directly to one of three levels of interaction.
Interorganizational procedures construct
Information sharing and communications. (Interorganizational). The ways in
which personnel within the interorganizational interaction use information and
communication processes to attain the policy objective. Respondents were presented with
a list of six possible options derived from the GIIA and could select all that apply. A
minimum criteria cumulative scale calculated a score.
Decision making. (Interorganizational). The ways in which the organizations
within the interorganizational interaction make implementation decisions pertaining to
the policy objective. Respondents were presented with a list of six possible options
derived from the GIIA and could select all that apply. A minimum criteria cumulative
scale calculated a score.
Resolution of turf issues. (Interorganizational). The process used for solving
conflicts between organizations within the interorganizational interaction. This dimension
is adapted from McNamara (2008). This dimension is not tested in the survey as it is not
thought to occur in the sample.
Organizational autonomy construct
Organizational autonomy. (Organizational). The degree to which each
partnering organization independently operates, in terms of the extent that their operating
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procedures and policies are adapted by the interorganizational interaction, and the extent
of authority given to the interorganizational interaction to develop policies that guide
operations of the collective. This dimension is measured by a three item reliable scale
developed by Thomson (2001) and also found to be reliable in Thomson et al. (2008) and
Chen (2008, 2010). Scale reliability was checked using Cronbach’s Alpha and Guttman’s
lower bound (Sijtsma, 2009). As these items were already shown by Thomson (2001) to
represent a single autonomy factor, factor analysis confirmed the dimensionality of the
scale.
A further single multiple choice question was added that uses the indicators in the
GIIA as items in the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one of three choices,
which correspond directly to one of three levels of interaction. Using this nominal
variable, a one-way ANOVA with planned contrasts further checked the reliability of the
autonomy scale.
Norms of trust and reciprocity construct
Trust. This construct consists of one dimension (organizational) defined as the
extent to which trustworthy relationships between organizations within the
interorganizational interaction are built. The trust dimension is the same as the autonomy,
using a three-item reliable scale from Thomson (2001) coupled with a three choice
multiple choice question directly taken from the GIIA, and analysis methods were the
same.
Sampling Procedure
A cross-sectional sample was selected that consists of organizations involved in
multiorganizational interactions convened in a NATO context. Examples include
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multiorganizational groups formed between the various NATO headquarters, commands,
and agencies, and between national defense and academic organizations within NATO
nations who work under a NATO forum, such as the many nation-nation projects under
the NATO Science and Technology Organization. This sample was chosen primarily for
convenience and access: at the time of writing, the author is an NATO international
civilian employed of NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation,
Norfolk, VA. A stratified purposeful sampling strategy was used, which involved
selecting respondents based on specific criteria to ensure that the three “strata” of
cooperation—coordination—collaboration in the GIIA are covered approximately by the
sample.
As clustering analysis is not a statistical method and does not make assumptions
about sample distributions, the sample does not have to representative in statistical
sense—i.e. that variance introduced by confounding uncontrolled variables is averaged
out by selecting a sample representative of the entire population. Thus there is no concern
about typical problems with surveys such as response, sampling and coverage biases.
Instead, clustering analysis requires that samples are representative across the dimensions
used for the clustering analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Nevertheless, data was
profiled for response bias according to gender, organization and years of experience, with
null results.
There are also no mathematical or statistical reasons that specify a number of
required cases for a sample, other than the obvious limitation that the number of sample
cases cannot be less than the number of dimensions used for clustering. Estimates of
appropriate sample size range from 5n to 2n, where n is the number of clustering
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dimension (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011). The survey resulted in 206 usable cases, which falls
within the range of 50 – 1024 range for ten clustering variables.
The procedure used to select the sample consisted of three steps. First, using a
combination of personal knowledge, public information and internal NATO project
management databases, a list of multiorganizational projects in the NATO arena was
created. Second, each project was rated according to several criteria (presence of formal
decision making committee or boards; presence of project initiation documents from
senior leadership; or Microsoft Sharepoint site established for the project or unclassified
internet website). Whether these features are present for each project gives some
indication about the placement of the project on the GIIA. The aim was to select a sample
that is equally distributed across the GIIA; however, this stratification is quite limited as
different organizations may be involved in different ways, and the accuracy of this scale
is fairly crude. Furthermore, as respondents were not identifiable, there was no way to
determine if the sample did actually meet the original selection criteria.
The third step involved identifying people working on the projects and selecting
those most likely to answer the survey. For consistency of the sample, mid-level career
staff were targeted (e.g. officer ranks OF2 (captain) – OF5 (colonel) in the military,
NATO civilian grades A2 – A5, or national equivalent4). This data was easily accessible
through the organization’s IT systems or through personal contacts and knowledge.
Starting from February 1st 2015, emails were sent out to the identified sample with a link
to the survey. With each survey sent out, the recipient was asked to send on the survey
4

According to NATO Standardization Agreement 2119, dated 1992, military officer ranks run from OF1
(second lieutenant) to OF9 (“4 star” general). An OF10 “General of the Army” category exists in some
NATO members, but typically this is reserved for wartime positions. The NATO civilian grading system
runs from A1 (a junior entrant) to A7 (head of an organization). An A5 grade is roughly equivalent to a
colonel OF5 rank in the military and is usually a branch or division head.
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other people involved in the multiorganizational interaction, provided that they worked
for another organization. Two follow-up emails were sent periodically, before the survey
was closed on March 16th 2015.

Data Analysis Procedures
Data processing. Once the allotted survey response time was over; data was
visually inspected using the Question Pro graphical interface, then downloaded into SPSS
version 20.0 for processing. Incomplete responses were filtered out data was inspected
for outliers or unusual cases. Composite variables were calculated and Z-standardized
variables were created using the SPSS. Composite variables were also transformed into
nominal categorical variables based on the three levels of interaction specified in the
GIIA. This process is explained in detail in chapter 4.
Selection of clustering variables. Unlike other dimensional reduction techniques
such as factor analysis, cluster analysis has no inbuilt process to make evaluations about
the relevant variables—i.e. GIIA dimensions—to include in the analysis. Thus only
theoretical reasons and post-hoc sensitivity analysis of the cluster solutions can guide the
selection of dimensions. Obviously, running clustering on every possible combination of
dimensions is unfeasible, so ideally the ex-ante considerations should select variables that
“characterize the objects being clustered and…relate specifically to the objectives of the
cluster analysis” (Hair et al., 2006, p. 490).
The GIIA is divided into six separate constructs: interorganizational policy
objective, interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational procedures,
organizational management, organizational autonomy, and norms of trust and reciprocity.
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Each dimension within these constructs is classified as either contextual, organizational,
or interorganizational. All the dimensions in the interorganizational policy objective
construct are classified as contextual, meaning they are not intrinsic properties of the
organization nor emergent interorganizational form, but are related to the systems context
or situation. Thus the interorganizational policy objective construct was not used for
clustering, but was used instead used to profile cluster solutions in criterion validity tests.
The remaining organizational- and interorganizational-type dimensions were
examined using descriptive analyses. Variables were checked for correlations, as highly
correlated variable (r > 0.9) are likely to reduce the differentiation in clusters and should
not be used for clustering. No highly correlated variables were found.
Detecting outliers. Cluster analysis is highly sensitive to outliers, which can
distort the cluster structure. Outliers may be aberrant observations that are not “real,”
such as someone who just clicked the first answer on the survey instrument for every
question; or they may be an undersampling of an actual group in the population (Hair et
al., 2006). In the former case, outliers should be eliminated from the data set; in the latter
case they should be included. Cluster analysis is unique among multivariate techniques in
that it describes similarity of objects only in a sample, and is not concerned about the
extent to which extreme outliers may skew a distribution away from normality
(Romesburg, 2004). Profile plots were inspected, which plot the standardized value of
each case in the sample across selected dimensions.
Clustering Analysis. Following the recommendation of Hair et al. (2006) a twostep approach was used. First a hierarchical, agglomerative method using Ward’s
algorithm and a squared Euclidean distance similarity measure was used, setting the
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output range for cluster solutions from two to eight. This initial set of cluster solutions
was then inspected and a smaller set of solutions was selected to be used as seed points
for a second step using a nonhierarchical k-means procedure. Hierarchical methods
calculate all possible inter-case similarities then begin clustering the closest cases into
clusters, without allowing cases to change clusters once joined. The advantage is that the
full range of cluster solutions can be examined in a single run. K-means clustering, on the
other hand, permits cluster membership to switch as the algorithm is run in order to
minimize within cluster variance. The disadvantage is that, in contrast to hierarchical
clustering, the solution is sensitive to initial starting conditions. Thus by providing a
“rough cut” of cluster solutions from a hierarchical analysis, k-means is thought to refine
the solutions and produce more homogeneous clusters (Hair et al., 2006).
For the hierarchical clustering, Ward’s method was selected as this algorithm
works by minimizing within-cluster sum of squares across the complete set of clusters
(Everitt, Landau, Lesse, & Stahl, 2011) and avoids small sized clusters, which would be
difficult to interpret given the number of clustering dimensions. The recommended
similarity measure for Ward’s method is the Euclidean Squared. The range of output was
set from a two-cluster solution to an eight-cluster solution, a range which provides room
for interpretation of additional solutions to the expected three-cluster solution. More than
an eight-cluster solution would be challenging to interpret meaningfully. Given the
different measurement scales, all clustering variables were standardized as z-scores.
Cluster profiling and interpretation. Cluster solutions were profiled in four
ways. First, in order to determine cluster stability, the K-means produced cluster
solutions were compared against the Ward’s method clusters and randomly generated
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seed-point K-means clusters. Also, cluster solutions were compared against randomly
generated cluster data. Second, clusters solutions were compared by running ANOVAs to
determine how the mean of clustering dimensions differed across clusters. Second,
criterion validity tests using one-way ANOVAs and MANOVAs (for the multi-item
dimensions) were conducted to determine if cluster means differed significantly across
contextual variables as specified by the GIIA. Chi-square analysis was performed on
contextual variables in their nominal form. Third, predictive validity of cluster solutions
was assessed in by running a MANOVA across the five outcome variables and conducing
follow-up ANOVA. Statistically significant Lambda’s and F-tests indicate that clusters
have predictive ability. This process was conducted first for the three-cluster solutions
(research question one) then for the other cluster solutions produced (research question
two).
For research question three, a discriminant function analysis with calculation of a
“potency index” for each dimension (Hair et al., 2006) was run to determine dimensions
that most strongly predict cluster membership. Finally, research question four was
evaluated by using the full results and the descriptive analysis to make a qualitative
assessment about the extent to which dimensions and the interaction state as a whole can
existing on a “continuum of interaction”. Table 3-2 describes the approach taken for each
research question in more detail.
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Table 3-2: Research questions and analysis methods
Research Question

Methodology

Contribution to knowledge

(1) To what extent can the level
of interaction corresponding
to the constructs of
cooperation, coordination and
collaboration be empirically
observed?

Confirmatory 2-step
(hierarchical / k-means)
cluster analysis with three
solutions

First large scale survey of
multiorganizational
interactions to determine if
commonly used and
theoretically postulated
interaction terms are actually
observed

(2) Are other constructs (levels
of interaction) observed?

Exploratory 2-step cluster
analysis without restricting
cluster number, followed by
intensive qualitative
interpretation of cluster
solutions

Profiling by ANOVA and
MANOVA on continuous
input and outcome variables;
Chi-square for nominal
variables

Generation of an alternative
taxonomy of interaction forms
that departs from the
traditional cooperation /
coordination / collaboration
form.

ANOVA / MANOVA and Chisquare profiling if necessary
(3) Which dimensions of the
interorganizational interaction
array are most important for
predicting an organization’s
level of interaction in a
multiorganizational
interaction?

Confirmatory: Using the
optimal cluster solutions from
the previous analysis, perform
a multiple discriminant
analysis to determine
dimensions that most strongly
predict cluster membership

Using data to justify narrowing
down list of dimensions to
describe interorganizational
interaction.

(4) To what extent can
dimensions of the
interorganizational interaction
array be conceptualized as
“increasing” along a
continuum of interaction?

Exploratory: review individual
distributions of dimensions

Challenge a basic idea that
underpins much of the
interorganizational and public
administration ideas

Review descriptive analysis and
interpret previous cluster
solutions and discriminant
function analysis

Providing data supported
evidence for priority variables
for focus on in future research

Evaluation of Reliability and Validity
This section evaluates the strategies to enhance reliability and validity of research
design.
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Reliability
Reliability is the dependability or consistency of an instrument in measuring
whatever it measures (Neuman, 2003). As the research instrument is a self-administered
survey, several aspects of reliability must be considered. First, the instrument’s
stability—the extent to which the survey results are consistent over time (Neuman, 2003).
This was not quantitatively evaluated during pilot testing but instead, the test-retest
stability assessment reflected more the readability and comprehensibility of the
instrument by determining whether the same respondent is likely to answer in the same
way over a time interval. To avoid error due to the time evolution of organization
features, pilot survey testers were asked to refer to a historical case rather than a currently
ongoing interaction. Pilot testers were also be divided into those that answer the survey
based on specific experiences of an interorganizational interaction, and those that simply
answer the survey to evaluate comprehensibility. A potential limitation with this
approach is that the pilot testing group were not representative of the research sample.
The second aspect of reliability concerns the representativeness of the instrument
such that it is consistent across subpopulations (Neuman, 2003). The survey instrument
captured basic demographic data to be used for a subpopulation reliability analysis.
Again, as the unit of analysis is the interorganizational-organizational dyad, not an
individual, survey representativeness is of limited importance to the overall reliability.
The third aspect of reliability concerns the measurement error or response error,
which is the difference between a survey response and the “true” value (Franklin &
Walker, 2003). Several strategies were be adopted to minimize this error. First the
internal consistency of the instrument was be evaluated using Cronbach’s Alpha and
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Guttman’s lower bound (Field, 2013). As several different constructs are evaluated in the
survey instrument, applying Cronbach’s Alpha to the entire test is likely to inflate the
value (Schmitt, 1996), thus only the dimensions that are known to be represented by an
underlying factor and assessed by multiple items were evaluated for this form of
reliability.
Second, the alternate forms reliability—the extent to which the structure of the
instrument affects responses—was considered. Several types of bias may be introduced
by the instrument structure: the tendency to focus on the first or last items in a list
(primary bias) or to not read all items in a list (fatigue bias); and the tendency for
respondents discern patters of responses in the answers (learning bias) (Choi & Pak,
2005). These categories of bias were mitigated by randomization of the order in which
multiple choice lists are presented, and randomization of question order where
appropriate in the entire survey.
The final aspect of response error concerns the general understandability and
comprehensibility of question wording. Five to seven pilot testers were recruited for indepth cognitive interviews following the initial pilot test in order to review question
wording an identify areas of ambiguity.
There are a number of other reliability issues concerning sampling that affect the
eventual validity of statistical conclusions: nonresponse error, sampling error and
coverage error. Given the nonprobabilistic nature of the clustering analysis technique
selected, it is not necessary to address these reliability issues. Clustering analysis does not
require the sample distribution to meet certain criteria nor does the sample have to be
statistically representative. The technique requires instead that samples are representative
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across the dimensions used for the clustering analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984).
The stratification process used to select the sample will attempt to ensure that cases are
roughly distributed across dimensions used in the clustering.
Validity
Validity refers to generally to the extent to which evidence supports the truth of
an inference. Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) define four types of validity: internal,
external, statistical conclusion, and construct validity. Internal and external validity are
relevant only in experimental designs thus are not considered here; however, the broader
question about generalizability—a type of external validity—is considered in the
limitations section. Statistical conclusion validity refers to the extent to which accurate
decisions can be made from the results of statistical tests. While this is of concern when
evaluating differences between experimental treatment groups, for example, some of the
post-cluster analysis techniques rely on statistical tests to determine if clusters are
distinct. As the statistics only relate to differences between samples, rather than some a
priori-defined population, this concern can only be addressed after data is gathered and
confirmation is made that the test assumptions are met by the data.
The primary validity concern lies with construct validity, which is the extent to
which an instrument measures what it is designed to measure, or how well the measure
captures the true reality of the abstract construct (Neuman, 2003). There are several
facets of construct validity. First, face and content validity consider whether indicators
are reasonable representations of constructs from the perspective of experts, and from the
perspective of the literature evidence base. The GIIA framework represents a cumulative
derivation from prior frameworks: this derivation process is fully documented in chapter
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2 of this dissertation and Appendix A. From the standpoint of the current literature base,
content validity of the GIIA is considered to be fairly high. A question that will
ultimately be considered in this research, however, is whether the literature base is
actually valid as to this date there has been no large scale empirical survey of the array /
typology literature addressed in chapter 2.
Another important facet of construct validity is termed criterion validity, which
assesses the extent to which indicators used agree with pre-existing measures. While a
large number of previous survey instruments were retrieved most do not rigorously
specify the relationship between survey items and underlying constructs, with the
exception of Thomson (2001). Bearing the constraints of survey length in mind, criterion
validity was addressed by including some repeated measures in the survey and use of
multiple measures in conjunction with proven valid measures used by Thomson (2001).
Even with these measures in place, an evaluation of the criterion validity of the survey
instrument is not possible without further testing of the survey instrument on other
samples and research contexts.
The final aspect of construct validity concerns the extent to which similar
measures converge and dissimilar measures diverge. Part of the data processing will
evaluate correlations between variables to confirm expected theoretical relationships, for
example, whether the level of interaction is correlated with increasing trust.
Limitations
There are several threats to the reliability and validity of this research, which may
limit the strength of inferences and conclusions made, and the extent to which results can
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be generalized to other case. These criticisms, however, are raised in light of the fact that
this is exploratory research and the first time such a survey instrument has been used.
A key limitation of the research design is the choice of unit of analysis. The unit
of interorganizational-dyad means that inferences and conclusions made about the level
of interaction—or observed clusters of cases across dimension—can only be made from
the perspective of an individual organization. While there is nothing theoretically wrong
with this approach and this research is the first stepping stone, the literature on
interorganizational relations and particularly the study of collaboration tends to seek
generalized knowledge about the “collaboration” as a whole, rather than one
organization’s experience in the collaboration. It should be pointed out, however, that
most collaboration studies in the public administration literature fail to adequately
address the necessary sampling and units of analysis issues.
A second limitation of the research design is the restricted sample, which may
limit generalizability to other cases. The NATO/defense sector sample is fairly unique:
defense policy issues typically engage with a different range of concerns than the
majority of organizations typically studied in public administration. The GIIA framework
and the concept of levels of interaction are expected to be applicable and interpretable in
this particular sample; however, the particular clusters identified or the dimensions found
important may vary with policy sector or organizational type. Thus the generalizability of
this research is expected to be low.
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CHAPTER 4:
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter presents descriptive results of the empirical data analysis. First, the
survey respondents are profiled and the survey is evaluated for demographic bias.
Second, descriptive univariate results are presented for each of the Generalized
Interorganizational Interaction Array (GIIA) dimensions and associated variables. This
includes explanation of calculations for composite variables, in addition to factor analysis
dimensionality and reliability checks for certain variables. Finally, the preparations for
cluster analysis are reviewed. The actual results of the cluster analysis and research
questions are presented in chapter 5.

Survey Respondent Profile
Survey Statistics
From 324 individuals directly contacted via email and an estimated 100 additional
respondents from snowball sampling, 331 respondents started the survey, with 208
(62.9%) completed responses recorded. Two of these completed responses were
discarded due to corrupted data, leaving an analysis sample of 206 responses. The mean
response time was 26.6 minutes (SD = 15.9 min; range: 7.7-108.25 min). This response
time, coupled with the encouraging free text answers, gives some indication that
respondents thoughtfully answered the questions. From hereon, all data and analysis
refers only to the 206 complete responses.
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Survey Respondents
As expected, the largest respondent groups are NATO civilian employees (30.7%)
and uniformed military (36.6%). The largest nationality groups are British (24.4%),
American (20.5%) Dutch (8.3%), German (7.3%) and Canadian (6.8%). No data is
available about whether this is representative generally of staff in NATO offices and
national defense organizations. In any case, this is not relevant to the research questions,
as the sample was profiled only by type of project and that the fact that it was in a NATO
context. While respondent’s language ability could have foreseeably affected their
understanding of the survey questions, this is not expected to be an issue as typically
NATO staff officers have very high fluency in English. No significant differences in
responses were observed between nationality groupings.
From the 205 who chose to answer the gender question, the majority of
respondents were male (182, 88.8%)) compared to female (23, 11.2%). As a comparison,
females account for 14.6% of the active duty U.S military personnel, and 36.2% of civil
servants in the U.K. Ministry of Defence.5 No demographic data on gender is available
for NATO organizations. On average, respondents have 24.6 years of professional work
experience (SD = 9.68). This indicates that the survey was successful in targeting the
desired seniority level of respondent (NATO civilian grade A2 to A5, and military ranks
from OF2 to OF5).
Evaluation of Respondent Bias
In order to evaluate whether the survey sample was subject to systematic bias,
three demographic variables were examined for effects: gender, years of professional

5

https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp ; https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/modcivilian-personnel-bulletin-2014
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experience, and the employing organization of the respondent. A series of independent
sample t-tests were run to compare the difference in means across genders, and one-way
ANOVAs for difference in means across organizational status groups, for eight
continuous variables collected in the survey: Task_Complexity_Sum, Autonomy2_Sum,
Trust2_Sum, and Outcome1 to Outcome5. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was
calculated for respondents’ years of experience (Yrs_Experience) against the eight
continuous test variables. The values indicate very little relationship between the test
variables. In summary, the results indicate no systematic bias in the survey sample.

Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
This section covers each dimension of the GIIA as captured by the survey data
and provides descriptive univariate analysis. First, the different types of variables used in
the analysis are presented. Second, survey variables are mapped to their respective
dimensions in the GIIA. Finally, the full descriptive analysis broken out by dimension is
presented.
Instead of displaying a summary overview of descriptive analyses for the survey
variables, for several key reasons each variable requires its own separate analysis. In
comparison to much social science survey research, which often features multiple items
combined in a scale that aims to identify an underlying latent factor, the majority of
survey items in this research relate to “tangible” aspects of an organization or
interorganizational interaction and thus require individualized and separate analysis.
Furthermore, additional explanation is required as some variables are combined as linear
sums, logarithmic sums, and other weighted composites to allow testing of the level of
interaction questions. Cluster solutions are interpreted on a variable by variable basis and
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require specific descriptive information. The descriptive analysis is also used to select the
variables most appropriate to perform the cluster analysis.
Overview of Survey Variables
This section reviews the different types of survey variables, explains the naming
convention, and describes how they are analyzed descriptively and used in further
analyses towards answering the main research questions.
Nominal categorical data
The first group of variables are those with nominal categories. Survey respondents
were asked to select an option—usually from three options corresponding to the three
levels of interaction in the GIIA—that best corresponded to their multiorganizational
interaction. Nominal variables are denoted by an “N” at the end of the name, e.g.
“Goals_N.” For the descriptives, a frequency analysis counts the number of cases in each
level. Cluster analysis is run using nominal variables, but also by transforming the
nominal variables into an scale (from one to three), which assumes a level of interaction.
In some cases, weighted sums are calculated using the nominal variables by adopting this
level of interaction assumption and treating the nominal categories as ordinal levels.
Another type of nominal variable are multiple response questions in which survey
respondents were asked to “select all that apply” from a list of options. Each option is
treated as a separate binary variable (0 = not selected, 1 = selected). A multiple response
frequency analysis is used that counts the total number of each option across all cases,
and then compares this total count to the total number of cases (N =206). No special
naming convention is used for these variables.
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Ordinal Likert data
Many of the survey questions are Likert items from one to seven, and are initially
treated as ordinal data. In most cases, the Likert items are combined in some way and
then treated as a scale. Likert items and their sums are presented with conventional
descriptive statistics: mean, standard error of the mean, bias corrected accelerated
bootstrap confidence intervals at 95%6, standard deviation and variance. Providing they
meet reliability criteria, only summed and composite scales from multiple Likert items
are used for clustering.
Linear and logarithmic summed scales
When nominal or ordinal variables have been combined into a composite
computed new variable, according to convention the new variable is treated as a scale. In
the case where a linear sum is used, variable are appended with “Sum”. For more
complex composites such as logarithm weighted sums, the variables have “Comp” in
their name. Where items are combined into summed scales that represent an underlying
factor, conventional scale-item analyses are performed such as inter-item correlations,
factor analysis and reliability analyses. In some cases, however, combined items are a
means to indicate a “position” on the GIIA framework, and should not be interpreted as
an underlying factor.
When appropriate, scale sums and composites are transformed back into
categorical data according to the level of interaction specified in the GIIA. These
dimensions will be employed in cluster analysis using association metrics rather than

6

Bootstrapping is a way to estimate computationally a parameter confidence interval directly from sample
data by collecting thousands of sub-samples and empirically determining the percentage that fall within a
specified bound of the parameter. “Bias corrected and accelerated” refers to corrections made to improve
accuracy (Wright, London, & Field, 2011).
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distance metrics requiring ordinal or scale data. Variables are appended with an “LOI,”
e.g. Purpose_Comp_LOI. “LOI” is used rather than “N” to separate those variables that
were allocated into categories based on composite sums (LOI), versus those that were
directly allocated by survey respondents (N). In the cases where scale sums were
translated into categories, correlation analysis showed that as expected, in all cases the
correlation between the two was very high.
GIIA Dimension—Survey Variable Mapping
Table 4-1 shows how survey variables map to the overall GIIA framework
dimensions. The column denoted “Type” categorizes dimensions by whether they are:
contextual or related to the situation (context); a feature of the participating organization
(Org), or a feature of the emergent interorganizational form (Interorg). In general, only
“Org” and “Interorg” are used for clustering analysis. Context and outcome variables are
used for profiling cluster solutions.
Table 4-1: Mapping of survey variables and questions to GIIA dimensions
Dimensions

Type

Meaning

Purpose of
Interorganizational
interaction

Context

The overall purpose of the
interorganizational
interaction [Adapted from
Mandell & Steelman (2003),
and Keast et al. (2007)]

Survey
Q’s

Survey Variables

Q1

Purpose1, Purpose2,
…Purpose7

Q4

Purpose_Sum
Purpose_Comp
Purpose_Comp_LOI

Time

Context

The length of time that the
interorganizational
interaction is expected to
work together to accomplish
the policy objective
[modified from McNamara,
2008]

Q5

Time_Dur_Indef
Time_Dur_Mths
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Survey
Q’s

Survey Variables

The complexity of tasks that
the interorganizational
interaction undertakes to
accomplish the policy
objective [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q6

Task_Complexity1,
…Task_Complexity6

Dimensions

Type

Meaning

Difficulty

Context

Task_Complexity_Sum

Role of single
organization

Context

The roles individual
organizations assume to
accomplish the policy
objective [McNamara, 2008]

Q7

Role_Single_Org_N

Impetus for collective
action

Context

The reason for developing the
interorganizational
interaction and the way in
which it was developed
[modified from McNamara,
2008]

Q8

Impetus_N

Q9

Mandated

The number of organizations
with first degree network
ties participating in the
interorganizational
interaction [Author
definition]

Q10

Reason1, ..Reason7
Reason_Sum
Reason_Sum_LOI

Numbers of
participating
organizations

Context

Num_Orgs

Category of
participating
organizations

Context

The sector and/or type of
organization.

Q11

Org_Type1,
Org_Type2,
…Org_Type7

History of previous
interaction in the
problem domain

Context

The extent to which
organizations and
participants from those
organization have worked
previously together on other
projects in the problem
domain [definition adapted
from Mattesich et al., 2001]

Q12

History_Org

Participant's Problem
Orientation

Org

Reflects the degree to which
the members view the
problem from a shared or
individual perspective. This
has to do with members'
values and perceptions
[Mandell & Steelman, 2003]

Q13

Num_Orgs_Outlier_Go
ne

History_Indv
History_Sum

Problem_Orient1
Problem_Orient2
Problem_Orient_Sum
Problem_Orient_Sum_
LOI
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Survey
Q’s

Survey Variables

The contributions allocated by
individual organizations to
the interorganizational
interaction in support of the
policy objective [modified
from McNamara, 2008]

Q14

Resource_Alloc1

Q15

Resource_Alloc2_N

Q16

Resource_Alloc3_N

The intrinsic and extrinsic
rewards provided to
individuals and participating
organizations to encourage
support for the
interorganizational
interaction [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q17

Dimensions

Type

Meaning

Resource allocation

Org

Incentives

Org

Resource_Alloc_Comp
Resource_Alloc_Comp
_LOI
Incentives
Incentives_LOI

Time to establish
multiorganizational
arrangement

Context

The length of time, relative to
the time for implementation
of the interaction, that the
partnership takes to
establish. [Inferred from
Keast et al., 2007]

Q18

Time_Interact

Key personnel

Org

Personnel who are responsible
for bringing together and
implementing the
interorganizational
interaction [Modified
McNamara, 2008]

Q19

Leadrshp_Forming_N

Q20

Staff_Forming_N

Q21

Key_Personnel_Sum
Key_Personnel_Sum_L
OI
Org_Lead_N

Orientation of policy
objective (Goals)

Interorg

Design

Interorg

The agreed and
comprehensive nature of
goals between interacting
organizations [Adapted from
D'Amour et al., 2008]

Q22

The administrative structure
emerging from the
interorganizational
interaction [Modified
McNamara, 2008]

Q23

Goals_N
Goals_S

Design1, Design2,
…Design6
Design_Comp
Design_Comp_LOI
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Survey
Q’s

Survey Variables

The way in which individual
organizations agree on their
roles and responsibilities
within the
interorganizational
interaction [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q24

Formality_N

The ways in which personnel
within the
interorganizational
interaction use information
and communication
processes to attain the policy
objective [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q25

The ways in which the
organizations within the
interorganizational
interaction make
implementation decisions
pertaining to the policy
objective [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q26

Dimensions

Type

Meaning

Formality of the
agreement

Interorg

Information sharing
and
communications

Interorg

Decision making

Interorg

Formality_S

Info1, Info2, …Info6
Info_Comp
Info_Comp_LOI

Decision1, Decision2,
…Decision6
Decision_Comp
Decision_Comp_LOI

Resolution of turf
issues

Interorg

The process used for solving
conflicts between
organizations within the
interorganizational
interaction [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Not
testet
d

N/A

Organizational
autonomy

Org

The degree to which each
partnering organization
independently operates, in
terms of the extent that their
operating procedures and
policies are adapted by the
interorganizational
interaction, and the extent of
authority given to the
collective to develop policies
that guide operations of the
collective. [Modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q27

Autonomy1_N

Q28

Autonomy2a
Autonomy2b
Autonomy2c
Autonomy2_Sum
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Survey
Q’s

Survey Variables

The extent to which
trustworthy relationships
between organizations
within the
interorganizational
interaction are built
[modified from McNamara,
2008]

Q29

Trust1_N

Q30

Trust2a

Perceptions of the outcomes of
the multiorganizational
interaction

Q31 –
Q35

Dimensions

Type

Meaning

Trust

Org

Outcomes

N/A

Trust2b
Trust2c
Trust2_Sum

Outcome1
Outcome2
Outcome3
Outcome4
Outcome5

Descriptive Analysis for GIIA Dimensions
This section presents the descriptive analysis for GIIA dimensions and the five
outcome variables. As only fully completed survey responses are included in the analysis,
the number of respondents for all variables is always equal to 206, thus N is not listed in
the tables. Whenever a parameter of interest is stated, namely means and correlation
coefficients, a bias corrected and accelerated 95% confidence interval is calculated from
1000 bootstrapped samples, abbreviated as BCa 95% CI7.
Purpose of the interorganizational interaction
This dimension of the GIIA captures the overall purpose of the interorganizational
interaction by specifying several distinct purposes for each level of interaction. These
purposes were combined into seven possible choices on the survey question, from which

7

Ideally, confidence intervals would be presented for all parameter estimates such as standard deviation,
standard error, and effect sizes; however, for the purposes of space, intervals are not presented for measures
of spread such as standard deviation as they do not feature prominently in the analysis. They are easily
calculated from the data. Unfortunately, SPSS v20.0 does not support calculation of effect sizes nor their
confidence intervals.
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the respondent could select all that apply. Each of the seven choices created a new binary
variable: Purpose1, Purpose2, …Purpose7. Descriptive results are presented in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2: Multiple response frequencies for Purpose variables

Assumed level
of Interaction

Total count
across all
respondents

% (out of
206)

Purpose1: Create an informal network of
communication among stakeholders

Cooperation

81

39.3

Purpose2: Generate support for an initiative

Cooperation

63

30.6

Purpose3: Conduct joint work with other organizations
to ensure tasks are done, but each organization
remains mainly autonomous

Coordination

119

57.8

Purpose4: Reach predetermined mutual goals together,
while remaining autonomous

Coordination

82

39.8

Purpose5: Share material, personnel or financial
resources to address common issues

Collaboration

91

44.2

Purpose6:Commit for a year or more to achieve shortand long-term outcomes

Collaboration

94

45.6

Purpose7: Create institutional and system change in a
policy area

Collaboration

64

31.1

Purpose for joining interorganizational interaction

A composite variable was calculated, Purpose_Comp = Log2([Purpose1 x 21] +
[Purpose2 x 22]+ [Purpose3 x 23] + … + [Purpose7 x 27]). This variable has the property
that Purpose(n) is always greater than any sum of the Purpose(n-i) where i < n. For
example, if a respondent only selected Purpose7, the score of Purpose_Comp would be
slightly greater than a respondent that selected all from Purpose1 to Purpose6. This
intends to convey the increasing scale of interaction. Table 4-3 shows the descriptives for
the Purpose_Comp variable. A further variable, Purpose_Comp_LOI was calculated,
which segments the Purpose_Comp score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by
the GIIA. The descriptives are shown in Table 4-4, demonstrating that, according to the
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GIIA, collaboration is the majority (72%) level of interaction in the respondent sample
when using purpose of the interorganizational interaction as a measure.
Table 4-3: Purpose_Comp descriptives
BCa 95% CI for Mean
Purpose_Comp
(Range 1.00 – 7.99)

Mean

Lower

Upper

5.819

5.572

6.047

Std. Error of
Mean
Std. Deviation
.122

1.743

Variance
3.038

Table 4-4: Purpose_Comp_LOI descriptives
Purpose_Comp_LOI Level

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

1.00 = Cooperation

7

3.4

3.4

2.00 = Coordination

49

23.8

27.2

3.00 = Collaboration

150

72.8

100.0

Total

206

100.0

Time Duration of Multiorganizational Interaction
This dimension captures the length of time that the multiorganizational interaction
is expected to exist. Out of 206 respondents, 105 (51%) indicated that their interaction
lasted “indefinitely,” and the other 101 (49%) cases specified a whole number of months
(Time_Dur_Mths) as shown in Table 4-5. The median value is two years, and 80% of
cases fell within three years or less.
Table 4-5: Time_Dur_Mths descriptives
N
Time_Dur_Mths 101

Minimum

Maximum Mean

Median

Std. Deviation

Variance

1
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24.00

29.584

875.187

29.57

Difficulty
This dimension captures the complexity of the tasks that the interorganizational
interaction undertakes. The dimension was specified by six Likert item questions in the
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survey: the number of distinct tasks, similarity, clarity, interdependence, routineness, and
the level of agreement about the tasks amongst participants in the interaction. The items
were captured as six different variables: Task_Complexity1 to Task_Complexity6, and a
simple linear summed Likert scale was computed (Task_Complexity_Sum). The
descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 4-6.
Table 4-6: Task_Complexity descriptives
BCa 95% CI for
Mean
Variable Name

Mean

Lower

Upper

Std. Error of
Mean

Task_Complexity1: number of
distinct tasks (1=low, 7=high)

5.01

4.77

5.24

.119

1.714

2.936

Task_Complexity2: similarity
(1=very similar, 7=very different)

3.87

3.67

4.09

.109

1.567

2.456

Task_Complexity3: clarity of tasks
(1=known and clearly defined,
7=ambiguous, undefined)

3.59

3.35

3.83

.114

1.641

2.691

Task_Complexity4: interdependence
(1=independent,
7=interdependent)

5.10

4.90

5.29

.099

1.428

2.039

Task_Complexity5: routineness
(1=routine, 7=irregular, atypical)

4.19

4.00

4.38

.104

1.497

2.242

Task_Complexity6: level of
agreement amongst participants
(1=agreed by all, 7=highly
contested)

3.24

3.05

3.42

.100

1.430

2.046

24.995

24.299

25.698

.341

4.892

23.927

Task_Complexity_Sum

Std.
Deviation Variance

Reliability Analysis For Task Complexity. Given that these six variables
purport to capture a single factor of “task complexity,” a reliability analysis was
conducted that found Cronbach’s alpha = .477, and Guttman’s lower bound, λ2 = .506.
This is well below the recommended .8 for a reliable scale (Field, 2013); however,
Cronbach’s alpha is dependent on the number of items in scale in addition to the inter-
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item correlations. There are only six items in the Task Complexity scale. Furthermore,
the inter-item (Table 4-7) and item-total correlations were low (Table 4-8), indicating
lack of relationship between the different items.
Table 4-7: Task Complexity Inter-Item Correlations; Pearson’s r (Significance) [Bias
corrected and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals]
Task Complexity
(TC)

TC1

TC1

1

TC2

.340 (.000)

TC2

TC3

TC4

TC5

TC6

1

[.197, .466]
TC3

.119 (.087)

.180 (.010)

[-.025, .250]

[.042, .313]

.067 (.336)

.051 (.462)

-.077 (.273)

[-.085, .214]

[-.100, .195]

[-.217, .066]

-.041 (.562)

.223 (.001)

.240 (.001)

.042.553

[-.184, .104]

[.086, .359]

[.100, .381]

[-.108, .187]

.109 (.121)

.055 (.430)

.324 (.000)

.161 (.021)

.172 (.013)

[-.041, .250]

[-.091, .200]

[.191, .450]

[.014, .293]

[.037, .305]

TC4

TC5

TC6

1

1

1

1

Table 4-8: Item-Total Statistics for task complexity reliability analysis
Scale Mean if Item Scale Variance if
Deleted
Item Deleted

Corrected Item- Squared Multiple Cronbach's Alpha
Total Correlation
Correlation
if Item Deleted

TC1

19.99

17.839

.218

.147

.446

TC2

21.13

17.194

.329

.183

.381

TC3

21.40

17.295

.289

.179

.403

TC4

19.90

20.853

.079

.052

.508

TC5

20.81

18.752

.226

.123

.439

TC6

21.76

18.185

.303

.154

.400

These results indicate that Task_Complexity4 has the lowest correlations—close
to zero—with the other items, and also Cronbach’s alpha increases to .508 when this item
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is deleted. This is still not enough indication that even if Task_Complexity4 was
removed, the remaining items would constitute a reliable scale.
Looking at the correlations for which r > .3, Task_Complexity1 (the number of
distinct tasks) is significantly correlated with Task_Complexity2 (the similarity of tasks),
r = .340 [95% BCa CI: .197; .466] (p < .0001). This result seems reasonable—the more
numerous the tasks, the more likely they are different. Task_Complexity3 (the clarity of
tasks) is significantly correlated with Task_Complexity6 (the level of agreement amongst
participants), r =.324 [95% BCa CI: .191, .450]. Again, this is a sensible finding that
confirms a basic tenet of a “wicked problem”—less clarity results in greater disagreement
between participants (Head & Alford, 2013).
A principal axis factoring was conducted on the six Task_Complexity items. The
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure showed poor sampling adequacy for this factor
analysis, KMO = .520, and individual item KMO values for Task_Complexity1 and
Task_Complexity4 were below the recommended .5 (Field, 2013). The other four
individual item KMO values, however, were only slightly greater than .5. The
determinant of the correlation matrix was .527, indicating that multicollinearity is not
present. When the two items failing the KMO test were removed, a single factor had an
eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 21.9% of variance.
In summary, there is limited evidence to support an underlying Task Complexity
factor among the six items, or even when the two problematic items are removed. Thus in
the cluster and discriminant analysis to follow, individual Task Complexity items can be
used, rather than the full composite sum.
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Role of a single organization
This dimension captures the role individual organizations assume to accomplish
the policy objective, and was coded as a single variable: Role_Single_Org_N. Table 4-9
shows the descriptive result for this variable.
Table 4-9: Role_Single_Org_N descriptives
Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

Role_Single_Org_N Values
1: If required, my organization could achieve the
goals independently without support from other
organizations

Cooperation

23

11.2

11.2

2: My organization requires some assistance from
other organizations to accomplish the goals

Coordination

58

28.2

39.3

3: No organization can achieve the goal
independently. My organization is interdependent
with other organizations

Collaboration

125

60.7

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Impetus for Collective Action
This dimension captures the way in which the interorganizational interaction was
developed, and was coded as a single categorical variable Impetus_N. A further binary
categorical variable (Mandated) was calculated, which captured whether participation in
the interorganizational interaction was voluntary. The results show that 130 (63.1%)
interorganizational interaction are mandated, whereas 76 (36.9%) are voluntary. Table 410 shows the descriptives for the Impetus_N variable.
A further variable captures the reasons, measured by importance, why a particular
organization is participating. Note this is different from the earlier Purpose dimension,
which captures the overall policy purpose of the interorganizational interaction. This
dimension was measured by an importance ranking between one and seven for each of
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seven reasons (variables Reason1 to Reason7). A linear composite sum variable,
Reason_Sum was calculated. Reason_Sum represents the overall ‘stakes’ an organization
has in an interorganizational interaction. It is not meaningful to interpret Reason_Sum as
an underlying latent factor, as there is no common “source” of the reasons and the
importance of each reason to each organization is highly contextual. Thus it is not
expected that Reason1 to Reason7 variables are highly correlated with each other and no
scale reliability analysis is required.
The results in Table 4-11 show that on average, Reason2 (build relationships),
Reason4 (enhance reputation), and Reason5 (create common vision), were rated as the
most important. Reason6 (contingent funding) and Reason7 (resolve conflicts) were
much less important. This is expected given the large proportion of respondents working
in governmental organizations, who generally are already funded regardless of specific
participation in multiorganizational projects. For example, 70% of the respondents
working in International Organizations (e.g. NATO or the United Nations) marked
Reason 6 as low in importance.
Table 4-10: Impetus_N descriptives

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

1: Directly tasked by a higher authority or mandate to participate
(e.g. a higher command, organizational policy or mission,
organization leader decision, legal requirements)

130

63.1

63.1

2: No direct tasking, but not participating would result in either a
loss of reputation or an inability to meet organizational goals.

36

17.5

80.6

3: Participation is voluntary and was initiated primarily by
senior management.

16

7.8

88.3

4: Participation is voluntary and was initiated primarily by the
staff level.

24

11.7

100.0

206

100.0

Impetus_N Values

Total
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Table 4-11: Reason(n) and Reason_Sum descriptives
BCa 95% CI for
Mean

Std.
Error
of
Mean

Std.
Deviation Variance

Variable

Mean

Lower

Upper

Reason1: Take advantage of partner
organizations' resources (for example:
money, information, expertise, physical
property) to help my organization achieve
its goals

4.59

4.34

4.83

.123

1.769

3.130

Reason2: Build relationships with partner
organizations because we expect to
interact with them again in the future

5.51

5.30

5.71

.102

1.471

2.163

Reason3: Enhance my organization's
reputation by working with partner
organizations that have strong reputations.

4.46

4.21

4.70

.122

1.752

3.069

Reason4: Enhance my organization's
reputation by demonstrating commitment
to resolving important problems

5.18

4.96

5.39

.105

1.505

2.265

Reason5: Create a common vision among
organizations for solving problems too
complex for my organization to solve
alone

5.05

4.81

5.28

.118

1.693

2.866

Reason6: Receive funding or grants that are
contingent upon participation

2.69

2.41

2.99

.142

2.036

4.147

Reason7: Resolve conflicts that have
occurred between my organization and
partner organizations

3.08

2.82

3.35

.138

1.987

3.949

30.558

29.626

31.524

.460

6.600

43.555

Reason_Sum

A further variable, Reason_Sum_LOI was calculated, which segmented the
Reason_Sum score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by the GIIA. The
descriptives are shown in Table 4-12. This demonstrates that, according to the GIIA,
coordination is the majority (72%) level of interaction in the respondent sample when
using purpose of the interorganizational interaction as a measure.
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Table 4-12: Reason_Sum_LOI descriptives
Reason_Sum_LOI

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

1.00 = Cooperation

18

8.7

8.7

2.00 = Coordination

139

67.5

76.2

3.00 = Collaboration

49

23.8

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Number of Participating Organizations
This dimension captures the number of organizations with first degree network
ties participating in the interorganizational interaction. Inspection of the data revealed
nine outliers with the number of organizations set as greater than or equal to 100. Closer
inspection of the other responses for these cases revealed that the intent of the question
was misunderstood, and the outliers were removed from the descriptive calculations.
Descriptive results are shown in Table 4-13.

Category of Participating Organizations
This dimension captures the categories of participating organizations involved in
the multiorganizational interaction. As would be expected for the defense environment,
governmental defense organizations are the most prevalent.
Table 4-13: Number_Orgs descriptives with outliers removed
BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error of
Median

Mean

Lower

Upper

Mean

Std.
Deviation

197 10.000

12.812

11.437

14.161

.796

11.176

N
Num_Orgs
(Outliers
removed

Variance
124.898
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Table 4-14: Category of participating organizations descriptives
Total count across all
respondents

% (out of
206)

1. International intergovernmental organization

160

77.7

2. Government defense organization (Military service or civilian
department)

182

88.3

3. Government organization (non-defense)

98

47.6

4. Educational organization (civilian university or college)

84

40.8

5. Nonprofit organization

55

26.7

6. For-profit business / corporation

70

34.0

7. Other

13

6.3

Category of Participating Organization

History of Previous Interaction in the Problem Domain
This dimension captures the extent to which organizations and participants from
those organizations have worked previously together on other projects in the problem
domain. From the two survey questions in this dimension, two variables were created:
History_Org and History_Indv. History_Org is significantly correlated with
History_Indv, r =.360 [95% BCa CI: .212; .502] (p <.001). Descriptive results are
presented in Table 4-15.
Table 4-15: History_Org, History_Indv and History_Sum descriptives

Variable Name

BCa 95% CI for Std. Error
Mean
of
Std.
Mean Lower Upper
Mean
Dev. Variance

History_Org - to what extent organizations involved 5.09
in the multiorganizational interaction have worked
together on previous initiatives? (1=Not at all; 7=to
a great extent)

4.88

5.30

.110

1.573

2.474

History_Indv - to what extent you have previously
4.19
worked with individual staff from the organizations
involved? (1=Not at all; 7=to a great extent)

3.92

4.46

.135

1.940

3.764

9.282 7.025

9.852

.202

2.905

8.437

History_Sum
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Participant’s Problem Orientation
This dimension reflects the degree to which members of an interorganizational
interaction view the problem from a shared or individual perspective. From two survey
questions two variables were created: Problem_Orient1 and Problem_Orient2.
Problem_Orient1 is significantly and highly correlated with Problem_Orient2, r =.569
[95% BCa CI: .433; .690] (p <.001), suggesting that the items do measure an underlying
factor of problem orientation. A third variable, Problem_Orient_Sum created a simple
linear summed scale of the Likert scores. Descriptive results are presented in Table 4-16.
Table 4-16: Problem_Orient1 & 2, and Problem_Orient_Sum descriptives
BCa 95% CI for
Mean
Variable Name

Mean Lower

Upper

Std.
Error
of
Mean

Std.
Deviation Variance

Problem_Orient1: Generally, people in this
6.00
multiorganizational interaction are dedicated to
the idea that we can make this project work
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral, 7=strongly
agree)

5.83

6.14

.080

1.146

1.312

Problem_Orient2: My ideas about what we want 5.32
to accomplish with this multiorganizational
interaction seem to be the same as the ideas of
others (1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral,
7=strongly agree)

5.14

5.49

.096

1.380

1.905

.156

2.240

5.015

Problem_Orient_Sum

11.311 10.995 11.602

A further variable, Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI was calculated, which segmented
the Problem_Orient_Sum score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by the
GIIA. The descriptives are shown in Table 4-17. This demonstrates that, according to the
GIIA, collaboration is the majority (72.8%) level of interaction in the respondent sample
when using purpose of the interorganizational interaction as a measure.
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Table 4-17: Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI descriptives
Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

1.00 = Cooperation

10

4.9

4.9

2.00 = Coordination

46

22.3

27.2

3.00 = Collaboration

150

72.8

100.0

Total

206

100.0

Resource Allocation
This dimension describes the contributions allocated by individual organizations
to the interorganizational interaction in support of the policy objective. Three survey
questions were coded into the variables Resource_Alloc1, Resource_Alloc2_N and
Resource_Alloc3_N. Descriptive results are shown in Table 4-18 and Table 4-19. These
variables are combined into a weighted composite sum: Resource_Alloc_Comp =
Resource_Alloc1 + (Resource_Alloc2 x 2) + Resource_Alloc3. The double weighting for
Resource_Alloc2 is to account for the fact that these three possible values strongly
discriminate between different types of interaction. There were no significant correlations
between the three Resource_Alloc variables. A further variable,
Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI segments the Resource_Alloc_Comp variable into the three
levels of interaction as specified by the GIIA. Descriptives are shown in Table 4-20 and
Table 4-21 .
Table 4-18: Resource_Alloc1 descriptives

Variable Name and Description

BCa 95% CI for
Mean
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
of Mean

Resource_Alloc1: My contribution in the
multiorganizational interaction is considered
5.96
part of my “regular duties” by my organization
(1=Strongly disagree; 7= Strongly agree)

5.74

6.19

.107

Std.
Dev. Variance

1.538

2.364
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Table 4-19: Resource_Alloc2_N and Resource_Alloc3_N descriptives
Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

Resource_Alloc2_N Values
1: My organization’s financial resources are not
involved

Cooperation

28

13.6

13.6

2: My organization allocates (or has received)
funding specifically for participation in the
multiorganizational interaction

Coordination

163

79.1

92.7

3: My organization pools financial resources with
other organizations into an independent operating
fund for the multiorganizational interaction

Collaboration

15

7.3

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

Resource_Alloc3_N Values
1: Information

Cooperation

44

21.4

21.4

2: The time and expertise of personnel

Coordination

148

71.8

93.2

3: Financial and material assets

Collaboration

10

4.9

98.1

4: Logistical and administrative support to the
multiorganizational group

Collaboration

4

1.9

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Table 4-20: Resource_Alloc_Comp descriptives
BCa 95% CI for Mean
Variable Name and Description

Mean

Lower

Upper

Std. Error
of Mean

Resource_Alloc_Comp (Range = 3 –
14)

11.704

11.456

11.961

.132

Std.
Dev. Variance
1.893

Table 4-21: Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI descriptives
Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI Values

Frequency Percent

Cumulative Percent

1 = Cooperation

5

2.4

2.4

2 = Coordination

117

56.8

59.2

3 = Collaboration

84

40.8

100.0

206

100.0

Total

3.585
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Incentives
This dimension captures the intrinsic and extrinsic incentives provided to
individuals and participating organizations to encourage support for the
interorganizational interaction. While the GIIA dimension has several different
operationalizations of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, due to a variety of survey-related
issues, only the leadership factor is captured in a single survey item. Table 4-22 shows
descriptives for the Incentives variable, and Table 4-23 shows the Incentives variable
segmented into the _LOI version.
Table 4-22: Incentives descriptives

Variable Name and Description

Mean

Incentives: select a number that indicates how
much your organization's leadership
recognizes the benefits of participating in the 5.981
multiorganizational interaction (1=strongly
disagree; 7=strongly agree)

BCa 95% CI for
Std. Error
Mean
of
Lower
Upper
Mean

5.797

6.160

.089

Std.
Dev. Variance

1.292

1.688

Table 4-23: Incentives_LOI descriptives
Incentives_LOI Values

Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent

1 = Cooperation

7

3.4

3.4

2 = Coordination

42

20.4

23.8

3 = Collaboration

157

76.2

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Time Taken to Establish Multiorganizational Arrangement
This dimension captures the length of time in months, relative to the time for
implementation of the interaction, that the partnership takes to establish. One survey
question recorded the number of months, and is coded in the variable Time_Interact.
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Understandably, the results displayed in show a high level of variance, with the standard
deviation (15.9 months) greater than the mean (13.5 months), compared to the median
and mode time of 6 months. While the GIIA assigns values for this dimension of “short
term,” “medium term,” and “long term” to each level of interaction, it is not clear how
these can be interpreted in the context of the real data, hence no attempt is made to
segment the results into a “level of interaction” variable as done for other variables.
Table 4-24: Time_Interact descriptives (months)
BCa 95% CI for Mean
Variable Name and Description Mean Median

Lower

Upper

Std. Error
of Mean

Time_Interact (months)

11.51

15.92

1.109

13.52

6.00

Std.
Dev. Variance
15.921 253.490

Key Personnel
This dimension captures the involvement of the key personnel who are
responsible for bringing together and implementing the interorganizational interaction.
The dimension was specified by two survey questions. The first captured the role of
leadership in the forming and planning the interorganizational interaction (coded as
variable Leadrshp_Forming_N); the second examined the role of staff in the organization
(coded as variable Staff_Forming_N). Descriptive results are presenting in Table 4-25.
A weighted composite variable was created: Key_Personnel_Sum =
(Leadrshp_Forming_N)2 + (Staff_Forming_N)2. The squared operation allows greater
weighting to higher levels of interaction and increases discrimination between states in
the combined sum. The variable is essentially a measure of the overall 'intensity' with
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which staff and leadership create the interaction. A Kendall’s tau8 correlation analysis
revealed a weak but statistically significant relationship between the leadership and staff
variables (τ = 0.193 [95% BCa CI: 0.048; 0.333], p = 0.003). Descriptive results for
Key_Personnel_Sum are shown in Table 4-26.
Table 4-25: Leadershp_Forming_N and Staff_Forming_N descriptives
Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

Leadrshp_Forming_N Values
1: Organizational leadership is not involved in
decisions to work together

Cooperation

19

9.2

9.2

2: Organizational leadership is openly supportive, but Coordination
isn't involved in detailed planning of contributions
to a multiorganizational interaction

127

61.7

70.9

3: Organizational leadership is openly supportive
AND is involved in planning contributions to the
multiorganizational interaction

60

29.1

100.0

206

100.0

Collaboration

Total

Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

Staff_Forming_N Values
1: Interaction occurs through lower levels of
organizations

Cooperation

45

21.8

21.8

2: Mid-level management implement and administer
organization's involvement in interaction

Coordination

67

32.5

54.4

3: The level of staff involved and their
responsibilities adapt to the task at hand; each role
is considered equally important

Collaboration

94

45.6

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Table 4-26: Key_Personnel_Sum descriptives
Variable Name and
Description
Key_Personnel_Sum
(Range: 2 – 18)

8

BCa 95% CI for Mean
Mean

Median Lower

Upper

Std. Error Std.
of Mean Deviation Variance

10.806

13.00

11.528

.319

10.193

4.577

20.947

Kendall’s tau was used as the data are nominal with very few categories, thus the number of tied ranks is
expected to be high (Field, 2013)
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As with the other survey variables, Key_Personnel_Sum was then segmented into
the three levels of interaction as specified by the GIIA. The descriptive results presented
in show that 51.9% of cases are rated as “collaboration.”
Table 4-27: Key_Personnel_Sum_LOI descriptives
Key_Personnel_Sum_LOI Values

Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent

1 = Cooperation

41

19.9

19.9

2 = Coordination

58

28.2

48.1

3 = Collaboration

157

51.9

100.0

206

100.0

Total

A third survey question was included in the Key Personnel dimension. This
question captured whether organizations were equal, or whether one or more
organizations shared leadership of the group. Descriptives for this question, coded as
variable Org_Lead_N are presented in Table 4-28.
Table 4-28: Org_Lead_N descriptives
Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

Org_Lead_N Values
1: All organizations are equal partners

Cooperation

35

17.0

17.0

2: One organization leads the group

Coordination

82

39.8

56.8

3: A few organizations share leadership of the group

Collaboration

89

43.2

100.0

206

100.0

Total

The Org_Lead_N variable was not included in the Key_Personnel_Sum variable
because after consideration, it was realized that it does not add further information about
the key personnel, but rather expresses something at a higher, interorganizational level of
analysis. The variable will be used as an additional profiling for cluster solution in later
analysis in chapter 5.
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Orientation of Policy Objective (Goals)
This dimension describes whether policy objectives (or “goals”) between
interacting organizations are agreed and comprehensive in nature. A single survey
question presented three options, which were coded into a variable Goals_N. Descriptives
for Goal_N are shown in Table 4-29. A scale version of the variable was also computed
for use in cluster analysis, Goals_S.
The frequencies show only one case at a level of cooperation, which when
compared to the other variables appears to be an outlier. The free text responses for this
case do not give any cause for concern and the case’s responses on other variables were
not problematic. The overall response for the Goals_N may indicate a poorly specified
question. “Goals” were not defined in the question, and the notion expressed in the first
possible response that “(t)here are no shared goals” goes against a normative belief about
collective working. Thus it is likely that respondents answered this question with some
optimism.

Table 4-29: Goals_N descriptives

Goals_N Values

Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

1: There are no shared goals

Cooperation

1

0.5

0.5

2: Some shared goals, in addition to individual
organizational goals

Coordination

124

60.2

60.7

3: Shared goals agreed between all participants

Collaboration

81

39.3

100.0

206

100.0

Total
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Design
This dimension captures the administrative structure that emerges in the
interorganizational interaction. The survey presented six different multiple response
options, coded in binary variables, Design1, Design2…Design6. Table 4-30 shows the
total count across all respondents for each design option, and a percentage out of 206,
which was the total number of possible positive responses for each variable.
A composite variable was calculated: Design_Comp = Log2([Design1 x 21] +
[Design2 x 22]+ [Design3 x 23] + … + [Design6 x 26]). The properties of this composite
variable are the same as for Purpose_Comp. Descriptive results for the Design_Comp
variable are shown in Table 4-31.

Table 4-30: Multiple response frequencies for Design variables

Design of interorganizational interaction

Assumed
level of
Interaction

Total count
across all
respondents

% (out of
206)

Design1: Informal communications between staff

Cooperation

175

85.0

Design2: Official communications backed by
organizational leadership

Cooperation

116

56.3

Design 3: Regular official meetings between working
level staff

Coordination

176

85.4

Design4: Regular official meetings between
organizational leadership

Coordination

94

45.6

Design5: Executive decision boards / committees
created especially for the multiorganizational group in
which leadership make decisions about the interaction

Collaboration

104

50.5

Design6: A new joint organization is created to
implement the tasks of the multiorganizational
interaction

Collaboration

46

22.3

182
A further variable, Design_Comp_LOI was calculated, which segmented the
Design_Comp score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by the GIIA. The
descriptives are shown in
Table 4-32. This demonstrates that, according to the GIIA, collaboration is the
majority (62%) level of interaction in the respondent sample when using design of the
interorganizational interaction as a measure.
Table 4-31: Design_Comp descriptives

Design_Comp
Range (1 to 6.98)

N

Mean

206

5.0635

BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error
Lower
Upper
of Mean Std. Dev. Variance
4.857

5.244

0.100

1.429

2.041

Table 4-32: Design_Comp_LOI descriptives
Design_Comp_LOI Level

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

1.00 = Cooperation

10

4.9

4.9

2.00 = Coordination

72

35.0

39.8

3.00 = Collaboration

124

60.2

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Formality of the Agreement
This dimension captures the way in which individual organizations agree on their
roles and responsibilities within the interorganizational interaction. A single survey
question presented three options, which were coded into a variable Formality_N.
Descriptives for Formality_N are shown in Table 4-33. A scale version of the variable
was also computed for use in cluster analysis, Formality_S.
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Table 4-33: Formality_N descriptives
Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

Formality_N Values
1: There are no shared goals Individual organizations
informally agree to work together to achieve
individual or mutually-beneficial goals

Cooperation

61

29.6

29.6

2: Policy documents (such as terms of reference or
memoranda of understanding) identify each
organization's roles and responsibilities, and are
signed off by leadership

Coordination

98

47.6

77.2

3: Policy documents (such as terms of reference or
memoranda of understanding) describe detailed
implementation plans in addition to roles and
responsibilities, and are signed off by leadership.

Collaboration

47

22.8

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Information Sharing and Communications
This dimension captures the ways in which personnel within the
interorganizational interaction use information and communication processes to attain the
policy objective. The survey presented six different multiple response options, coded in
binary variables: Info1, Info2…Info6. Table 4-34 shows the total count across all
respondents for each Information Sharing and Communications option, and a percentage
out of 206, which was the total number of possible positive responses for each variable.
A composite variable was calculated: Info_Comp = Log2([Info1 x 21] + [Info2 x
22]+ [Info3 x 23] + … + [Info6 x 26]). This variable has the same properties as
Purpose_Comp and Design_Comp. Descriptive results for the Info_Comp variable are
presented in Table 4-35. A further variable, Info_Comp_LOI was calculated, which
segmented the Info_Comp score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by the
GIIA. The descriptives are shown in Table 4-36. This demonstrates that, according to the
GIIA, collaboration is the majority (77.2%) level of interaction in the respondent sample
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when using information sharing and communications methods of the interorganizational
interaction as a measure
Table 4-34: Multiple response frequencies for Info variables
Assumed
level of
Interaction

Information Sharing and Communications

Total count
across all
respondents

% (out
of
206)

Info1: Information is shared through informal channels
and relationships between participants (e.g. staff email)

Cooperation

157

76.2

Info2: Formal (official documents) and informal
communication channels are used

Cooperation

141

68.4

Info3: Interorganizational communication is formalized,
with staff given mandate to share information

Coordination

79

38.3

Info4: Formalized communications infrastructures begin to
develop (group email lists, shared web-based
information repositories etc.)

Coordination

98

47.6

Info5: Open and frequent communication through formal
and informal channels

Collaboration

140

68.0

Info6: Interorganizational communication is
institutionalized in organizational policies and processes
(e.g. policy requirements to share information with
partner organizations)

Collaboration

66

32.0

Table 4-35: Info_Comp descriptives

Info_Comp
Range (1 to 6.98)

N

Mean

206

5.278

BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error
Lower
Upper
of Mean
5.032

5.495

.109

Std.
Dev. Variance
1.558

Table 4-36: Info_Comp_LOI descriptives
Info_Comp_LOI Level

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

1.00 = Cooperation

8

3.9

3.9

2.00 = Coordination

39

18.9

18.9

3.00 = Collaboration

159

77.2

100.0

206

100.0

Total

2.428
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Decision Making
This dimension captures the ways in which the organizations within the
interorganizational interaction make implementation decisions pertaining to the policy
objective. The survey presented six different multiple response options, coded in binary
variables: Decision1, Decision2…Decision6. Table 4-37 shows the total count across all
respondents for each decision making option, and a percentage out of 206, which was the
total number of possible positive responses for each variable. A Decision_Comp variable,
and a Decision_Comp_LOI variable were calculated in the same way as for the
Information Sharing and Communications Dimension. The descriptive results are
presented in Table 4-38 and Table 4-39.
Table 4-37: Multiple response frequencies for Decision variables

Decision making

Assumed
level of
Interaction

Total count
across all
respondents

% (out
of
206)

Decision1: Decisions are made independently by each
organization

Cooperation

50

24.3

Decision2: Centralized decision making is practiced; a
lead organization(s) dominates the decision making
process

Cooperation

58

28.2

Decision3: Senior leadership (chief executive or command
group level) conducts collective decision making about
the interorganizational interaction

Coordination

74

35.9

Decision4: Participative decision making based on
consensus and compromise generates rules to govern
activities and relationships between organizations

Coordination

105

51.0

Decision5: Organizational representatives have latitude to
negotiate rules and discuss agreements to identify
common ground

Collaboration

103

50.0

Decision6: Joint decision making occurs at all levels of
organization

Collaboration

68

33.0
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Table 4-38: Decision_Comp descriptives
BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error
Mean
Lower
Upper
of Mean

N
Decision_Comp

206

Range (1 to 6.98)

4.943

4.679

5.154

.120

Std.
Dev. Variance
1.725

2.977

Table 4-39: Decision_Comp_LOI descriptives
Decision_Comp_LOI Level

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative Percent

1.00 = Cooperation

14

6.8

6.8

2.00 = Coordination

57

27.7

34.5

3.00 = Collaboration

135

65.5

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Organizational Autonomy
This dimension captures the degree to which partnering organizations
independently operate. A single survey question presented three options related to the
compatibility of policies, which were coded into a variable Autonomy1_N. Descriptives
for Autonomy1_N are shown in Table 4-40. Another set of three survey items were
offered (Autonomy2a, Autonomy2b, Autonomy2c), which combine to form a scale that
measures the extent to which an organization’s autonomy is affected. Descriptives for the
Autonomy2 items and an Autonomy2_Sum scale are presented in Table 4-41 .
Table 4-40: Autonomy1_N descriptives
Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

Autonomy1_N Values

1: The multiorganizational group does not have policies Cooperation

44

21.4

21.4

2: Policies developed for the multiorganizational group Coordination
are compatible with my organizations policies

100

48.5

69.9

3: Partner organizations jointly develop policies and
negotiation is required when they conflict with
individual organization policies

62

30.1

100.0

206

100.0

Total

Collaboration
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Table 4-41: Autonomy2 and Autonomy2_Sum descriptives
BCa 95% CI for
Mean
Std. Error
Lower Upper of Mean

Std.
Dev. Variance

Variable Name and Item Description

Mean

Autonomy2a: The multiorganizational
interaction hinders my organization from
meeting its own organizational mission
(1=Not at all; 7=to a great extent)

1.97

1.80

2.15

.094

1.356

1.838

Autonomy2b: My organization’s independence
is affected by having to work with partner
organizations on activities related to the
multiorganizational interaction (1=Not at all;
7=to a great extent)

2.90

2.62

3.17

.133

1.908

3.639

Autonomy2c: As a representative of my
organization, I feel pulled between trying to
meet both my organization’s and the
multiorganizational interaction's expectation
(1=Not at all; 7=to a great extent)

3.33

3.07

3.57

.134

1.929

3.723

Autonomy2_Sum_S

2.731

2.549

2.909

.097

1.388

1.925

Reliability Analysis for Autonomy2. According to Thomson (2001), the three
Autonomy2 items should form a single factor of “organizational autonomy,” which
constitutes the dimension in the GIIA. A reliability analysis was conducted that found
Cronbach’s alpha (N=206) = .704, and Guttman’s lower bound λ2 = .704. This is below
the recommended .8 for a reliable scale; however, others note that for exploratory
research lower values can be acceptable (Field, 2013). Furthermore, given that
Cronbach’s alpha is highly dependent on the number of items, in addition to inter-item
correlation, the reliability of the Autonomy2 scale is likely affected by the low number of
items. Results indicate moderate correlations between items (Table 4-42) and the highest
value of Cronbach’s alpha with all items present.
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Table 4-42: Autonomy2 Inter-Item Correlations; Pearson’s r (Significance) [Bias
corrected and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals]
Autonomy2

Autonomy2a

Autonomy2a

1

Autonomy2b

.527 (.000)

Autonomy2b

Autonomy2c

1

[.419, .630]
Autonomy2c

.504 (.000)

.376 (.000)

[.399, .601]

[.235, .496]

1

Table 4-43: Item-total statistics for Autonomy2

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal
Squared Multiple Cronbach's Alpha
Correlation
Correlation
if Item Deleted

Autonomy2a

6.23

10.128

.621

.387

.546

Autonomy2b

5.29

8.198

.503

.294

.643

Autonomy2c

4.87

8.202

.489

.271

.664

A principal axis factoring test of the dimensionality of the Autonomy2 scale
showed that a single factor is present, as expected from Thomson (2001, 2009). The
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified a reasonable sampling adequacy for this
factor analysis, KMO = .657, and KMO values for individual items were >.618 thus all
above the recommended .5 (Field, 2013). The determinant of the correlation matrix was
.527, indicating that multicollinearity is not present. A single factor had an eigenvalue
over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 48.6% of variance (Table 4-44).
Table 4-44: Factor analysis results for the Autonomy2 scale
Initial Eigenvalues

Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings

Factor

Total

% of Variance

Cumulative %

Total

% of Variance

Cumulative %

1

1.941

64.689

64.689

1.457

48.576

48.576

2

.625

20.836

85.525

3

.434

14.475

100.000

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
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Relationship between Autonomy1_N and Autonomy2_Sum. The relationship
between Autonomy1_N—a three-level categorical variable and Autonomy2_Sum—a
continuous scale, provides a test of criterion validity of the Autonomy2_Sum scale. It is
expected that the importance of organizational autonomy increases as the partnership
develops joint policies, thus for each level of Autonomy1_N, Autonomy2_Sum should
increase. This was tested using a one-way ANOVA with planned contrasts with the three
Autonomy1_N levels as the grouping variable, and Autonomy2_Sum as the ‘dependent’
variable.
There is a significant effect of Autonomy1_N level on the value of
Autonomy2_Sum, F(2, 203) = 7.150, p =.001, ω =.24. The planned contrasts reveal that,
compared to level 1 of Autonomy1_N, level 2 is significantly associated with an mean
increase of 0.572 in Autonomy2_Sum, t(203) = 2.345, p =.02, r = 0.16. Compared to
level 2 of Autonomy1_N, level 3 is significantly associated with a mean increase of .433
in Autonomy2_Sum, t(203) = 1.986, p = .048, r = .14. In other words, there is evidence to
support the assertion that the impact of organizational autonomy (Autonomy2_Sum)
increases as the partnership develops joint policies (Autonomy1_N). While the
association is significant, the effect sizes are small, hence closer scrutiny is required.
First, differences in variances between groups were examined: Levene’s test is not
significant, indicating nonsignificant differences in variance between groups, F(2, 203) =
1.482, p =.230. Group sample sizes are different, however, so the Gabriel post-hoc test
was used. Gabriel’s test was only significant for the mean difference comparison = 1.004
(95% CI .367, 1.642) between level 3 and 1 of Autonomy1_N, p = .001. The mean
difference between level 2 and 1 was significant at the .052 level.
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In conclusion, given the presence of a single factor, the moderate inter-item
correlations, the maximum scale value of Cronbach’s alpha with all items included, and
the criterion validity test, the analysis can proceed with the assumption that Autonomy2
constitutes a single factor and thus the Autonomy_Sum variable can be used as a single
clustering dimension.

Trust
This dimension captures the extent to which trustworthy relationships between
organizations within the interorganizational interaction are built. A single survey question
presented three options, which were coded into a variable Trust1_N. Descriptives for
Trust1_N are shown in Table 4-45. Another set of three survey items were offered
(Trust2a, Trust2b, Trust2c), which combine to form a scale that measures the dimension.
Descriptives for the Trust2 items and the Trust2_Sum scale are presented in Table 4-46.

Table 4-45: Trust1_N descriptives
Assumed Level
Cumulative
of Interaction Frequency Percent
Percent

Trust1_N Values
1: Trust relationships are not required

Cooperation

12

5.8

5.8

2: Trust relationships are useful, but must be based
on reciprocal behaviors

Coordination

70

34.0

39.8

3: Trust between organizations is necessary; in all
levels of staff

Collaboration

124

60.2

100.0

206

100.0

Total
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Table 4-46: Trust2 and Trust2_Sum descriptives

Variable Name and Item Description
Trust2a: The people who represent
partner organizations in the

Mean

BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error Std.
Lower
Upper
of Mean Dev. Variance

5.78

5.60

5.96

.083

1.96

1.430

Trust2b: My organization can count on
each partner organization to meet its
obligations in the multiorganizational
interaction. (1=Strongly disagree;
7=strongly agree)

4.94

4.70

5.15

.105

1.513

2.289

Trust2c: My organization feels it
worthwhile to stay and work with
partner organizations rather than leave
or scale back commitments to the
multiorganizational interaction
(1=Strongly disagree; 7=strongly
agree)

5.83

5.66

6.00

.086

1.232

1.517

Trust2_Sum

5.518

5.374

5.660

.071

1.015

1.030

multiorganizational interaction are
trustworthy (1=Strongly disagree;
7=strongly agree)

Reliability Analysis for Trust2. According to Thomson (2001), the three Trust2
variables should form a single factor of “organizational trust,” which constitutes the
dimension in the GIIA. A reliability analysis was conducted that found Cronbach’s alpha
(N=206) = .653, and Guttman’s lower bound λ2 = .668. As was the case with the
Autonomy scale, the value of reliability measures should be interpreted in the context of
the low number of items. Results indicate (Table 4-47) moderate and significant
correlations between Trust2a and Trust2b (r = .573 (p =.000) [.464, .675]), and low and
significant correlations for the other item combinations. The highest value of Cronbach’s
alpha (.716) is attained with Trust2c removed (Table 4-48).
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Table 4-47: Trust2 Inter-Item Correlations; Pearson’s r (Significance) [Bias corrected
and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals]
Trust2

Trust2a

Trust2a

1

Trust2b

.573 (.000)

Trust2b

Trust2c

1

[.464, .675]
Trust2c

.312 (.000)

.280 (.000)

[.142, .4.73]

[.136, .427]

1

Table 4-48: Item-total statistics Trust2

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Scale Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected ItemTotal
Correlation

Squared Multiple Cronbach's Alpha
Correlation
if Item Deleted

Trust2a

10.77

4.850

.568

.353

.430

Trust2b

11.61

3.868

.523

.339

.476

Trust2c

10.72

5.791

.331

.113

.716

A principal axis factoring test of the dimensionality of the scale showed that a
single factor is present as expected from Thomson (2001, 2009). The Kaiser-MeyerOlkin (KMO) measure verified a reasonable sampling adequacy for this factor analysis,
KMO = .599, and KMO values for individual items >.570, thus all above the
recommended .5 (Field, 2013). The determinant of the correlation matrix was .596,
indicating that multicollinearity is not present. A single factor had an eigenvalue over
Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 43.4% of variance (Table 4-49).
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Table 4-49: Factor analysis results for the Trust2 scale
Initial Eigenvalues

Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings

% of Variance Cumulative %

Total

Factor

Total

1

1.794

59.791

59.791

2

.780

26.003

85.794

3

.426

14.206

100.000

1.303

% of Variance Cumulative %
43.441

43.441

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

Relationship between Trust1_N and Trust2_Sum. The relationship between
Trust1_N—a three-level categorical variable and Trust2_Sum—a continuous scale,
provides a test of criterion validity of the Trust2_Sum scale. It is expected that the
organizational trust factor score (Trust2_Sum) should increase as the relevance of trust in
the multiorganizational interaction increases (Trust1_N), thus for each level of Trust1_N,
Trust2_Sum should increase. This was tested using a one-way ANOVA with planned
contrasts with the three Trust1_N levels as the grouping variable, and Trust2_Sum as the
‘dependent’ variable.
There is a significant effect of Trust1_N level on the value of Trust2_Sum, F(2,
203) = 9.277, p =.000, ω =.27. The planned contrasts reveal that the difference in means
between level 1 and level 2 of Trust1_N is not significant, (t(203) = -.138, p = .890, r =
.01), and is found to be slightly negative, rather than positive as expected. The mean
difference between level 2 and 3 is positive (.603) and significant, t(203) = 4.130, p
=.000, r =.28. The mean difference between level 3 and 1 is positive (.561) but just fails
the significance criteria, t(203) = 1.900, p = .059, r = .13.
Due to the low effect sizes and differences in group sizes, Gabriel’s post-hoc
comparison test was performed, indicating that the only significant difference is between
level 3 and 2 (mean difference = .603 [95% CI: .255, .951], p =.000). Given the low
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sample size for level 1 (N = 12) and the fact that there may be a normative bias in this
question—respondents may not have wanted to state that “trust is not required”—the
results for this level will be discounted. The ANOVA and planned contrast tests support
the assertion that the organizational trust factor score (Trust2_Sum) should increase as
the relevance of trust in the multiorganizational interaction increases (Trust1_N), with the
exception for when no trust relationships are required.
In conclusion, given the presence of a single factor, the moderate inter-item
correlations, and the criterion validity test, the analysis can proceed with the assumption
that Trust2 constitutes a single factor and thus the Trust2_Sum variable can be used as a
single clustering dimension. Given the weak Cronbach alpha scores, however, the
Trust2_Sum variable will be closely scrutinized when employing statistical based tests
such as discriminant analysis.

Outcome Variables
In addition to the dimensions captured in the GIIA, the survey also included five
interorganizational interaction “outcome” variables, which examined respondents
perceptions about the overall effectiveness of the interaction, and whether participating in
the interaction affected the quality of working relationships that developed, broadened the
organization’s view about the original policy problem, improved the quality and quantity
of interactions, and increased an organizations influence over others. The descriptives for
the five outcome variables—Outcome1, Outcome2,…Outcome5—are presented in Table
4-50.
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Table 4-50: Outcome variable descriptives
BCa 95% CI for Mean

Std. Error
of Mean Std. Dev. Variance

Variable Name

Mean

Lower

Upper

Outcome1: Overall, the
multiorganizational interaction is
effective in achieving expected
outcomes. (1=strongly disagree,
4=neutral, 7=strongly agree)

5.46

5.28

5.63

.092

1.320

1.742

Outcome 2: Overall, high quality
working relationships have
developed between my organization
and partner organizations as a result
of this multiorganizational
interaction. (1=strongly disagree,
4=neutral, 7=strongly agree)

5.30

5.09

5.48

.100

1.430

2.044

Outcome3: Overall, my organizations
view of the issue(s)/problem(s) that
brought the organizations together
has broadened as a result of the
interaction. (1=strongly disagree,
4=neutral, 7=strongly agree)

5.59

5.41

5.76

.089

1.284

1.648

Outcome 4: Overall, my organization
has increased its interaction with
partner organizations as a result of
the multiorganizational interaction.
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral,
7=strongly agree)

5.14

4.93

5.33

.110

1.576

2.483

Outcome 5: Overall, the
multiorganizational interaction has
helped to make partner
organizations’ influence on each
other more equal. (1=strongly
disagree, 4=neutral, 7=strongly
agree)

4.64

4.45

4.83

.098

1.414

1.999

There are moderate, positive, significant correlations present between all
Outcome variables. This indicates that the five variables are relatively concurrent,
although there is not theoretical justification to support an underlying factor analysis as
the operationalizations are somewhat crude (Thomson, 2001). The correlation results are
presented in Table 4-51.
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Table 4-51: Outcome Variable Correlations; Pearson’s r (Significance) [Bias corrected
and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals]
Outcomei
Variable

Outcome1

Outcome1

1

Outcome2

.471 (.000)

Outcome2

Outcome3

Outcome4

Outcome5

1

[.324, .605]
Outcome3
Outcome4
Outcome5

.395 (.000)

.417 (.000)

1

[.250, .537]

[.250, .563]

.297 (.000)

.540 (.000)

.470 (.000)

[.147, .450]

[.371, .680]

[.301, .618]

.351 (.000)

.493 (.000)

.431 (.000)

.472 (.000)

[.203, .502]

[.366, .626]

[.366, .626]

[.338, .601]

1
1

Preparing for Clustering Analysis
As explained in chapter 3, several interrelated issues concerning the data,
variables and the clustering method must be addressed before starting the analysis (Hair
et al., 2006). The following issues are reported on in the last part of this descriptive
analysis section:


Assessing adequacy of the sample size



Standardization of the data or variables



Reviewing outliers



Examining multicollinearity

Sample Size Adequacy
Given the 5n to 2n range criterion for sample size (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011), where
n is the number of clustering variables, the required number of cases ranges from 55 to
2048, assuming n = 11 –the maximum number of variables that could be used for
clustering in this research. For n = 10, the required number of cases ranges from 50 to
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1024. The sample size of N = 206 is within the desired range. In addition this numerical
criteria, Hair et al. (2006) recommend simply that the sample size should be large enough
to ensure that all expected groups are adequately represented. This criterion is now
reviewed by comparing the nominal counts of levels of interaction for each clustering
variable.
As explained in the descriptive statistics, the 11 dimensions of the GIIA used for
clustering can be represented by nominal variables with three levels corresponding to the
three levels of interaction: cooperation, coordination and collaboration. Comparing basic
frequency data for the nominal variables shows that, on average, the 11 clustering
dimensions are 54.3% at the level of collaboration, 36.3% at the level of coordination,
and 9.4% at cooperation Table 4-52. Five variables have counts at ten or less for the level
of cooperation. This implies that, if a distinct level—or cluster—of “cooperation” can be
discerned from the structure of the data, it is unlikely that these variables will contribute
very strongly in determining the cluster solution.
The variables Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI, Incentives_LOI, Info_Comp_LOI,
and Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI were segmented into the three levels based on continuous
scale variable, thus the low count of values at the level of cooperation actually represents
an underlying range. This is not the case, however, for the Goals_N variable, which is
based on a single survey question. Thus the single count at the level of cooperation means
that only one case has a value of 1 in the Goals_S version of the variable. For this reason,
the Goals dimension will not be used for clustering, and will instead be used as a
profiling dimension.
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This variable-averaged breakdown of cases across the three levels of interaction
does not mean that the sample has more instances of collaboration than coordination, as
often a particular multiorganizational interaction (case) exhibits some variables at a level
of collaboration and some at coordination or cooperation. Furthermore, using a three
level scheme may conceal underlying structures in between the overall levels of
coordination and collaboration, for example, that can only be discerned by looking either
at the continuous scale variables or with associative measures of similarity in the nominal
variables.
Table 4-52: Frequencies of levels of interaction for clustering variables
Count
Potential Clustering Variables

Cooperation

Coordination Collaboration

Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI

10

46

150

Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI

5

117

84

Incentives_LOI

7

42

157

Key_Personnel_Sum_LOI

41

58

107

Goals_N

1

124

81

Design_Comp_LOI

10

72

124

Formality_N

61

98

47

Info_Comp_LOI

8

39

159

Decision_Comp_LOI

14

57

135

Autonomy1_N

44

100

62

Trust1_N

12

70

124

213 (9.4)

823 (36.3)

1230 (54.3)

19.4

74.8

111.8

Total count for level (% of 2266 )
Mean count for each level

In summary, the sample size of 206 is suitable for clustering 11 dimensions (or
ten with the Goals_S variable removed), and for most variables there is a adequate spread
of values across expected levels. The difference in counts between levels may indicate
that clusters of varying size will be discovered.
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Standardization of data
As the clustering dimension variables are measured on difference scales, using
them in an undstandardized form would give larger weighting to variables with
numerically larger scales. There is no theoretical reason to retain the original scales, thus
all variables are standardized as z-scores as recommended by Hair et al. (2006).
Outliers
Clustering solutions are potentially affected by outliers, especially hierarchical
approaches (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Data for all clustering dimensions was
inspected for outliers, identified by z scores of |4| or greater, with none found. Given that
all dimensions are constructed from Likert items with seven levels, the ranges of resultant
composite scales are fairly limited and all variables are of the same order of magnitude.
Multicollinearity
Variables with high multicollinearity are weighted more in the development of
cluster solutions, as the proportion of variance explained by a single variable decreases
when other highly correlated variable are included (Hair et al., 2006). Thus it is important
to inspect the overall correlations of cluster variables. The highest correlation is between
Trust2_Sum and Problem_Orient_Sum, r = .550 [95% BCa CI: .429; .654] (p < .0001).
Correlations between the continuous scale variables are displayed in Table 4-53. Given
the medium to low correlations between variables, analysis will proceed under the
assumption that multicollinearity is not an issue. The major impact of this is that
conventional similarity measures can be used, rather than generalized distances that
account for multicollinearity such as the Mahalanobis D2 (Everitt et al., 2011).
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Table 4-53: Clustering variable correlations; Pearson’s r (significance) [Bias corrected
and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals]
1
1: Problem_Orient_

2

3

4

5

6

1

Sum
2: Resource_Alloc_ .229 (.001)
Comp

1

[.093, .368]

3: Incentives

.091 (.191)

.291 (.000)

1

[-.050, .245] [.152, .414]
4: Key_Personnel_
Sum

.106 (.130)

.162 (.020)

.295 (.000)

[-.028, .227] [.041, .290]

[.167, .419]

.263 (.000)

.169 (.015)

.012 (.867)

[.141, .377]

[.043, .284] [-.123, .151] [-.088, .182]

.034 (.623)

.170 (.014)

5: Goals_S

6: Design_Comp

1

.046 (.511)

.111 (.111)

1

.292 (.000)

.022 (.753)

1

[-.121, .181] [.032, .315] [-.024, .255] [.150, .426] [-.144, .177]
7: Formality_S

-.026 (.710)

.261 (.000)

.168 (.016)

.428 (.000)

[-.162, .106] [.062, .370] [-.011, .249] [.119, .401]

[.032, .292]

[.302, .550]

.063 (.369)

.062 (.378)

.390 (.000)

8: Info_Comp

.228 (.001)

.124 (.076)

.185 (.008)

.290 (.000)

.315 (.000)

[-.076, .118] [.038, .347]

[.147, .439]

[.201, .427] [-.086, .196] [.252, .518]

.084 (.232)

.054 (.437)

.162 (.020)

9: Decision_Comp

.104 (.137)

.078 (.266)

.194 (.005)

[-.046, .208] [-.033, .233] [-.061, .168] [.028, .285] [-.062, .212] [.046, .353]
10:
-.337 (.000) -.004 (.950) -.065 (.356) .135 (.053) -.229 (.001) .180 (.009)
Autonomy2_Sum [-.457, -.200] [-.154, .143] [-.217, .064] [.014, .259] [-.347, -.109] [.054, .313]
11: Trust2_Sum

.550 (.000)

.273 (.000)

.245 (.000)

[.429, .654]

[.144, .399]

[.093, .388] [-.076, .156] [.129, .357] [-.119, .142]

7

8

7: Formality_S

1

8: Info_Comp

.359 (.000)

.048 (.493)

9

.250 (.000)

.002 (.980)

10

11

1

[.255, .463]
9: Decision_Comp
10: Autonomy2_Sum
11: Trust2_Sum

.170 (.015)

.339 (.000)

1

[.021, .306]

[.194, .464]

.300 (.000)

.035 (.613)

.072 (.302)

[.171, .410]

[-.105, .159]

[-.071, .218]

.064 (.363)

.116 (.097)

.118 (.090)

-.372 (.000)

[-.066, .183]

[.000, .238]

[-.003, .235]

[-.500, -.239]

1

Correlations where r > .25 and the lower confidence bound > .15 are in bold for ease of reading

1
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CHAPTER 5:
STUDY FINDINGS

This chapter discusses the main results of the empirical study and draws initial
conclusions. First, the steps performed for clustering analysis are described and cluster
solutions are presented. Subsequent sections address each of the four research questions
in turn. Finally, conclusions are drawn and the Generalized Interorganizational
Interaction Array (GIIA) is evaluated.

Clustering Analysis
This section presents the steps taken to arrive at a stable set of final cluster
solutions that are used to address the research questions in the following sections. A
cluster solution is the main result from the cluster analysis process, which assigns a
cluster membership to each of the 206 cases in the sample. In a “three-cluster” solution,
for example, each case is assigned a value of one, two or three, corresponding to
membership in cluster one, cluster two or cluster three. The following steps in the cluster
analysis are presented. First, initial cluster results from a hierarchical agglomerative
cluster analysis are described and profiled. Other than ensuring cluster distinctiveness, no
interpretation is made at this stage. Second, taking the optimal clusters from the
hierarchical stage as seed points, the k-means cluster analysis results are presented and
profiled. Finally, the k-means cluster solutions are validated for stability using a variety
of approaches.
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Hierarchical Analysis Results
Using the approach described in chapter three, a hierarchical cluster analysis with
Ward’s algorithm was run and the agglomeration schedule, dendrogram, and cluster
membership tables were generated. The results were checked for outliers and for small or
single member clusters. No single member clusters were observed. The five-, six-, sevenand eight-cluster solutions had a cluster of eight cases; however, this was combined with
another by the four-cluster solution. No outliers such as single cases joining cluster
solutions at later stages of the process were observed.
In order to determine the number of cluster solutions taken forward for analysis,
the agglomeration schedule for the last ten stages was inspected and the percentage
change in the agglomeration coefficient with each clustering stage was calculated (Table
5-1). Using the stopping rule of a five percent minimum change, the agglomeration
schedule indicated that the five-, four-, three-, and two-cluster solutions were optimal.
Inspecting the dendogram and cluster descriptives, however, showed that three clusters in
the four-cluster solution were identical to three clusters in the five-cluster solution and
that the small cluster of eight cases was simply combined with another.
This suggests that there is limited meaningful difference between the five- and
four-cluster solution and only the four-cluster solution is taken forward. On the basis of
this stopping rule analysis and the subsequent descriptive analysis, the two-, three-, and
four cluster solutions are retained and provided as the seed points for the k-means
clustering.
These cluster solutions were then profiled across each of the clustering variables
to ensure that each cluster within a solution was distinct. For each of the ten clustering
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variables, the mean and standard deviation was calculated for each cluster. Using
clustering membership as the independent variable and clustering variables as dependent
variables, an ANOVA examined the differences between cluster means.
Table 5-1: Agglomeration schedule for hierarchical cluster analysis

Cluster Stage

Hierarchical Process

Stopping Rule

Number of Clusters

Agglomeration Coefficient

Before

After

Value

% Increase to Next Stage

197

10

9

1166.058

3.62

198

9

8

1208.268

3.92

199

8

7

1255.633

4.92

200

7

6

1317.372

4.99

201

6

5

1383.069

6.10

202

5

4

1467.383

6.91

203

4

3

1568.828

11.42

204

3

2

1748.035

17.27

205

2

1

2050

—

The results presented in Table 5-2, Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 show that with the
exception of the two-cluster solution, there are significant differences across clusters for
all clustering variables, indicating that all identified clusters are distinctive. The twocluster solution was only nonsignifcant (at the .01 level) for V10: Autonomy2_Sum.
Furthermore, no cluster contains less than ten percent of total cases, and from inspecting
the means and the plots, each cluster is sufficiently distinct—in addition to significantly
different9—thus they are all good candidates for seed points for the k-means analysis.

9

Ward’s algorithm maximizes differences between cluster means regardless of whether there are actually
natural clusters, thus p-values cannot be interpreted in the same context as for ‘natural’ groups and only
provide a descriptive indicator of cluster distinctiveness (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). The use of
significance tests is appropriate, however, when profiling clusters against variables that were not used in
the clustering algorithm.
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Table 5-2: Four-cluster solution using Ward's method
4-Cluster Sol. Ward Method
1

2

3

4

ANOVA*

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

F

η2

V1

.554

.452

.369

.677

-.033

.675

-1.666

.984

80.755

.545

V2

.402

.635

-.308

1.070

.273

.741

-.695

1.299

13.516

.167

V3

.482

.501

-.426

1.322

.238

.705

-.559

.915

14.850

.181

V4

.314

.833

-.526

.879

.542

.793

-.634

1.054

22.650

.252

V6

.347

.695

-.645

1.101

.489

.701

-.374

1.005

21.464

.242

V7

.166

.876

-.717

.779

.563

.982

-.040

.827

21.825

.245

V8

.525

.529

-.731

1.126

.280

.745

-.147

1.039

23.009

.255

V9

.492

.543

-.670

1.189

.108

.851

.128

.901

16.972

.201

V10

-.618

.583

-.560

.674

.890

.735

.511

1.052

58.373

.464

V11

.498

.733

.209

.864

-.082

.905

-1.167

.909

27.538

.290

N

58

58

59

31

*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 3, dfW = 202, p < .001

Table 5-3: Three-cluster solution using Ward's method
3-Cluster Sol. Ward Method
1

2

3

ANOVA*

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

F

η2

V1

.258

.644

.369

.677

-1.666

.984

99.995

.496

V2

.337

.691

-.308

1.070

-.695

1.299

20.025

.165

V3

.359

.622

-.426

1.322

-.559

.915

21.112

.172

V4

.429

.818

-.526

.879

-.634

1.054

32.804

.244

V6

.419

.698

-.645

1.101

-.374

1.005

31.851

.239

V7

.366

.948

-.717

.779

-.040

.827

29.004

.222

V8

.401

.656

-.731

1.126

-.147

1.039

33.144

.246

V9

.298

.738

-.670

1.189

.128

.901

22.320

.180

V10

.142

1.005

-.560

.674

.511

1.052

16.507

.140

V11

.206

.871

.209

.864

-1.167

.909

32.474

.242

N

117

58

*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 2, dfW = 203, p < .001
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Table 5-4: Two-cluster solution using Ward's method
2-Cluster Sol. Ward Method
1

2

ANOVA*

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

F

η2

V1

.258

.644

-.339

1.256

99.995

.088

V2

.337

.691

-.443

1.163

20.025

.150

V3

.359

.622

-.472

1.193

21.112

.170

V4

.429

.818

-.564

.939

32.804

.243

V6

.419

.698

-.551

1.071

31.851

.232

V7

.366

.948

-.481

.855

29.004

.177

V8

.401

.656

-.527

1.126

33.144

.213

V9

.298

.738

-.392

1.157

22.320

.118

V10

.142

1.005

-.187

.967

16.507

.027

V11

.206

.871

-.270

1.096

32.474

.056

N

117

89

*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 1, dfW = 204, p < .001, except V10 where p = .02

K-Means Nonhierarchical Analysis Results
Using the cluster centroids from the hierarchical analysis above, a k-means
optimization cluster analysis was run for two-, three-, and four-cluster solutions. The kmeans cluster solutions were profiled by in the same manner as the hierarchical solutions.
The means and standard deviations per cluster were obtained for each of the ten
clustering variables. Using clustering membership as the independent variable and
clustering variables as dependent variables, an ANOVA examined the differences
between cluster means for each variable. The results presented in Table 5-5, Table 5-6
and Table 5-7 show that with the exception of the two-cluster solution, clusters are
significantly different across all clustering variables, indicating that all identified clusters
are distinctive. As in the hierarchical analysis, the two-cluster solution was only
nonsignifcant (at the .058 level) for V10: Autonomy2_Sum. Furthermore, no cluster
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contains less than ten percent of total cases, and inspection of the means and the plots
shows that each cluster is sufficiently distinct—in addition to significantly different.
Table 5-5: Four-cluster solution using k-means method
4-Cluster Sol. K-means method using seed points from hierarchical results
1

2

3

4

ANOVA*

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

F

η2

V1

.494

.560

.245

.858

-.044

.770

-1.449

1.068

46.012

.406

V2

.259

.745

-.347

1.093

.364

.690

-.865

1.263

16.596

.198

V3

.391

.581

-.489

1.274

.282

.747

-.811

1.075

19.417

.224

V4

.030

.856

-.491

.973

.623

.800

-.635

.994

19.579

.225

V6

.140

.819

-.920

1.078

.625

.592

-.287

.900

30.625

.313

V7

-.137

.900

-.839

.722

.729

.822

.048

.851

30.659

.313

V8

.325

.558

-1.278

1.105

.513

.555

.009

.817

56.837

.458

V9

.427

.558

-1.032

1.142

.187

.846

.073

.909

28.674

.299

V10

-.737

.490

-.376

.760

.824

.720

.634

1.082

62.487

.481

V11

.525

.728

.086

.808

-.047

.884

-1.287

.890

34.936

.342

N

72

43

61

30

*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 3, dfW = 202, p < .001

Table 5-6: Three-cluster solution using k-means method
3-Cluster Sol. K-means method using seed points from hierarchical
results
1

2

3

ANOVA*

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

F

η2

V1

.402

.551

.243

.808

-1.255

1.035

78.023

.435

V2

.368

.776

-.278

1.001

-.444

1.154

15.380

.132

V3

.441

.607

-.310

1.161

-.566

1.045

24.199

.193

V4

.460

.841

-.571

.892

-.241

.995

27.644

.214

V6

.460

.706

-.735

1.053

-.008

.881

36.910

.267

V7

.343

.930

-.776

.719

.314

.893

35.839

.261

V8

.543

.500

-.926

1.099

.069

.742

68.856

.404

V9

.434

.651

-.632

1.152

-.095

.941

27.705

.214

V10

-.030

.911

-.523

.714

.805

1.037

29.021

.222

V11

.370

.792

.205

.786

-1.130

.874

55.461

.353

N

100

62

*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 2, dfW = 203, p < .001

44

207
Table 5-7: Two-cluster solution using k-means method
2-Cluster Sol. K-means method using seed points from
hierarchical results
1

2

ANOVA*

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

F

η2

V1

.161

.810

-.221

1.182

7.582

.036

V2

.365

.695

-.499

1.133

45.725

.183

V3

.373

.628

-.510

1.178

48.206

.191

V4

.422

.862

-.578

.883

66.322

.245

V6

.434

.695

-.593

1.051

71.209

.259

V7

.420

.895

-.574

.840

65.152

.242

V8

.497

.516

-.679

1.100

104.600

.339

V9

.351

.728

-.480

1.119

41.608

.169

V10

.113

.998

-.154

.987

3.633

.017

V11

.194

.909

-.265

1.061

11.077

.052

N

119

87

*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 1, dfW = 204, p < .01, except V10 where p = .058

Assessment of Cluster Stability
As the structure of cluster solutions is dependent on the clustering procedure, it is
necessary to evaluate “cluster stability” (Hair et al., 2006)—the robustness of cluster
solutions to variations in method. Several confirmatory tests were run to compare
different cluster solutions: first, the original Ward’s method solutions were compared
with the seeded k-means solutions; second, the seeded k-means solutions were compared
with randomly generated seed points; and finally, clusters generated by randomly
assigning cases to a cluster were compared with the k-means solutions.
For each comparison, a chi-square test was run to determine the strength of
association between each cluster solution, with the null hypothesis that there is no
association. Cluster stability is indicated by a significant result, occurring when the
numbers of cases in each cluster corresponded well between the different cluster
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solutions. Additionally, Cohen’s kappa (κ) was calculated to determine the magnitude of
agreement between different cluster solutions.
The results in Table 5-8 show that in all cases, the association between test
solutions and the seeded k-means solutions is high. Similarly, Cohen’s κ is generally high
and significant with the exception of the four-cluster solution comparison between the
random and seeded k-means approaches where κ is low but significant. These results are
supportive of the existence of a natural cluster structure in the data. The final test was
performed by randomly generating clusters. Chi-square tests and ANOVAs on the
clustering variables were nonsignificant, indicating that clusters are different from
random.
Table 5-8: Results of cluster stability tests
Measure of Association

Inter-Solution Agreement Rating

χ2 *

BCa 95% CI

(Cramer’s V) *

df

κ*

Lower

Upper

2-Cluster Solution: Wards
vs. seeded k-means

119.649

1

.762

.665

.847

3-Cluster Solution: Wards
vs. seeded k-means

225.321

4

.736

.653

.809

4-Cluster Solution: Wards
vs. seeded k-means

332.938

9

.697

.623

.766

2-Cluster Solution: Seeded
vs. random k-means

140.334

1

.817

.722

.896

3-Cluster Solution: Seeded
vs. random k-means

313.290

4

.871

.810

.928

4-Cluster Solution: Seeded
vs. random k-means

190.818

9

.291

.200

.378

Comparison

*Significant at the .001 level

(.762)
(.740)
(.734)
(.825)
(.872)
(.556)
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Research Question 1
The first research question asks to what the levels of interaction corresponding to
the constructs of cooperation, coordination and collaboration are observed. In other
words, from the 206 cases of interorganizational interactions in the sample, are there
observed clusters that can be interpreted according to the three levels of interaction
defined in the GIIA? The question is answered in this section as follows. First, the threecluster solution is profiled. Second, concurrent validity is evaluated by profiling observed
clusters against variables not used for clustering, namely the “contextual” category of
variables. Third, the predictive validity of the clusters is examined using
interorganizational outcome variables. Finally, an overall interpretation is made and
summary results presented.
Profile of the Three-Cluster Solution
If the GIIA and the concept of a level of interaction were accurate representations
of reality, the results would show three, roughly horizontal and equally spaced lines on a
means plot across the clustering variables. As shown in Figure 5-1 this is not the case.
Cluster one is composed of 100 cases (48.6% of total cases) and is characterized by an
higher than average score on the clustering variables with the exception of the
Autonomy2_Sum variable, which was lower than average. Cluster two is composed of 62
cases (30.1% of total cases) and displays a range of high and low scores, but they are
consistently below those of cluster one. Cluster three, composed of 44 cases (21.4% of
total cases), is almost a mirror image of cluster two and displays a range of high and low
scores. The Autonomy2_Sum score for Cluster three, however, is higher than all other
clusters.
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Figure 5-1: Three-cluster solution standardized means plot

Cluster two is characterized by a high level of shared perspectives (V1) and trust
(V11) between interacting organizations, with an overall low level of formalization and
structure of the interorganizational interaction in terms of the extent of collective
decision-making (V9), joint working (V6), communications (V8) and formalized policies
(V7). Cluster two has the lowest score for the impact of organizational autonomy (V10),
meaning that an organization’s autonomy is not much affected by participation in the
interaction. Cluster three, on the other hand, has low levels of shared perspectives (V1)
and trust (V11), but moderate to high levels of formalization in terms of collective
decision-making (V9), joint working (V6), communications (V8) and formalized polies
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(V7). Cluster three has the highest score for the impact of organizational autonomy
(V10), meaning that an organization’s autonomy is affected by participation in the
interaction. For both cluster two and three, organizations are moderately involved in their
respective interorganizational interactions in terms of the extent of resources allocated
(V2), the extent to which leadership recognizes the benefits (V3), and the level of staff
involved in the interaction (V4).
In cluster one, there is a high level of trust and shared perspectives, a high level of
organizational involvement in terms of resources, and a high level of formalization and
structure in the interorganizational interaction. The exception is that the impact of
autonomy is lower than in cluster three, but above cluster two.
While standardization of clustering variables removes the problem of distortions
caused by different measurement scales, this transformation effectively weights each
variable according to its standard deviation (Everitt et al., 2011). Thus for cluster
interpretation it is necessary to inspect each variable in terms of its “natural”
measurement scale. Given that most of the clustering variables are composite sums,
however, the natural scales are not intuitive. Instead, the categorical versions of the
variables can be used, which have the advantage of being more readily interpretable thus
facilitating a direct comparison between the cluster solution and the GIIA.
Cross-tabulations were run to compare each clustering variable in its “_LOI”
form, with the three-cluster solution. For the autonomy and trust variables, no LOI
variables were created, thus they are reported in their natural Likert scale with a range of
one to seven. In Table 5-9, for each clustering variable, each cluster is described in terms
of the extent to which it is collaboration, coordination or cooperation. For each of the
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three levels in the clustering variables, the maximum value (in terms of percentage of
cases within that cluster) was identified. This gives an indication of the overall
“conformity” of the three-cluster solution to the GIIA.
Table 5-9: Three-cluster solution profiled in terms of levels of interaction
Percentage of cases in cluster at the specified level of interaction for
the clustering variable
Cluster 1

Cluster 2

Cluster 3

N = 100

N = 62

N = 44

1: Problem_Orient_Sum

90.0% collaboration

82.3% collaboration

61.4% coordination

2: Resource_Alloc_Comp

59.0% collaboration

72.6% coordination

72.7% coordination

3: Incentives

91.0% collaboration

67.7% collaboration

54.5% collaboration

4: Key_Personnel_Sum

71.0% collaboration

38.7% coordination

45.5% collaboration

9: Decision_Comp

81.0% collaboration

45.2% collaboration

59.1% collaboration

6: Design_Comp

80.0% collaboration

59.7% coordination

59.1% collaboration

8: Info_Comp

96.0% collaboration

45.2% collaboration

79.5% collaboration

7: Formality_S

52.0% coordination

64.5% cooperation

59.1% coordination

Clustering Variable

F(2,203) = 29.021, p = .000, η2 = .222

10: Autonomy2_Sum
Mean

2.690

2.005

3.849

Std. deviation

1.264

.991

1.439

Median

2.667

1.667

4.000

2

F(2,203) = 55.461, p = .000, η = .353

11: Trust2_Sum
Mean

5.893

5.726

4.371

Std. deviation

.804

.797

.887

Median

6.000

5.667

4.333

From this initial profiling, cluster one can be interpreted as collaboration. All but
one of the clustering variables one through nine are at a majority level of collaboration.
The exception—Formality_S—which captures the extent to which plans and
implementation details are formalized, is at a level of coordination for both clusters one
and three, and cooperation for cluster two. The value of Formality_S for the level of
collaboration indicates substantial involvement on behalf of an organization’s leadership,
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thus it is likely that this occurs infrequently. Collaboration for this variable is defined as
“Policy documents (such as terms of reference or memoranda of understanding) describe
detailed implementation plans in addition to roles and responsibilities, and are signed off
by leadership.” The descriptive results for Formality_N (Table 4-33) show that only a
minority of cases, 47 out of 206, selected this option. Out of those 47, 33 are in cluster
one and 13 in cluster three, while only one is in cluster two. Cluster interpretations will
be expanded upon in the summary at the end of this section.
Concurrent Criterion Validity of Three-Cluster Solution
Concurrent criterion validity in the context of cluster analysis is a determination
of the extent to which variables not included in the clustering process are associated or
related to each cluster. From the 20 dimensions in the GIIA, ten were used in clustering,
and these dimensions were categorized as “organizational”—i.e. features of the
participating organizations, and “interorganizational”—i.e. features that exist only
because of the interorganizational interaction. The remaining dimensions are
“contextual,” meaning they relate to the surrounding context or situation. In some cases,
however, the GIIA essentially makes a hypothesis that certain contextual features will be
associated with certain levels of interaction, for example, that collaboration occurs with
difficult policy problems. Thus we can expect that these contextual dimensions will
discriminate between different clusters.
In this section, the contextual variables that were not included in the clustering
analysis, plus a few organizational variables that were omitted, are tested against the
three-cluster solution to determine if the variables can discriminate clusters. The primary
approach is by means of cross-tabulation and chi-square analysis.
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Purpose of interorganizational interaction
The chi-square shows that there is no relationship between the levels of
Purpose_Comp_LOI and the three clusters, χ2(4) = 1.019, p = .912. As the
Purpose_Comp_LOI variable was artificially segmented into the three categories, the
underlying Purpose_Comp variable was also tested to see if the means varied across
clusters. A one-way ANOVA was run that found no significant differences between the
mean of Purpose_Comp across clusters, F(2,203) = 2.058, p = .130.
Table 5-10: Profile of three-cluster solution against Purpose_Comp_LOI variable
Cluster
Purpose_Comp_LOI
1

Number
% within cluster

2

Number
% within cluster

3

Number
% within cluster

Total

Number

1

2

3

Total
(N=206)

3a

3a

1a

7

3.0%

4.8%

2.3%

3.4%

25a

15a

9a

49

25.0%

24.2%

20.5%

23.8%

72a

44a

34a

150

72.0%

71.0%

77.3%

72.8%

100

62

44

206

χ (4) = 1.019, Cramer’s V = .050, p = .912; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion
2

whose values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).

These results suggest that the overall purpose of an interorganizational interaction
may not be critical in defining the type or level of interaction. This is inconsistent with
existing literature that aligns collaboration with more complex purposes, for example
Keast et al. (2007).
Time duration of the interorganizational interaction
Out of the 206 cases, 101 reported a finite time duration in months. A one-way
ANOVA was run to determine if clusters varied in the mean time duration for
interorganizational interactions. Levene’s test indicated unequal variances between
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clusters, thus Welch’s F is reported. There was a significant, weak effect of cluster
membership on the time duration of the interorganizational interaction, F(2, 65.023) =
3.652, p = .031, η2 = .026. The Games-Howell post-hoc test showed a significant
difference only between cluster one (mean = 32.95 months, SD = 31.080) and cluster
three (mean = 19.89 months, SD = 11.761), p = .05. This mean difference fits the
interpretation of cluster one as “collaboration,” but there is limited support overall for the
time duration dimension in the GIIA.
The remaining 105 cases recorded the duration of the interorganizational
interaction as “indefinite.” A cross-tabulation and chi-square analysis in Table 5-11
showed a significant but weak relationship between the indefinite status of an interaction
and the three clusters, χ2(4) = 6.832, p = .031, V = .182 , p = .031. Cluster one was more
likely to be indefinite, indicating support for its interpretation as “collaboration.”
Table 5-11: Profile of three-cluster solution against the time duration of interaction
Cluster
Time duration of interaction
Not indefinite

Number
% within cluster

Indefinite

Number
% within cluster

Total

Number

Total
(N=206)

1

2

3

43a

39b

19a,b

101

43.0%

62.9%

43.2%

49.0%

57a

23b

25a,b

105

57.0%

37.1%

56.8%

51.0%

100

62

44

206

χ2(4) = 6.832, Cramer’s V = .182, p = .031; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion
whose values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).

Difficulty of Task
The descriptive analysis of this dimension (Table 4-6) indicated that there is not
an underlying task complexity factor in the data as hoped, thus the individual items are
retained. A MANOVA was run with the six Task_Complexity variables as dependent
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variables and cluster membership as the independent, with a follow-up univariate
ANOVA (Table 5-12). As cluster sizes are different, but other MANOVA assumptions
are met, Pillai’s trace is reported. The results indicate a significant effect of cluster
membership on task complexity, V = .275, F(12, 398) = 5.287, p < .001, η2 = .137,
meaning that a linear combination of task complexity items discriminates between
clusters.
Table 5-12: ANOVA results for task complexity variables and three-cluster solution
Cluster Means (Seeded K-means)
1

2

3

Task_Complexity1: number of distinct tasks
(1=low, 7=high)

5.37

4.39

5.07

Task_Complexity2: similarity (1=very
similar, 7=very different)

3.87

Task_Complexity3: clarity of tasks
(1=known and clearly defined,
7=ambiguous, undefined)

3.29

Task_Complexity4: interdependence
(1=independent, 7=interdependent)

5.09

Task_Complexity5: routineness (1=routine,
7=irregular, atypical)

3.81

Task_Complexity6: level of agreement
amongst participants (1=agreed by all,
7=highly contested)

3.15

N

100

Task Complexity Variables

ANOVA*
F
(sig.)
6.679

η2
.062

(.002)
3.79

3.98

.182

.002

(.834)
3.39

4.57

10.933

.097

(.000)
4.97

5.30

.678

.007

(.509)
4.31

4.89

8.786

.080

(.000)
2.76

4.11

13.365

.116

(.000)
62

44

*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 2, dfW = 203

Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed significant but weak effects for Task
Complexity variables except Task_Complexity2 and Task_Complexity4. For all variables
except Task_Complexity1, cluster three reports higher mean scores than clusters one and
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two. Post-hoc follow-ups using Gabriel’s test showed that these differences were
significant at the .001 level for Task_Complexity1, 3, 5 and 6.
Role of single organization
The results indicate that the extent to which an organization can achieve
unilaterally the goal of the multiorganizational interaction does not significantly
discriminate between clusters, χ2(4) = 4.946, p = .298. The single largest cell value in the
cross-tabulation in Table 5-13, however, is consistent with the interpretation of cluster
one as “collaboration,” with 67 out of 100 cases in cluster one reporting that no
organization can achieve the goals independently (Role_Single_Org_N = 3).
Table 5-13: Profile of three cluster solution against Role_Single_Org_N
Cluster
1

2

3

Total
(N=206
)

Number

7a

9a

7a

23

% within
cluster

7.0%

14.5%

15.9%

11.2%

Number

26a

20a

12a

58

% within
cluster

26.0%

32.3%

27.3%

28.2%

Role_Single_Org_N
1 = If required, my organization could
achieve the goals independently without
support from other organizations
2 = My organization requires some
assistance from other organizations to
accomplish the goals
3 = No organization can achieve the goals
independently. My organizational is
interdependent with other organizations

Number

67a

33a

25a

125

% within
cluster

67.0%

53.2%

56.8%

60.7%

Total

Number

100

62

44

206

χ (4) = 4.946, Cramer’s V = .110, p = .298; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose
2

values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).

Impetus for collective action
The results shown in Table 5-14 indicate that the way in which the
interorganizational interaction was initiated (Impetus_N) significantly discriminates
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between clusters, χ2(6) = 21.290, p = .001, the effect size, Cramer’s V = .227 , p = .001, is
moderate.
Table 5-14: Profile of three-cluster solution against Impetus_N
Cluster
Impetus_N
1 = Directly tasked by a higher authority or
mandate to participate (e.g. a higher command,
organizational policy or mission, organization
leader decision, legal requirements)
2 = No direct tasking, but not participating
would result in either a loss of reputation or an
inability to meet organizational goals
3 = Participation is voluntary and was initiated
primarily by senior management

4 = Participation is voluntary and was initiated
primarily by the staff level
Total

Total

1

2

3

(N=206)

Number

74a

27b

29a,b

130

% within
cluster

74.0%

43.5%

65.9%

63.1%

Number

13a

14a

9a

36

% within
cluster

13.0%

22.6%

20.5%

17.5%

Number

8a

6a

2a

16

% within
cluster

8.0%

9.7%

4.5%

7.8%

Number

5a

15b

4a,b

24

% within
cluster

5.0%

24.2%

9.1%

11.7%

Number

100

62

44

206

χ (6) = 21.290, Cramer’s V = .227, p = .001; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose
2

values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).

While the Impetus_N variable discriminates between clusters, the results are not
immediately interpretable in terms of the GIIA levels of interaction and it is not clear that
cluster one can be interpreted as “collaboration.” Recent literature suggests that a special
case of collaboration occurs when the interaction is “mandated” by either law or by
senior leadership decision (McNamara, 2016). By combining responses 2, 3, and 4 in the
Impetus_N variable, a new binary variable was created that determines whether the
interaction was mandated or not mandated. The cross-tabulation results for “Mandated”
in Table 5-15 indicated a significant, moderate relationship between Mandated and
clusters, χ2(2) = 15.432, p = .000. Cramer’s V = .274 , p = .000.
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Table 5-15: Profile of three-cluster solution against mandated / voluntary status
Cluster
Mandated
Voluntary

Number
% within cluster

Mandated

Number
% within cluster

Total

Number

Total
(N=206)

1

2

3

26a

35b

15a,b

76

26.0%

56.5%

34.1%

36.9%

74a

27b

29a,b

130

74.0%

43.5%

65.9%

63.1%

100

62

44

206

χ (2) = 15.432, Cramer’s V = .274, p = .000; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion
2

whose values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).

The final component of the impetus for collective action dimension is the reason
why a particular organizations joins, captured in Reason_Sum and Reason_Sum_LOI
variables. The results indicate that Reason_Sum_LOI does not significantly discriminate
between clusters, χ2(4) = 4.737, p = .317.
Table 5-16: Profile of three-cluster solution against Reason_Sum_LOI
Cluster
1

2

3

Total
(N=206)

Number

9a

6a

3a

18

% within cluster

9.0%

9.7%

6.8%

8.7%

Number

62a

42a

35a

139

% within cluster

62.0%

67.7%

79.5%

67.5%

Number

29a

14a

6a

49

% within cluster

29.0%

22.6%

13.6%

23.8%

Number

100

62

44

206

Reason_Sum_LOI
1
2

3
Total

χ (4) = 4.737, Cramer’s V = .107, p = .317; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion
2

whose values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).

As the Reason_Sum_LOI variable was artificially segmented into the three
categories, the underlying Reason_Sum variable was also tested to see if the means
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varied across clusters. A one-way ANOVA was run that found no significant differences
between the mean of Reason_Sum across clusters, F(2,203) = 1.609, p = .203.
Numbers of participating organizations
A one-way ANOVA was run to determine if clusters could be distinguished by
the mean number of organizations participating in the interorganizational interaction.
Levene’s test indicated unequal variances between clusters, thus Welch’s F is reported.
There is a significant, weak effect of cluster membership on the numbers of organizations
participating in the interorganizational interaction, F(2, 113.752) = 3.000, p = .051, η2 =
.023. The Games-Howell post-hoc test shows a significant difference only between
cluster one (mean = 14.403 organizations, SD = 11.765) and cluster three (mean = 10.238
organizations, SD = 7.798), p = .041.
History of previous interaction in the problem domains
A one-way ANOVA was run to determine if history of previous interaction
discriminated clusters. The results found no significant differences between the mean of
History_Sum across clusters, F(2,203) = 1.269, p = .283.
Time take to establish multiorganizational interaction
A one-way ANOVA was run to determine if the time taken to establish the
multiorganizational interaction could discriminate clusters. The results found no
significant differences between the mean time in months across clusters, F(2,203) = .501,
p = .607.
Goals
Goals_N is an interorganizational-type variable that was originally considered as
a clustering variable, however, due to a level only having one case, it was not selected
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and was reserved instead for profiling the cluster solutions. After adding the outlier case
to the next level up, the cross-tabulation and chi-square analysis indicate a significant but
weak relationship between the orientation of the policy objective in interaction (Goals_N)
and the three clusters, χ2(2) = 6.640, V = .177 , p = .040
Table 5-17: Profile of three-cluster solution against Goals_N
Cluster
1

2

3

Total
(N=206)

Number

56a

35a,b

34b

125

% within cluster

56.0%

56.5%

77.3%

60.7%

Number

44a

27a,b

10b

81

% within cluster

44.0%

43.5%

22.7%

39.3%

Number

100

62

44

206

Goals_N (Adjusted outliers)
2 = Some shared goals, in addition
to individual organizational goals
3 = Shared goals agreed between all
participants
Total

χ2(2) = 6.460, Cramer’s V = .177, p = .040; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose
values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).

Organizational Leadership
Org_Lead_N is an “organizational” type variable that was originally included as
part of the Key Personnel dimension of the GIIA. It was not included in the
Key_Personnel_Sum variable due to concerns about its meaning, and was retained for
cluster profiling. The results indicate that Org_Lead_N does not significantly
discriminate between clusters χ2(4) = 4.946, V = .089, p = .298.
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Table 5-18: Profile of three-cluster solution against Org_Lead_N
Cluster
1

2

3

Total
(N=206)

Number

19a

12a

4a

35

% within cluster

19.0%

19.4%

9.1%

17.0%

Number

36a

26a

20a

82

% within cluster

36.0%

41.9%

45.5%

39.8%

Number

45a

24a

20a

89

% within cluster

45.0%

38.7%

45.5%

43.2%

Number

100

62

44

206

Org_Lead_N
1 = All organizations are equal
partners
2 = One organization leads the
group
3 = A few organizations share
leadership of the group
Total

χ2(4) = 3.261, Cramer’s V = .089, p = .521; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose
values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).

Trust
The nominal Trust1_N variable used to check the reliability of the scale
Trust2_Sum was not used for clustering and can therefore be used to profile. Results
indicate that Trust1_N significantly but weakly discriminates clusters χ2(4) = 13.829, V =
.183, p = .007. Clusters one and two are significantly more likely to report that trust is
necessary between organizations in all levels of staff, in comparison to cluster three.
Table 5-19: Profile of three-cluster solution against Trust1_N
Cluster
1

2

3

Total
(N=206)

Number

3a

6a

3a

12

% within cluster

3.0%

9.7%

6.8%

5.8%

Number

25a

23a, b

22b

70

% within cluster

25.0%

37.1%

50.0%

34.0%

Number

72a

33a

19b

124

% within cluster

72.0%

53.2%

43.2%

60.2%

Number

100

62

44

206

Trust1_N
1 = Trust relationships are not
required
2 = Trust relationships are useful,
but must be based on reciprocal
behaviors
3 = Trust between organizations is
necessary; in all levels of staff
Total

χ2(4) = 13.829, Cramer’s V = .183, p = .007; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose
values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).
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Autonomy
While the autonomy scale (Autonomy2_Sum) was used in clustering, the nominal
Autonomy1_N used to check the scale reliability was not and can therefore be used to
profile the cluster solutions. Results indicate that Autonomy1_N significantly and
moderately discriminates clusters χ2(4) = 34.790, V = .291, p < .001. Cluster two is
significantly more likely to report that the multiorganizational group does not have
policies compared to cluster one and cluster three.
Table 5-20: Profile of three-cluster solution against Autonomy1_N
Cluster
1

2

3

Total
(N=206)

Number

12a

28b

4a

44

% within cluster

12.0%

45.2%

9.1%

21.4%

Number

49a

27a

24a

100

% within cluster

49.0%

43.5%

54.5%

48.5%

Number

39a

7b

16a

62

% within cluster

39.0%

11.3%

36.4%

30.1%

Number

100

62

44

206

Autonomy1_N
1 = The multiorganizational group
does not have policies
2 = Policies developed for the
multiorganizational group are
compatible with my organizations
policies
3 = Partner organizations jointly
develop policies and negotiation
is required when they conflict
with individual organization
policies
Total

χ (4) = 34.790, Cramer’s V = .291, p < .001; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose
2

values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected).

Evaluation of Systematic Bias in the Clusters
A final chi-square analysis was run to determine if clusters were differentiated
based on work status, organizational status, and gender variables. No significant
differences were found.
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Predictive Criterion Validity of Three-Cluster Solution
Predictive validity is evaluated by determining whether clusters predict a
theoretically-expected relationship. This is tested by profiling the clusters against the five
outcome variables, as literature suggests that different interorganizational forms will vary
in terms of outcome (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998). The hypothesis for this
test is that there will be significant differences in outcome variable means for different
clusters. The null hypothesis is that no significant differences in outcome variables is
observed.
A MANOVA was run with the five outcome variables as dependent variables and
cluster membership as the independent. As cluster sizes are different, but other
MANOVA assumptions are met, Pillai’s trace is reported. The results indicate a
significant but weak effect of cluster membership on perceived outcomes of the
interorganizational interaction, V = .220, F(10, 400) = 4.946, p < .001, η2 = .110,
meaning that the a linear combination of outcome variables discriminates between
clusters and explains 11% of variance overall.
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed significant differences between cluster
means for all variables except Outcome5 at the .05 level, and generally weak effect sizes
(Table 5-21). For all variables, cluster one reports higher mean scores than clusters three.
Post-hoc follow-ups using Gabriel’s test showed that these differences were significant at
the .001 level for Outcome1, 2, 3, and 5. There were no significant differences at the .05
level between clusters one and two. The difference in means between clusters two and
three were significant at the .001 level for Outcome 1, 2 and 5.
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Table 5-21: Profile of three-cluster solutions against outcome variables
3-Cluster Sol. K-means method using seed points from
hierarchical results

Outcome Variables
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral,
7=strongly agree)

1

2

3

ANOVA
F(2, 203) η2

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Outcome1: Overall, the
multiorganizational interaction
is effective in achieving
expected outcomes

5.76

1.182

5.65

1.103

4.50

1.471

17.172* .145

Outcome 2: Overall, high quality
working relationships have
developed between my
organization and partner
organizations as a result of this
multiorganizational interaction

5.70

1.227

5.19

1.566

4.52

1.338

11.695* .103

Outcome3: Overall, my
organizations view of the
issue(s)/problem(s) that
brought the organizations
together has broadened as a
result of the interaction

5.82

1.192

5.47

1.457

5.25

1.144

3.514X .033

Outcome 4: Overall, my
organization has increased its
interaction with partner
organizations as a result of the
multiorganizational interaction

5.33

1.615

5.15

1.658

4.70

1.286

2.442O .023

Outcome 5: Overall, the
multiorganizational interaction
has helped to make partner
organizations’ influence on
each other more equal

5.02

1.263

4.55

1.467

3.89

1.368

10.966* .098

N

100
X

62

44

O

* p < .001; p = .032; p = .090

The results support the prediction that the type of interorganizational interaction
affects perceived outcomes of the interaction. In this case, cluster one is generally
perceived as having better outcomes than cluster three. There is no substantial nor
significant difference in outcome between clusters one and two.

226
Summary of Results for Research Question 1
This section summarizes the evidence presented for research question one. A
three cluster solution was produced using a k-means optimization algorithm, with seed
points from a hierarchical Ward’s cluster algorithm. The cluster solution was evaluated in
four different ways. First, cluster stability tests ensured that clusters were robust to
changes in clustering algorithm. The final cluster solutions were compared with
hierarchically-produced cluster solutions and randomly generated k-means solutions,
producing statistically significant chi-square test results. Comparison with completely
random clusters showed no significant results.
Second, the clusters were evaluated for their distinctiveness by comparing means
across the clustering variables and examining profile plots. ANOVAs were run that
compared means for the clustering variables across the clusters, finding significant
results. Third, clusters were assessed for criterion validity on set of 17 demographic,
contextual, and organizational variables not used in the clustering. There were nine
variables that did not significantly discriminate clusters: Purpose_Comp_LOI,
Org_Lead_N, Gender, Work_Status, Org_Status, Role_Single_Org_N, History_Sum,
Time_Interact, and Reason_Sum_LOI. Eight variables significantly discriminated
clusters:


Time_Dur_Mths – the mean time duration of the interaction was significantly
higher for cluster one (32.95 months) compared to cluster three (19.98 months)



Time_Dur_Indef – clusters one and three were more likely to be indefinite in
duration;
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Task_Complexity – cluster three involved interorganizational interactions with
higher ratings overall for task complexity;



Mandated – clusters one and three were more likely to be mandated, compared to
cluster two, which was predominately voluntary;



Num_Orgs – the mean number of organizations involved in the
interorganizational interactions was significantly higher for cluster one (14.4) than
cluster three (10.2);



Goals_N – cluster three was the least likely to have shared goals between all
participants;



Autonomy1_N – cluster two was more likely to report that the interorganizational
interaction did not have policies;



Trust1_N – clusters one and two rated the necessity of trust significantly higher
than cluster three.
Finally, clusters were tested for predictive validity by profiling against outcome

variables. The five outcome variables significantly distinguished between clusters one
and three, and to a limited extent cluster two and three. Cluster one was overall
associated with better perceived outcomes, followed by cluster two then cluster three.
Interpretation of the Three-Cluster Solution
The results in Table 5-9 and Figure 5-1 suggest that cluster one can be interpreted
as “collaboration” and support the description of this level of interaction in the GIIA. The
criterion profiling also supports this interpretation. Cluster one is more enduring, either
indefinite or of longer duration than the others; and involves more interactions with
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shared goals. The other clusters are not so readily interpretable, however, thus warrant
closer scrutiny.
The majority of clustering variables are at a level of collaboration also for cluster
three, and the Formality_S variable is equal in score. This suggests that cluster three can
be interpreted as a “different variant” of collaboration. Where cluster one and cluster
three differ most in terms of their natural scores is on Problem_Orient_Sum,
Autonomy2_Sum, and Trust2_Sum. Problem_Orient_Sum describes the extent of shared
perspectives. Cluster one scores highly on this variable, supporting its interpretation as
collaboration. The literature consistently identifies shared perspectives as an essential
criterion for collaboration (Gajda, 2004; Gajda & Koliba, 2007; Gray, 1989; Mattessich
et al., 2001)
Autonomy2_Sum captures the impact on organizational autonomy from
participating in the interaction. Cluster one records a below average score of autonomy
(V10). This suggests that the formalized collaborative processes (V6—V9), combined
with shared perspectives (V1) and high trust (V11), serve to mitigate the overall impact
of organizational autonomy (V10). Again, this finding is consistent with the
interpretation of interorganizational collaboration as a relatively structured state of
interaction in which the collective processes serve to mitigate the overall impact of the
interaction on each organization. In contrast, cluster three seems to be a “difficult” state
of interaction, in which—compared to cluster one—the slightly lower amount of
collaborative process (V6, V8, V9) with the same level of formalization (V7), results in a
situation of high impact on organizational autonomy (V10).

229
The difference in levels of trust between the clusters offers another important
layer of interpretation. Cluster one is characterized by a high level of trust (V11), whereas
cluster three is low. The structure of cluster three suggests that collaborative processes (as
indicated by V6—V9) can still occur in the absence of high levels of trust (V11) and
shared perspectives (V1). As noted above, however, the tradeoff is the impact on
organizational autonomy and outcomes.
To interpret and compare further cluster three and cluster one, the criterion
profiling results are useful. The GIIA dimension “difficulty” and its Task_Complexity
variables used for profiling were able to discriminate clusters (Table 5-12). Cluster three
reported generally higher ratings of task complexity than for cluster one. This fits with
the overall impression of cluster three as a “difficult” variant of collaboration—low trust
and shared perspectives, and greater than average difficulty and complexity of tasks.
Another key difference between cluster one and three that is consistent with this
interpretation is the Goals_N variable, which significantly discriminated clusters. 22.7%
of cluster three cases scored the interaction as having “shared goals agreed between all
participants” compared to 44.0% of cluster one. Similarly, the predictive validity tests
showed that cluster one reports the highest perceived outcomes and cluster three the
lowest.
Cluster two is not significantly different to cluster three across the three
organizational category “objective” variables Resource_Alloc_Comp (V2), Incentives
(V3) and Key_Personnel_Sum (V4). This means that cluster two and cluster three are, on
average, similar in the overall magnitude and scale of commitments made by
organizations to the interorganizational interaction. Cluster two and three are highly
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significantly different across the other three organizational category “perception”
variables: Problem_Orient_Sum (V1), Autonomy2_Sum (V10) and Trust2_Sum (V11).
Cluster one, however, is significantly different across all these variables.
Some perspective is offered by the four interorganizational category variables:
Design_Comp (V6), Formality_S (V7), Info_Comp (V8), Decision_Comp (V9). These
variables capture the heart of interorganizational interaction, describing features that only
emerge out of an interorganizational interaction such as joint policies and collective
decision processes. Cluster two differs most from the others on Design_Comp, which
describes the structural features of the interaction (e.g. meetings, decision boards, new
joint organizations), and Formality_S, which describes the level of formality of policy
documents governing the interaction. Cluster two is predominately at the level of
coordination for Design_Comp, meaning that most cases within cluster two do not have
executive decision boards or joint organizations created for the interorganizational
interaction. Cluster two is at the level of cooperation for Formality_S, meaning that there
are not formalized policies governing the interaction and organizations work informally
together.
The presence of these two results means that cluster two cannot be interpreted as
collaboration—at least not in the same sense as the other two clusters, which do have
formalized policies and executive decision boards created especially for the interaction.
Likewise, cluster two cannot accurately be described as “cooperation”—in terms
portrayed by the GIIA—as its score on Decision_Comp was 45.2% at the level of
collaboration. Given its high scores for trust and shared perspectives and low score on
impact of autonomy, but overall medium level of structure and formalization, cluster two
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may be better described as “partnering” in a manner similar to Woodland and Hutton
(2012).

Research Question 2
The second research question asks to what extent other constructs or levels of
interaction are observed that depart from the three-level framework in the GIIA. This
question is answered in this section as follows. First, the two-cluster solution is profiled,
tested for criterion validity and predictive validity, and then interpreted. Second, the fourcluster solution is evaluated in the same manner. For space considerations, discussion of
the results is left until the interpretation sections, and only summary results are presented
for the profiling and criterion validity tests.
Figure 5-2: Two-cluster solution standardized means plot
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Profile of Two-Cluster Solution
In the same manner as for the three-cluster solution, the value of each clustering
variable can be expressed in terms of the level of interaction according to the GIIA, as
shown in Table 5-22. The values for the autonomy and trust variables are expressed in
their natural scales (Likert scales from one to seven).
Table 5-22: Two-cluster solution profiled in terms of levels of interaction
Percentage of cases in cluster at the specified level of interaction
for the clustering variable
Cluster 1

Cluster 2

N = 119

N = 87

1: Problem_Orient_Sum

79.0% collaboration

64.4% collaboration

2: Resource_Alloc_Comp

56.3% collaboration

74.7% coordination

3: Incentives

89.1% collaboration

58.6% collaboration

4: Key_Personnel_Sum

69.7% collaboration

37.9% cooperation

9: Decision_Comp

78.2% collaboration

48.3% collaboration

6: Design_Comp

79.0% collaboration

55.2% coordination

8: Info_Comp

95.8% collaboration

51.7% collaboration

7: Formality_S

52.9% coordination

54.0% cooperation

Clustering Variable

F(1,204) = 3.633, p = .058, η2 = .017

10: Autonomy2_Sum
Mean

2.888

2.517

Std. deviation

1.385

1.369

Median

2.667

2.000
2

F(1,204) = 11.878, p = .001, η = .052

11: Trust2_Sum
Mean

5.713

5.249

Std. deviation

.923

1.077

Median

6.000

5.667

Two-Cluster Solution Criterion Validity
In the same manner as performed for the three-cluster solution, the criterion
validity of the two-cluster solutions is tested using cross-tabulations, chi-square tests, and
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ANOVAs. For conciseness, the cross-tabulations are not presented and only summary
results given in Table 5-23.
Table 5-23: Summary results from profiling two-cluster solution for criterion validity

Variable
Work_Status

Statistic

χ (3) = 15.144
2

Effect
Size

Sig.

Details of Significant Results

V = .271

.002

Cluster one > cluster two for military
personnel
Cluster one < cluster two in civilian
government employees
No practical significance of result

Org_Status

χ (2) = 1.073

V = .072

.585

Gender

χ2(1) = .332

V = .404

.564

Purpose_Comp_LOI

χ (2) = .695

V = .291

.706

2

2

2

Purpose_Comp

F(1, 204) = .561

η = .003

.455

Time_Dur_Indef

χ (1) = 4.295

V = .144

.038

Time_Dur_Mths

F(1, 99) = .106

η2 = .001

.745

2

Task_Complexity
(Multivariate)

Pillai’s V = .129

Task_Complexity1
Task_Complexity2
Task_Complexity3
Task_Complexity4

2

Cluster one more likely to be
indefinite in duration (57% of
cases)

η = .129

.000

Clusters are weakly discriminated by
a multivariate task complexity

F(1, 204) = 11.906

η2 = .055

.001

Cluster one reports higher numbers
of tasks

F(1, 204) = .909

η2 = .004

.341

F(6,199) = 4.895

F(1, 204) = 3.450
F(1, 204) = 2.343

2

.017

2

.127

2

η = .065
η = .011

Cluster one reports less task clarity

Task_Complexity5

F(1, 204) = 11.793

η = .055

.001

Task_Complexity6

F(1, 204) = .001

η2 = .000

.976

Role_Single_Org_N

χ (2) = 5.230

V = .159

.073

Cluster one more likely to report that
no organization can achieve goals
independently (66.4% of cases)

Impetus_N

χ2(3) = 21.692

V = .325

.000

Cluster one more likely to be directly
tasked by higher authority

2

Cluster two reports less routine, more
atypical tasks

Cluster two more likely to be
voluntarily initiated by lower staff
levels
Mandated

χ2(1) = 16.519

Reason_Sum_LOI

χ (2) = 2.553

V = .283

.000

Cluster one more likely mandated
Cluster two more likely voluntary

2

V = .111

.279
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Variable
Reason_Sum
Num_Orgs
History_Sum

Statistic
F(1, 204) = .751
F(1, 195) = 3.593
F(1, 204) = 6.679

Effect
Size

Sig.

2

.387

2

.060

2

.010

2

η = .004
η = .018
η = .032

Time_Interact

F(1, 204) = .106

η = .001

.745

Goals_N

χ (2) = 2.336

V = .106

.311

Org_Lead_N

χ2(2) = .468

V = .048

.791

Autonomy1_N

χ (2) = 22.322

V = .329

.000

2

2

Details of Significant Results

Cluster one more likely to have
jointly developed policies
Cluster two more likely to have no
joint policies

Trust1_N

χ2(2) = 6.983

V = .184

.030

Cluster one more likely to report
necessity of trust at all levels

Two-Cluster Solution Predictive Validity
A MANOVA was run with the five outcome variables as dependent variables and
cluster membership as the independent. As cluster sizes are different, but other
MANOVA assumptions are met, Pillai’s trace is reported. The results indicate a
significant but weak effect of cluster membership on perceived outcomes of the
interorganizational interaction, V = .966, F(5, 200) = 3.625, p < .001, η2 = .083, meaning
that the a linear combination of outcome variables discriminates between clusters and
explains 8.3% of variance overall.
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed significant differences between cluster
means for Outcome2, Outcome3, and Outcome5 at the .01 level, and generally weak
effect sizes (Table 5-24). For all variables, cluster one reports higher mean scores than
clusters two.
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Table 5-24: Profile of two-cluster solution against outcome variables

Outcome Variables
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral, 7=strongly
agree)

2-Cluster Sol. K-means method using
seed points from hierarchical results
1

2

ANOVA

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

F(1, 204)

η2

Outcome1: Overall, the multiorganizational
interaction is effective in achieving expected
outcomes

5.56

1.182

5.31

1.367

1.850

.009

Outcome 2: Overall, high quality working
relationships have developed between my
organization and partner organizations as a
result of this multiorganizational interaction

5.56

1.267

4.93

1.561

10.267* .048

Outcome3: Overall, my organizations view of
the issue(s)/problem(s) that brought the
organizations together has broadened as a
result of the interaction

5.79

1.149

5.32

1.410

6.875*

.033

Outcome 4: Overall, my organization has
increased its interaction with partner
organizations as a result of the
multiorganizational interaction

5.25

1.558

4.99

1.596

1.409

.007

Outcome 5: Overall, the multiorganizational
interaction has helped to make partner
organizations’ influence on each other more
equal

4.91

1.321

4.26

1.458

N

119

10.906* .051

87

* p < .01

Two-Cluster Solution Interpretation
The two-cluster solution is composed of one cluster of 119 cases (57.8%) and
another cluster of 87 cases (42.2%). As the clusters are comprised of more cases than the
three- and four-cluster solutions, they have higher variances across the clustering
variables and the means of each cluster tend to be closer to the total mean of all cases.
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This has the effect of lowering the scores for each variable but increasing the error
margins.
The profiling in Table 5-22 shows that cluster one can clearly be interpreted as
collaboration, in terms of the GIIA. Clustering variables (V1 to V9) are predominately at
the level of collaboration, albeit with slightly less prevalence compared to the threecluster solution due to the increasing variance effect mentioned above. As with the threecluster solution, Formality_S (V7) is a the level of coordination.
The criterion validity tests demonstrate cluster discrimination across eight
variables: Work_Status, Time_Dur_Indef, Task_Complexity, Role_Single_Org_N,
Impetus_N, Mandated, Autonomy1_N, and Trust1_N. Predictive validity tests of the five
Outcome variables show that, as in the case of the three-cluster solution, cluster one is
generally rates higher outcomes that cluster two. The multivariate and univariate tests
discriminated between the clusters. The results are supportive of an interpretation of
cluster one as collaboration. Cluster one is more likely to: be of indefinite duration;
involve higher numbers of tasks of less clarity; report that no individual organization in
an interorganizational interaction can achieve the collective goal independently; report
that trust is required at all levels; and involve joint policies.
Inspection of a cross-tabulation of the two-cluster solution against the threecluster solution shows that 99% of cluster one cases in the three-cluster solution are
present in cluster one of the two-cluster solution. Likewise 97% of cluster two cases in
the three-cluster solution are in cluster two of the two-cluster solution. Cluster three of
the three-cluster solution, however, is roughly equally divided between cluster one and
two of the two-cluster solution. Cluster three was unique in that it had very high scores
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for autonomy (V10) and very low scores for shared perspectives (V1) and trust (V11).
The division of cluster three cases between cluster one and two in the two-cluster solution
has the effect of smoothing out the differences between these variables, as shown by the
overlapping error bars in the means plot.
The implication is that for the two-cluster solution, the “perception” type
variables (shared perspectives (V1), autonomy (V10) and trust (V11)), are reduced in
their discriminating effect, whereas the structural- and process-related organizational and
interorganizational category variables are increased in their discriminating effect.
In terms of evaluating the overall meaning of the two-cluster solution, the results
suggest that collaboration is still a distinct and observable level of interaction, but only in
the “pure” sense of tangible structural, resource, and process factors. There are factors
that fundamentally define collaboration—jointly developed policies, executive decision
boards created only for the interorganizational interaction, joint decision making at
leadership and staff levels simultaneously. It would not be meaningful to call something
collaboration in the absence of these factors.
There is no logical constraint, however, on the variation of perception of trust or
autonomy among the participants. In other words, the presence of a jointly developed
policy does not logically require a certain level of trust; however, high levels of trust may
contribute to a more successful experience—evidence that is provided by the higher rated
outcome variables for higher trust clusters.
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Profile of Four-Cluster Solution
In the same manner as for the two- and three-cluster solution, the value of each
clustering variable can be expressed in terms of the level of interaction according to the
GIIA, as shown in Table 5-25. The standardized means plot is displayed in Figure 5-3.

Table 5-25: Four-cluster solution profiled in terms of level of interaction
Percentage of cases in cluster at the specified level of interaction for
the clustering variable
Cluster 1

Cluster 2

Cluster 3

Cluster 4

N = 72

N = 43

N = 61

N = 30

1: Problem_Orient_Sum

91.7% collab.

83.7% collab.

72.1% collab.

66.7% coord.

2: Resource_Alloc_Comp

50.0% collab.

69.8% coord.

52.5% collab.

76.7% coord.

3: Incentives

87.5% collab.

65.1% collab.

86.9% collab.

50.0% coord.

4: Key_Personnel_Sum

51.4% collab.

37.2% coord.

80.3% collab.

50.0% coop.

9: Decision_Comp

86.1% collab.

41.9% coord.

63.9% collab.

70.0% collab.

6: Design_Comp

65.3% collab.

60.5% coord.

86.9% collab.

46.7% coord.

8: Info_Comp

93.1% collab.

51.2% coord.

93.4% collab.

73.3% collab.

7: Formality_S

55.6% coord.

69.8% coop.

50.8% collab.

63.5% coord.

Clustering Variable

10: Autonomy2_Sum

F(3,88.97) = 74.800, p = .000, η2 = .481 (Welch’s F reported)

Mean

1.708

2.209

3.874

3.611

Std. deviation

.681

1.054

.999

1.501

Median

1.667

2.000

4.000

3.500

2

F(3,202) = 34.936, p = .000, η = .342

11: Trust2_Sum
Mean

6.051

5.605

5.470

4.211

Std. deviation

.739

.821

.897

.903

Median

6.000

5.667

5.667

4.167
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Figure 5-3: Four-cluster solution standardized means plots

Four-Cluster Solution Criterion Validity
Summary results of criterion validity tests of the four-cluster solutions are
presented in Table 5-26.
Table 5-26: Summary results from profiling four-cluster solution for criterion validity

Variable

Statistic

Effect
Size

Sig.

Details of Significant Results
No practical significance of result

Work_Status

χ2(9) = 23.135

V = .193

.006

Org_Status

χ (6) = 5.880

V = .119

.442

Gender

χ (3) = .955

V = .068

.844

Purpose_Comp_LOI

χ2(6) = .9.309

V = .150

.150

2
2

2

Purpose_Comp

F(3,202) = .980

η = .014

.403

Time_Dur_Indef

χ (3) = 5.642

V = .165

.132

2
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Variable
Time_Dur_Mths

Statistic
F(3,97) = 1.302

Effect
Size

Sig.

Details of Significant Results

2

.278

2

η = .116

.000

Clusters are weakly discriminated by
a multivariate task complexity

η = .039

Task_Complexity
(Multivariate)

Pillai’s V = .347

Task_Complexity1

F(3, 202) = 5.104

η2 = .070

.002

Cluster one and three report higher
numbers of tasks than two and four

Task_Complexity2

F(3, 202) = 2.121

η2 = .031

.099

Cluster one and three report greater
task dissimilarity than two and four

Task_Complexity3

F(3, 202) = 8.646

η2 = .114

.000

Cluster one reports greatest task
clarity, cluster four reports least

Task_Complexity4

F(3, 202) = .957

η2 = .014

.414

F(18,597) = 4.332

2

Task_Complexity5

F(3, 202) = 4.077

η = .057

.008

Cluster four reports least routine,
most atypical tasks; cluster three
reports most routine, least atypical
tasks

Task_Complexity6

F(3, 202) = 11.619

η2 = .147

.000

Cluster four reports least agreement
about tasks

Role_Single_Org_N

χ (6) = 7.091

V = .131

.316

Impetus_N

χ (9) = 25.960

V = .205

.002

Cluster one reports most agreement
2
2

Cluster one, three and four more
likely to be directly tasked by
higher authority
Cluster two more likely to be
voluntarily initiated by lower staff
levels or by leadership

Mandated

χ2(3) = 21.850

V = .326

.000

Cluster three most likely to be
mandated (82% of cases)
Cluster one and four are 60%
mandated / 40% voluntary
Cluster two more likely voluntary
(63% of cases)

Reason_Sum_LOI
Reason_Sum
Num_Orgs

χ2(6) = 9.091
F(3,202) = .320
Welch’s F(3,99.4)
= 1.722

V = .149

.168

2

.811

2

.001

η = .005
η = .036

Cluster three has highest mean
number of participating orgs. (15)
Cluster four has the lowest (8.3)

History_Sum
Time_Interact

F(3,202) = 1.711
F(3,202) = .592

2

.166

2

.621

η = .025
η = .009
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Effect
Size

Sig.

Details of Significant Results

χ (6) = 11.455

V = .075

.047

Clusters three (62%) and four (83%)
have higher proportions of “both
shared and individual” goals
compared to cluster one (50%) and
two (58%)

Org_Lead_N

χ2(6) = 4.042

V = .099

.678

Autonomy1_N

χ2(6) = 27.566

V = .259

.000

Cluster two more likely to have no
joint policies

Trust1_N

χ2(6) = 11.013

V = .163

.085

Cluster one more likely to report
necessity of trust at all levels

Variable

Statistic

Goals_N

2

Four-Cluster Solution Predictive Validity
A MANOVA was run with the five outcome variables as dependent variables and
cluster membership as the independent. Box’s M test of equality of covariance matrices
was highly significant, indicating that a key assumption for MANOVA was violated.
Furthermore, Levene’s test of equality of variances failed for three out of the five
outcome variables. Thus it is not possible to determine if a multivariate combination of
outcome variables can discriminate clusters in the four-cluster solution.
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs, correcting for the unequal variances, revealed
significant differences between cluster means for all outcome variables, but generally
weak effect sizes with the exception of Outcome1, which accounted for 14.8% of
variance between clusters (Table 5-27). For all variables, cluster three reports
significantly higher mean scores than clusters four. Cluster one reports significantly
higher mean scores than cluster four for Outcome1, Outcome2 and Outcome5.
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Table 5-27: ANOVA results for outcome variables and the four-cluster solution
4-Cluster Sol. K-means method using
seed points from hierarchical results
Outcome Variables
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral,
7=strongly agree)
Outcome1: Overall, the
multiorganizational interaction is
effective in achieving expected
outcomes
Outcome 2: Overall, high quality
working relationships have developed
between my organization and partner
organizations as a result of this
multiorganizational interaction
Outcome3: Overall, my organizations
view of the issue(s)/problem(s) that
brought the organizations together has
broadened as a result of the
interaction
Outcome 4: Overall, my organization
has increased its interaction with
partner organizations as a result of the
multiorganizational interaction
Outcome 5: Overall, the
multiorganizational interaction has
helped to make partner organizations’
influence on each other more equal
N

1

2

3

4

ANOVA

Mean

Mean

Mean

Mean

F

SD

SD

SD

SD

Significance

5.85

5.65

5.43

4.30

1.252

1.021

1.117

1.601

5.50

5.07

5.66

4.40

F(3,202) = 6.557

1.353

1.682

1.196

1.276

.000

5.65

5.40

5.90

5.10

1.436

1.498

.831

1.185

5.10

4.98

5.57

4.60

1.737

1.739

1.258

1.329

4.88

4.49

4.92

3.70

F(3,202) = 6.523

1.363

1.437

1.320

1.317

.000

72

43

61

30

η2

Welch’s F(3,89.7)
= 7.708
.148
.000

.089

Welch’s F(3,90.8)
= 7.435
.045
.000
Welch’s F(3,92.9)
= 4.089
.042
.009

.088

Four-Cluster Solution Interpretation
In the four-cluster solution, cluster one has 72 cases (35.0% of the total number),
cluster two has 43 cases (20.9%), cluster three has 61 (29.6%), and cluster four has 30
cases (14.6%). As the clusters are comprised of less cases than the two- and three-cluster
solutions, they have generally lower variances across the clustering variables and more
diverse or extreme means. The smaller clusters tend to exhibit greater error bars, as
shown in the means plot in Figure 5-3.
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The profiling in Table 5-25 shows that cluster one clearly can be interpreted as
collaboration in terms of the GIIA as clustering variables (V1 to V9) are predominately at
the level of collaboration. As with the three-cluster solution, Formality_S (V7) is at the
level of coordination. Cluster one in the four-cluster solution is characterized by high
levels of organizational commitment (V2 – V4), high levels of structure, process and
formality (V6 – V9), the highest levels of shared perspectives (V1), the highest levels of
trust (V11) and low levels of impact of autonomy (V10), more so than even for cluster
one in the three-cluster solution. Cluster three, on the other hand, has similar levels across
V2 – V9, but a high level of impact of autonomy (V10), average shared perspectives (V1)
and a slightly lower trust score (V11) compared to cluster one. Cluster three appears to be
a highly formalized variant of collaboration, but without the high levels of trust in cluster
one, and having a great impact on participating organization’s autonomy.
Cluster two exhibits high trust and shared perspectives, moderate organizational
commitments, low levels of structure, process and formality, and a low level—not
significantly different from cluster one—of autonomy. Cluster two receives an overall
rating of cooperation for Formality_S (V7), with 70% of cases indicating that no
formalized agreements exist in their respective interorganizational interactions. Cluster
two may be interpreted as another variant of “partnering” described in the three-cluster
solution, as the level of organizational commitment is higher than would be expected for
cooperation, but the level of formality and structure is fairly low.
Cluster four exhibits the lowest levels of trust and shared perspectives, low levels
of organizational commitment, moderate to high levels—between collaboration and
coordination—of formality, structure and process, but a high level of impact of
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autonomy. Cluster four is significantly lower across all outcome variables. Cluster four
may be the “difficult” collaboration variant observed in the three cluster solution.
Inspection of a cross-tabulation of the three-cluster solution with the four-cluster
solution shows that the original “collaboration” cluster in the three-cluster solution was
split evenly between clusters one and three in the four-cluster solution, supporting further
the interpretation of cluster three in the four-cluster solution as a collaboration variant.
Furthermore, about 30% of cases from cluster two in the three-cluster solution were
allocated to cluster one in the four-cluster solution, and about 70% formed a new cluster
two. The “difficult collaboration” cluster three in the three-cluster solution was split in
two in the four-cluster solution, with 36% of cases going to cluster three and 63% of
cases to cluster four. Closer inspection shows that the “difficult” cases ended up in cluster
four, whereas the less difficult cases went to cluster three.
The criterion validity tests demonstrate cluster discrimination across eight
variables: Work_Status, Time_Dur_Indef, Task_Complexity, Num_Orgs, Impetus_N,
Mandated, Autonomy1_N, and Trust1_N. Predictive validity tests of the five Outcome
variables were less conclusive due to violation of statistical assumptions required for the
MANOVA. Individual univariate tests showed generally higher means for clusters one
and three compared to cluster two and four. The univariate tests discriminated between
the clusters with Bonferroni-adjusted significance values. The criterion and predictive
results are supportive of an interpretation of cluster one and cluster three as collaboration.
Cluster one and three are more likely to: be indefinite in duration; involve higher
numbers of tasks of less clarity; report that no individual organization in an
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interorganizational interaction can achieve the collective goal independently; report that
trust is required at all levels; and involve joint policies.
The more granular look at the cluster structure reveals an inconsistency with the
interpretation from the three-cluster solution, in which cluster one was a high outcome,
high trust collaboration with low impact on autonomy, and cluster three was a low
outcome, low trust collaboration with high impact on autonomy. In the four-cluster
solution, there are three variants of collaboration, two high outcome variants (cluster one
and three) with high and average trust scores but significantly different high and low
autonomy levels, and a low outcome variant, with very low trust and high impact on
autonomy. The narrative in the interpretation for the three-cluster solution suggested that
in cluster three—the “difficult collaboration”—the low trust and shared perspectives
coupled with the high level of formalization contributed to a state of high impact on
autonomy. But in the four-cluster solution we now see a high impact of autonomy
collaboration (cluster three) and low impact of autonomy collaboration (cluster one) that
have similar levels of trust and similar high outcomes compared to the other clusters. A
series of MANCOVA tests were run to investigate these results further, especially
concerning the trust variable, which are explained in research question four.

Research Question 3
Research question three examines which dimensions of the GIIA are most
important for predicting an organization’s level of interaction in an interorganizational
interaction. In other words, which variables are most important in discriminating cluster
membership? Researchers are often faced with a multitude of potential variables that
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could be included in an analysis, thus selecting a parsimonious yet theoretically
meaningful set is important.
A series of discriminant function analyses were run for the two-, three-, and fourcluster solutions with the clustering, contextual and outcome variables. The aim of each
analyses was to investigate differences between clusters by creation of a discriminant
function—a linear combination of GIIA variables that maximizes group separation. The
coefficients of the discriminant functions, coupled with the function-variable correlations,
allow the relative contributions of variables to cluster separation to be assessed.
This section is organized as follows: first, the protocol concerning discriminant
analysis assumptions is reviewed; second, for each clustering solution the clustering,
contextual and outcome variables are assessed using the discriminant function
significance and model fits, the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients
and function-variable correlations; and third, the ability of functions to correctly classify
cases is checked. After reviewing the two-, three-, and four-cluster solution discriminant
analyses, an overall assessment is made about the contribution of the variables. For space
considerations, only the results from the clustering variables are shown in detail, and
results are only reported if the discriminant analysis assumptions are met.
Assumptions of Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant function analysis is fairly sensitive to assumptions concerning
sample size, multicollinearity, and equality of covariance between the tested groups.
First, the sample size must be assessed. Hair et al. (2006) recommend that the sample size
be 20X the number of independent variables. With ten clustering variables and a sample
of 206, this assumption is satisfied. Second, multicollinearity must be evaluated, as high
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correlations between variables affects their importance in the discriminant functions. The
results in Table 4-53 showed that only moderate to low correlations are present in the
clustering variables, thus multicollinearity is not an issue. The final assumption concerns
equality of covariance matrices. This is tested in each case using Box’s M test. If the
covariance matrices are not equivalent—indicated by a significance test at the .001
level—then the log determinants are compared. The convention adopted is that given the
large sample size, failures of Box’s M test can be ignored providing that log determinants
are of the same order of magnitude (Burns & Burns, 2008; Garson, 2012).
The interpretations for each of the results presented are as follows:


Function: a projection of the data onto a latent dimension that best separates
clusters. For more than two clusters, multiple orthogonal (i.e. uncorrelated)
functions are created.



Eigenvalue: a measure of overall effectiveness of a discriminant function by
describing how much discriminating ability a function possesses. For multiple
functions, eigenvalues are relative to each other.



Percent variance: the proportion of discriminating ability of all independent
variables in a discriminant function.



Wilk’s Lambda (Λ): the proportion of the total variance in discriminant scores
unexplained by group differences, hence the closer to zero Λ is, the more
representative a discriminant function is of the underlying variance.



Rc: the canonical correlations of discriminant scores with the set of independence
variables, indicating an overall strength of relationship between the discriminant
function and the variables.
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Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients: standardized weights
for each variable in the discriminant function, which allows calculation of
discriminant score used to classify cases. The magnitude of coefficients indicates
how strongly discriminating variables affect the score. Their calculation is
affected by correlation between variables, hence coefficients cannot be used as the
only source of interpretation.



Variable-discriminant function correlations: Often termed the “structure matrix,”
these report correlations between the independent variables and discriminating
functions, indicating how much variables ‘load’ onto functions reflecting shared
variance.



Classification confusion matrix: compares the prediction accuracy of the
discriminant functions with the actual data (cluster membership).

Two-Cluster Solution Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant analysis for the ten clustering variables, presented in Table 5-28,
revealed one discriminant function that significantly discriminated clusters, Λ = .323,
χ2(10) = 224.7, RC 2 = .677, p < .001. The Wilk’s Λ indicates that 32.3% of variance in
the discriminant scores is unexplained by the difference between clusters. The effect size,
RC 2, is moderate. Table 5-29 shows the classification accuracy of the discriminant
function is high, correctly classifying 96.6% of cases.
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Table 5-28: Summary discriminant analysis results for the two-cluster solution
Overall Model Fit: Canonical Discriminant Functions
Percent of Variance
Function

Eigenvalue

1

2.903

Function
%

Cum.
%

100

χ2

Canonical
Corr. RC

RC 2

Wilk’s Λ

(df)

Sig.

.823

.677

.323

224.7

.000

100

10
Discriminant Function Coefficients and Discriminant Loadings
Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients

Independent Variable –
Discriminant Function
Correlations

Function 1

Function 1

V1: Problem_Orient_Sum

.153

.133

V2: Resource_Alloc_Comp

.348

.327

V3: Incentives

.384

.336

V4: Key_Personnel_Sum

.353

.394

V6: Design_Comp

.357

.408

V7: Formality_S

.308

.391

V8: Info_Comp

.379

.495

V9: Decision_Comp

.385

.312

V10: Autonomy2_Sum

.113

.092

V11: Trust2_Sum

.083

.161

Independent Variables

Table 5-29: Classification matrix for two-cluster solution discriminant function
2-Cluster Sol. KMeans Method
Original

Count
%

Predicted Group Membership*
1

2

Total

1

119

0

119

2

7

80

87

1

100.0

.0

100.0

2

8.0

92.0

100.0

* 96.6% of original grouped cases correctly classified.
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For V2 – V8, the standardized coefficients lie within the range of .308 - .385, with
Decision_Comp (V9) the largest. V1, V10 and V11 lie within the range of .083 - .152,
with Trust2_Sum the smallest. These results indicate that the Trust2_Sum and
Autonomy2_Sum variable contribute least to the discriminant function scores, which is
further reflected in their low loadings (r =.161, r =.092, respectively). The analysis
confirms the conclusions from the two-cluster solution profiling made earlier—at the
relatively crude level of granularity provided by a two-cluster solution, clusters are
distinguished most based on the interorganizational category variables, which cannot
logically vary across groups to the extent that perceptual organizational category
variables can.
Another discriminant analysis was run for four contextual variables:
Purpose_Comp, Role_Single_Org_S, Reason_Sum, and History_Sum. These variables
were chosen because they are continuous and do not have missing values.
Task_Complexity_Sum was not selected due to its poor multivariate performance in the
previous tests, and Num_Orgs was omitted due to the nine cases removed for outliers.
Time_Dur was not selected as its number of cases does not meet the assumptions for
discriminant analysis. Other nominal variables cannot be used in the analysis due to the
limitations of the method.
One discriminant function was revealed that significantly but weakly
discriminated clusters, Λ = .942, χ2(4) = 12.175, RC 2 = .059, p = .016. The Wilk’s Λ
indicates that 94.2% of variance in the discriminant scores is unexplained by the
difference between clusters. The effect size, RC 2, is low, and correspondingly the low
classification accuracy of 60.2% was achieved. The results indicated that for this
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discriminant function (but not generally), History_Sum is highly correlated (r = .726)
and Role_Single_Org_S is moderately correlated (r = .643). These results confirm the
criterion validity tests displayed in Table 5-23, which showed a significant effect for
these variables, although History_Sum was not interpreted due to its low effect size.
A further discriminant analysis was run for the five Outcome variables. One
discriminant function was revealed that significantly but weakly discriminated clusters, Λ
= .917, χ2(5) = 17.482, RC 2 = .083, p = .004. The Wilk’s Λ indicates that 91.7% of
variance in the discriminant scores is unexplained by the difference between clusters. The
effect size, RC 2, is low, and correspondingly the low classification accuracy of 64.6%
was achieved. The structure matrix confirms the predictive validity MANOVA tests of
the clusters, showing that Outcome5, Outcome2 and Outcome3 discriminate most, albeit
weakly, between clusters.

Three-Cluster Solution Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant analysis for the ten clustering variables across the three-cluster
solution, presented in Table 5-30 revealed two discriminant functions. The first explained
53.1% of variance, RC 2 = .638, and the second explained 46.9% of variance, RC 2 = .608.
In combination, these functions significantly discriminated clusters, Λ = .142, χ2(20) =
387.9, p < .001. Removing the first function also significantly discriminated clusters, Λ =
.391, χ2(9) = 186.4, p < .001. Table 5-31 shows the classification accuracy of the
discriminant functions are high, correctly classifying 97.6% of cases.
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Table 5-30: Summary discriminant analysis results for the three-cluster solution
Overall Model Fit: Canonical Discriminant Functions
Percent of Variance
Function

Eigenvalue

1

1.760

2

Function
%

Cum.
%

53.1

1.557

RC 2

Wilk’s Λ

df

Sig.

.799

.638

.142

387.9

.000

(1 & 2)

20

.391

186.4

53.1

46.9

χ2

Canonical
Corr. RC

100.0

.780

.608

.000

9
Discriminant Function Coefficients and Discriminant Loadings
Independent Variable –
Discriminant Function
Correlations

Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients
Independent Variables

Function 1

Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

V1: Problem_Orient_Sum

.228

.621

.231

.658

V2: Resource_Alloc_Comp

.152

.037

.265

.133

V3: Incentives

.326

.305

.325

.183

V4: Key_Personnel_Sum

.298

.084

.393

.009

V6: Design_Comp

.370

.072

.441

-.117

V7: Formality_S

.187

-.356

.374

-.261

V8: Info_Comp

.442

-.387

.591

-.202

V9: Decision_Comp

.453

-.056

.390

-.061

V10: Autonomy2_Sum

.090

-.281

.086

-.419

V11: Trust2_Sum

.026

.446

.203

.552

Table 5-31: Classification matrix for three-cluster solution discriminant functions
3-Cluster Sol. KMeans Method
Original

Count

%

Predicted Group Membership*
1

2

3

Total

1

100

0

0

100

2

6

54

2

62

3

4

0

40

44

1

100.0

.0

.0

100.0

2

9.7

87.1

3.2

100.0

3

9.1

.0

90.9

100.0

* 94.2% of original grouped cases correctly classified.
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Comparing the discriminant loadings for the two functions offer the best way to
interpret the results. The loadings for function one are highest across the
interorganizational category variables (Design_Comp (r = .441), Formality_S (r = .374),
Info_Comp (r = .591), Decision_Comp (r = .390)), the next highest across the
organizational commitment group of variables (Resource_Alloc_Comp (r = .265),
Incentives (r = .325), Key_Personnel_Sum (r = .393)), and finally lowest across the three
perception-based organizational variables (Problem_Orient_Sum (r = .231),
Autonomy2_Sum (r = .086), Trust2_Sum (r = .203)). Thus the interorganizational
variables offer greatest discriminating power, confirmed by their generally higher
coefficient magnitudes.
In comparison, correlations of the variables with function two show the highest
loadings—even greater in magnitude than function one—for the perception-based
variables (Problem_Orient_Sum (r = .658), Autonomy2_Sum (r = -.419), Trust2_Sum (r
= .552)). Conversely, the other variables now load very weakly—all less than .26—with
function two.
The territorial map in Figure 5-4 shows this visually. Looking horizontally across
function one, cluster one is at a further distance from clusters two and three. Cluster one
showed the greatest difference from the other two in terms of its interorganizational
category variables—thus explaining why these variables load more on function one.
Looking vertically at function two, cluster three is now at a greater distance from clusters
one and two. Cluster three showed the greatest difference from the others in terms of its
values for trust, shared perspectives and autonomy—explaining why these variables load
more onto function two.
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Figure 5-4: Territorial map for three-cluster solution discriminant analysis

Another discriminant analysis for the four contextual variables across the threecluster solution revealed two discriminant functions. The first explained 58.3% of
variance, RC 2 = .038, and the second explained 41.7% of variance, RC 2 = .028. In
combination, these functions significantly but weakly discriminated clusters, Λ = .936,
χ2(8) = 13.425, p = .098. When the first function was removed, however, clusters were
not significantly discriminated, Λ = .972, χ2(2) = 5.621, p = .132. The classification
accuracy of the discriminant functions were moderate, correctly classifying 55.8% of
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cases. Due to the weak effects, the variable-function loadings are not conclusive, but
overall the model provides a weak confirmation of the criterion validity of clusters.
Finally, a discriminant analysis for the five outcome variables across the threecluster solution revealed two discriminant functions. The first explained 88.5% of
variance, RC 2 = .190, and the second explained 11.5% of variance, RC 2 = .003. In
combination, these functions significantly but weakly discriminated clusters, Λ = .786,
χ2(10) = 48.508, p < .001. When the first function was removed, however, clusters were
not significantly discriminated, Λ = .970, χ2(5) = 6.051, p = .195. The classification
accuracy of the discriminant functions were low, correctly classifying only 48.1% of
cases. The overall the model provides a reasonable confirmation of the predictive validity
of clusters. Inspection of the discriminant function centroids and territorial maps shows
that function one discriminates cluster one from two and three, and function two
discriminates cluster two from one and three.

Four-Cluster Solution Discriminant Analysis
Discriminant analysis for the ten clustering variables across the four-cluster
solution revealed three discriminant functions, presented in Table 5-32. The first
explained 52.0% of variance, RC 2 = .717, the second explained 36.8% of variance, RC 2 =
.643, and the third explained 11.1% of variance, RC 2 = .209. In combination, these
functions significantly and strongly discriminated clusters, Λ = .065, χ2(30) = 539.8, p <
.001. Removing the first and second functions also significantly discriminated clusters at
the < .001 level. Table 5-33 shows the classification accuracy of the discriminant
functions are high, correctly classifying 97.1% of cases.
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Table 5-32: Summary discriminant analysis results for the four-cluster solution
Overall Model Fit: Canonical Discriminant Functions
Percent of Variance
Function

Eigenvalue

1

2.538

2
3

Function
%

1.798
.543

52.0

Cum.
%
52.0

36.8

88.9

11.1

100.0

χ2

Canonical
Corr. RC

RC 2

.847

.717

.802
.593

Wilk’s Λ

df

Sig.

.065

539.8

.000

(1, 2 & 3)

30

.232

289.6

(2 & 3)

18

.648

85.9

.643
.209

.000
.000

8
Discriminant Function Coefficients and Discriminant Loadings
Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients
Independent Variables

Independent Variable –
Discriminant Function
Correlations

Func. 1

Func. 2

Func. 3

Func. 1

Func. 2

Func. 3

V1: Problem_Orient_Sum

-.289

.482

.322

-.214

.545

.251

V2: Resource_Alloc_Comp

.058

.286

.150

.100

.329

.218

V3: Incentives

.085

.476

-.022

.118

.373

.066

V4: Key_Personnel_Sum

.049

.174

.428

.220

.232

.360

V6: Design_Comp

.279

.368

.031

.370

.237

.108

V7: Formality_S

.369

-.150

.069

.408

.056

.224

V8: Info_Comp

.624

.022

-.289

.510

.286

-.260

V9: Decision_Comp

.396

.269

-.542

.307

.231

-.409

V10: Autonomy2_Sum

.449

-.339

.641

.428

-.385

.603

V11: Trust2_Sum

-.177

.294

.254

-.149

.502

.126

Interpretation of the coefficients and loadings is more challenging with three
functions; however, the territorial map in Figure 5-5 shows that function one separates
out cluster two, whereas function two separates out cluster four. Again, this is due to the
different ways to load the autonomy and trust variables compared with the
interorganizational variables. Cluster four is the lowest on trust, but the highest on impact
of autonomy, whereas cluster two is the inverse.
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Table 5-33: Classification matrix for four-cluster solution discriminant functions

Original

Count

%

Predicted Group Membership*

4-Cluster Sol. KMeans Method

1

2

3

4

1

71

0

1

0

72

2

2

41

0

0

43

3

1

0

59

1

61

4

0

0

1

29

30

1

98.6

.0

1.4

.0

100.0

2

4.7

95.3

.0

.0

100.0

3

1.6

.0

96.7

1.6

100.0

4

.0

.0

3.3

96.7

100.0

* 97.1% of original grouped cases correctly classified.

Figure 5-5: Territorial map for four-cluster solution discriminant analysis

Total

258
Summary of Results
As more groups are added to the discriminant calculation, interpretation becomes
increasingly challenging. Hair et al. (2006) recommend calculating a “potency index,”
which creates a composite sum of a variable’s discriminating power across functions. The
potency indices (multiplied by 100 for ease of viewing) are shown in Table 5-34. The
indices for the two-cluster solution are simply the squared correlations (discriminant
loadings) as there is only one function with one eigenvalue.
Table 5-34: Potency indices for 4-, 3, & 2-cluster solution discriminant analyses
4-Cluster Solution

3-Cluster Solution

2-Cluster Solution

Potency
Index

Rank

Potency
Index

Rank

Potency
Index

Rank

V1: Problem_Orient_Sum

14.04

3

23.14

1

1.77

9

V2: Resource_Alloc_Comp

5.04

10

4.56

10

10.69

6

V3: Incentives

5.91

9

7.18

9

11.29

5

V4: Key_Personnel_Sum

5.94

8

8.21

8

15.52

3

V6: Design_Comp

9.32

6

10.97

4

16.65

2

V7: Formality_S

9.33

5

10.62

5

15.29

4

V8: Info_Comp

17.29

2

20.46

2

24.50

1

V9: Decision_Comp

8.73

7

8.25

7

9.73

7

V10: Autonomy2_Sum

19.03

1

8.63

6

0.85

10

V11: Trust2_Sum

10.63

4

16.48

3

2.59

8

Variable

The top four ranks in each solution are in bold

The two-cluster solution resulted in one cluster clearly interpretable as
collaboration, and another that, while not at any one particular level of interaction, clearly
lacked certain key features of collaboration such as formalized policies and joint decision
making. This is reflected in the ranking for potency indices. The top four ranks (in bold)
all relate to “observable” aspects of an interorganizational interaction that either are or
are not present. The least discriminating variables are the autonomy, trust and shared
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perspectives, which as discussed in the cluster interpretations – have no “logical” reason
constraining their values across clusters.
The three-cluster solution “opened up” the second cluster from the two cluster
solution based on different scores on trust, autonomy, and shared perspectives. This is
indicated by top rankings for these variables, with the exception of autonomy. Once
again, Design_Comp is highly ranked, indicating that the presence—or absence—of joint
decision-making forums is critical to distinguishing clusters. The four-cluster solution
creates even more detail between clusters. It appears that the numerous possible
combinations of variables two through nine smooth-out the overall importance of their
discriminating power, leaving clusters to be primarily distinguished by variations in trust,
autonomy and shared perspectives.
For all solution sets, Info_Comp is consistently ranked high, either first or second,
in discriminating ability. Reviewing the descriptives in Table 4-35 show that this variable
scores predominately at the level of collaboration terms of the nominal categorical
variable, Info_Comp_LOI. Examining the frequency distribution for the continuous
version of the variable reveals a highly skewed distribution. Further analysis needs
conducting using a stepwise approach to adding variables into the discriminant function
to understand the importance of this finding.
In conclusion, the discriminant function analysis adds supporting weight to the
distinctiveness of clusters, although their interpretation in terms of the GIIA is still
inconclusive, with the exception of the collaboration-variant clusters. The discriminant
function analysis also reaffirms the multivariate results concerning the weak, but
significant difference in outcomes between clusters.
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Research Question 4
Research question four asks to what extent dimensions of an interorganizational
interaction array can be conceptualized as “increasing” along a continuum of interaction.
The aim is to critique and evaluate this assumption inherent in much public
administration and organizational science literature. The analysis proceeds as follows.
First, for each dimension of the GIIA descriptive and cluster analysis results are
reviewed, referring back to the original GIIA framework and, where necessary, the
supporting literature. At each stage, the ability to interpret the dimension as varying along
a continuum is made. Second, an overall evaluation is made of the usefulness of the
dimension in understanding or defining interaction states. Finally, the evidence for each
dimension of the GIIA is summarized and conclusions are made. The following
abbreviations are used: two-cluster solution (2CS), three-cluster solution (3CS) and fourcluster solution (4CS).
Review of GIIA Dimensions
Purpose of interorganizational interaction
While Mandell and Steelman (2003) and Keast et al. (2007) make the reasonable
assumption that “increasing” levels of interaction are associated with more complex
purposes, the purpose dimension of the GIIA does not discriminate any of the cluster
solutions identified. The descriptive results for the Purpose_Comp and
Purpose_Comp_LOI variables show that 72.8% of responses are at the level of
collaboration, in GIIA terms. This should increase the chance that clusters clearly
identified as collaboration, based on the clustering variables, would differ significantly
from the other clusters. The cross-tabulations and chi-square analysis show no such
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result, however, as the cases with high levels of Purpose_Comp are even spread
throughout all clusters. There are 44 case of interorganizational interactions that are
clearly not collaboration as defined by clustering variables, but in which the purpose
dimension is rated at the level of collaboration.
The survey results do not support use of the purpose dimension in defining an
interaction state. There is nothing preventing an informal network aspiring to create
institutional and system change—the highest ranking purpose. Similarly, it is reasonable
to assume that highly formalized and structured collaborations could be formed purely for
the purpose of exploring interests—the lowest ranking purpose in the GIIA. There is little
support to interpret this dimension as a continuum.
There is a possibility, however, that results are affected by the survey sample. In
the highly bureaucratized domain of defense organizations, interaction between
organizations may more likely be formalized—regardless of the purpose. Thus future
research is needed in other contexts to evaluate the importance of purpose, especially as it
seems a popular choice in defining interaction states (Cross et al., 2009; Gajda, 2004;
Gajda & Koliba, 2007).
Time
The length of time that the interorganizational interaction is expected to exist is
significant for cluster one (collaboration) in the 2CS, and for clusters one (collaboration)
and three (difficult collaboration) in the 3CS. No significant results are found in the 4CS.
In general, the clusters identifying as collaboration are more likely to be either indefinite
or of greater number of months in duration. This supports the assertion made by
McNamara (2008) that collaboration is associated with longer-term interactions.

262
From a logical perspective, however, there is no reason why interaction states
should be defined by time. In fact, many examples can be found of intense collaboration
in emergency or crisis situations (Bryson et al., 2006; Simo, 2009). While the time
dimension is a “natural” continuum, there is little reason why it should be overlain onto a
continuum of interaction.
Difficulty
For all cluster solutions, the Task_Complexity variables discriminate clusters in
the expected direction, with collaboration clusters receiving generally higher ratings. The
factor analysis for this dimension is inconclusive, however, indicating that each element
should be retained as a separate feature. For example, Task_Complexity6, which captures
the level of disagreement amongst participants, may be more related to other dimensions
in the framework such as participant’s problem orientation, trust, and autonomy.
While task complexity overall discriminates clusters, there are some unexpected
results. For example, task complexity is higher overall for cluster three—the “difficult”
variant of collaboration—in the 3CS. Furthermore, results from the 4CS show that the
cooperation-like or partnering clusters report greater task dissimilarity. This hints at the
possibility that task complexity may not be a necessary condition for any particular
interaction state. In other words, there is no logical reason why “collaboration” could not
exist in the absence of high task complexity.
Role of single organization
For the 2CS, cluster one is more likely to report that no single organization can
accomplish the goals alone—the highest level of Role_Single_Org_N. At the low level of
detail afforded by the 2CS, collaboration in general is distinguished by this dimension.
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With the greater resolution of detail in the 3CS and 4CS, however, this dimension does
not discriminate clusters.
Strictly, there is no logical reason why a highly formalized and structured
collaboration could not exist for a problem that any one of the collaborating organizations
could solve alone. A total of 36 respondents, for example, record that their participation
in the interaction is technically “voluntary” but is necessary to prevent loss of reputation.
For these cases there is insufficient evidence to understand the reasons for this choice of
answer, but the possibility remains that highly capable organizations—especially in the
defense sector—could solve problems on their own but instead choose to collaborate for
other reasons.
Interdependence is treated as a fundamental element of collaboration in the
literature (Emerson et al., 2012; Morris et al., 2013; Morris & Miller-Stevens, 2016b;
Trist, 1977), or as Gray (1989) states: “collaboration implies interdependence” (p.11).
Thus even given the inconclusive results from the survey, there is theoretical ground to
warrant continued inclusion of this dimension in the framework. This dimension was
captured by a single survey question with only three possible options, which given the
complex nature of interdependence, is probably insufficient.
Impetus for collective action
This dimension describes two distinct components: first whether an organization’s
participation in an interaction is voluntary or mandated, and second, ratings of
importance of different reasons for an organization’s participation. Result show that the
mandated/voluntary status of an interaction significantly discriminates clusters in all
solutions. Generally, the cluster identifying as collaboration is more likely to be
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mandated. Given the number of exceptions (e.g. 26% of cluster one was voluntary), the
fact that an interaction is mandated does not seem to be a strong determinant of an
interaction state: mandated cooperation could equally well exist, albeit less frequently as
evidenced from the survey results, as mandated collaboration.
McNamara (2016) suggests that mandated collaborations are distinct interaction
states that occupy a separate “level” in an interorganizational array. Further testing is
needed to determine whether this is the case and the multitude of consequences that
result. Bryson et al. (2006) suggest that deliberate planning—i.e. joint decision boards—
is more likely in mandated collaborations. A cross-tabulation of Design_Comp_LOI with
Mandated shows this to be the case. In the context of the present study, there is evidence
to suggest that the mandated/voluntary nature is important in distinguishing interaction
states, but there little justification for placing “mandated” interactions on a continuum.
The other part of the impetus dimension captures the importance of several
reasons for an organization’s participation. No significant relationships are found,
indicating that the importance of a particular reason is highly contextual for each
organization, regardless of interaction state. There is no justification for assuming a level
of interaction in this dimension.
Numbers of participating organizations
In the 2CS, there are no differences between clusters in terms of the number of
participating organizations. In the 3CS, cluster one (collaboration) has slightly higher
mean numbers, and in the 4CS, cluster three (collaboration variant) is higher. No specific
prediction is made in the GIIA about the numbers of organizations for each level of
interaction. The results suggest that collaboration may be associated generally with
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higher numbers. This may be indicative, however, of increased interdependence or task
complexity rather than something fundamental about the number of participants. Higher
numbers of participants may also naturally force different types of decision making
structures, though in the terms of the present study this assertion is not supported as
cluster three (the difficult variant of collaboration) exhibits the lowest number of
participating organizations but has a high level of collaboration-like decision making
structures.
Category of participating organizations
Margerum (2008) finds that different interaction states can be identified based on
the types of participants, which in turn relate to the nature of the problem bringing
organizations together. Other scholars define collaboration in terms of a cross-sector
interaction (Ansel & Gash, 2007). Although no specific predictions are made in the GIIA,
no evidence is found that suggests any difference between clusters in terms of
participating organizations. The significance of this finding, however, should be
interpreted in the context of the study sample, which was dominated heavily by
governmental organizations.
History of previous interaction in the problem domain
The extent to which organizations and participants have worked together on
previous initiatives only weakly discriminates clusters in the 2CS, with the collaboration
cluster reporting higher previous history scores. Mattessich et al. (2001) identify previous
history as a key element of a successful collaboration, and a major explanatory part of
Ostrom (2005) institutional analysis framework relies on the fact that repeated
interactions over time contribute to shared institutions and trust. Conversely, using
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empirical data during disaster relief collaborations, Hicklin et al. found no evidence that
prior history affected collaboration.
While there is very weak evidence from the present study to suggest an effect, the
special case of the sample may affect the results. Military officers and NATO civilian
staff tend to rotate posts fairly frequently, hence respondents may not have had a full
appreciation of the extent of previous history of interaction with other organizations.
Participant’s problem orientation
The extent to which participants view problems from a shared or individual
perspective strongly discriminates clusters, with decreasing importance moving from the
4CS to the 2CS. Mandell and Steelman (2003) assert that shared perspectives are
necessary for higher levels of interaction, and Mattessich et al. (2001) identify it as a
requirement for successful collaboration. Shared perspectives are related to the more
encompassing concept of “shared vision,” which is frequently identified as an essential
component of collaboration (Mayer & Kenter, 2016).
There is strong evidence for treating this dimension as varying along a continuum.
First, its discriminating power increases with greater number of clusters, and second, the
descriptives reveal a relatively smooth frequency distribution, albeit fairly skewed
towards the higher end of the scale as indicated by the _LOI version of the variable.
While the dimension does discriminate clusters, there is no logical reason as to
why interaction states must fundamentally be defined by the presence or absence of
shared vision, and the evidence suggests that this dimension is more indicative of the
level of perceived outcomes rather than the structural nature of an interaction. The
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MANCOVA results, for example, reveal that differences in outcome variables between
clusters become nonsignificant when controlling for the Problem_Orient_Sum variables.
Resource allocation
Resource allocation—or the contributions allocated by individual organizations to
the interorganizational interaction—is a moderate discriminant of clusters. Across all
cluster solutions, cluster tend to form into two variants with respect to this dimension—
high resource allocation at the level of collaboration in GIIA terms, and moderate
resource allocation at the level of coordination in GIIA terms.
The underlying distribution of Resource_Alloc_Comp values are smooth, with
very few values below the level of coordination. This is likely a sample effect due to the
nature of military and government organizations, which contribute relatively substantial
resources even for small interactions. For example, almost 80% of cases indicate that
their organization had contributed financially to interactions.
There is justification for treating resource allocation as a continuum. Above the
level of cooperation, the distribution of the composite variable Resource_Alloc_Comp is
fairly smooth. Increasing resource allocation in terms of money, personnel time, or
physical assets represents increasing “stakes” for an organization involved in an
interaction, and there is a logical relationship between the level of organizational
involvement and the existence of collective decision making apparatus, as portrayed by
the interorganizational category of dimensions.
The exception to the continuum is perhaps the idea that resources are “pooled” in
certain interaction states. One of the survey items, taken from the “collaboration” cell of
the GIIA for the resource allocation dimension, states that organizations “pool financial
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resources with other organizations into an independent operating fund for the
multiorganizational interaction.” Only 7% of respondents selected this option, which
seems incongruent with the generally higher rated answers from other items in this scale.
Further research should expand on the meaning of pooling resources; the stated benefit of
pooling seems linked with other important features of interorganizational interaction such
as authority, autonomy and decision making.
Incentives
This dimension as stated in the GIIA captures both the intrinsic and extrinsic
rewards provided to individuals and participating organizations. No reliable survey
instruments were found that could capture the entire dimension and only the leadership
element was carried forward in the survey, which rated the extent to which leaders
recognized the benefits of participating in the interaction. This dimension is a reasonable
discriminant of clusters and is significantly lower for the less successful clusters four (in
the 4CS) and three (in the 3CS).
While the descriptive results indicate a heavy skew toward the level of
collaboration, there is nothing in principle preventing this dimension from existing on a
continuum. It is not certain, however, whether its point on a continuum is relevant for an
interorganizational interaction state, as leaders could equally recognize the benefit of
participating even for a low level of interaction. For the 3CS, the results show that 67%
of cases in cluster two—the “lower” interaction state in terms of overall mean values—
received the highest rating for incentives.
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Time to establish multiorganizational arrangement
Keast et al. (2007) suggest that the time it takes for an interorganizational to
establish itself to the point where it could achieve its objectives, is related to the level of
interaction. No significant results are found for this dimension. Given the lack of concern
in the literature for this particular dimension, its removal from the GIIA is supported.
Key personnel
This dimension describes the extent of involvement of personnel responsible for
bringing together and implementing the interorganizational interaction. Two questions
looking at the role of staff and the role of leadership were combined into a single
composite scale. The smooth variation of the scale variable suggests that this dimension
can be interpreted as a continuum, although for this sample the distribution is skewed
towards the level of collaboration. This dimension is best at discriminating clusters in the
2CS. In the 3CS and 4CS, it does not discriminate between the collaboration-variant
clusters, but does for the non-collaboration clusters.
At the level of collaboration, the GIIA includes additional elements concerning
the role of lead organizations, thus a third survey question was created to ask respondents
about whether a single organization led the group (Org_Lead_N). This was not included
in the key personnel variable due to the obvious level of analysis inconsistency, and the
variable was instead used to profile clusters. The Org_Lead_N variable does not
discriminate clusters, indicating that for this sample, whether an interorganizational
interaction is led by single or multiple organization makes little difference to the level of
interaction. This result stands in contrast to the importance placed on “lead organizationgoverned networks” by Provan and Kenis (2008), who suggest that the type of collective
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governance (either shared, lead organization, or via a bespoke “network” organization) is
related to the numbers of participants, goal consensus and trust.
Orientation of policy objective (goals)
This dimension captures the extent to which goals are agreed between
organizations. As a result of a highly skewed response distribution, this dimension was
not selected for clustering as originally intended and was used to profile the cluster
solutions. The Goals_N variable significantly but weakly discriminates clusters in the
4CS and 3CS, showing that the “difficult collaboration” cluster three is less likely to
report shared goals than the other clusters. The evidence for this dimension’s inclusion in
the GIIA and its interpretation as a continuum of interaction is inconclusive.
Design
This dimension captures the administrative structure emerging from the
interorganizational interaction and reflects the “intensity” of the ways in which
organizations work together. Arguably, this dimension captures a core element of
collaboration—the presence of joint decision making boards or joint organizations
created specifically for the interaction—a fact recognized in all the interorganizational
array and typologies reviewed for this study, and much of the broader literature on
collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009).
For the 2CS and 3CS this dimension strongly discriminates all clusters, and for
the 4CS discriminates only cluster two, with the other three clusters being similar in
design level. This dimension is crucial in interpreting clusters as “collaboration,”
indicated by a majority of cases at the level of collaboration for the Design_Comp
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variable. The descriptive analysis reveals a smooth distribution of the Design_Comp
variable, thus lending support to the interpretation of a continuum.
Formality of the agreement
This dimension describes the way in which organizations agree on their roles and
responsibilities in the interaction, either informally, formally specifying roles, or formally
specifying detailed planning in addition to roles. Overall, this dimension as strong
discriminant of clusters for the 2CS, but less so for the other solutions, although cluster
two in the 3CS is substantially different in its level of formality.
Cross-tabulations with the other dimensions reveal some obvious results:
mandated interactions exhibit more formal arrangements, and executive-level decision
making structures are associated with higher formality. Yet it is challenging to interpret
the dimension as a continuum; instead, it appears to be a binary condition: either the
interorganizational interaction is informal, or there are some formalized policies. The
significant results mainly lie in the difference between these two states, rather than the
two variants of formalization expressed in the survey question. This binary state is
reflected in the pattern of discriminant analysis for clusters, with the collaboration-variant
cluster types lying close together in formality, including the “difficult” variants, and the
non-collaboration cluster types with low formality being fairly distinct.
Information sharing and communications
This dimension describes the ways in which organizations use information and
communication processes, and is a strong discriminator of clusters for all cluster
solutions. The descriptive analysis shows, however, that the distribution is highly skewed
towards the top value possible, putting 77.2% of all respondents at collaboration. While
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the impact of this skew was not appreciated at the time the cluster analysis was
conducted, further investigation is required concerning this dimension, including omitting
it from further cluster analysis runs. The evidence supporting this dimension in the GIIA
is inconclusive, even given its top ranking as a discriminant variable. There is insufficient
evidence to evaluation its interpretation as a continuum.
Decision making
Decision making refers to the ways in which organizations make decisions in the
interaction in terms of its level of collectiveness. This dimensions is one of the weaker
discriminators of clusters and is ranked seventh out of ten in potency index for all cluster
solutions. Given the importance of this dimension in the collaboration literature this
result was initially surprising, however, closer analysis reveals that its discriminating
power lies mainly in discerning collaboration from non-collaboration. Much research
identifies certain types of collective decision making as synonymous with collaboration.
Thomson and Perry (2006), for example, identify the decision making and governance
mechanism as a core component of the “black box” of collaboration process, and many of
the interorganizational arrays reviewed include this dimension (Carrasco, 2009; Gajda,
2004; McNamara, 2012; Williams, 2010; Woodland & Hutton, 2012). Descriptive
analysis shows a smooth distribution of scores across the sample, indicating that this
dimension can be interpreted as a continuum.
Organizational autonomy
The autonomy dimension captures the degree to which each partnering
organization independently operates. The GIIA along with much collaboration research
assumes that as the level of interaction increases, individual organizations become less

273
autonomous as a consequence of an “intrinsic tension between self-interest and the
collective interest.” (Thomson, 2001, p.94). Autonomy is weakly discriminating for the
2CS, moderately discriminating for the 3CS and strongly discriminating for the 4CS.
The results obtained do not support the hypothesis that increasing interaction
results in loss of autonomy. In the 3CS there are two variants of collaboration, identified
by their high scores on interorganizational dimensions, which differ markedly on the
autonomy scores. The “difficult” collaboration variant has the highest autonomy score.
Likewise, the four cluster solution features three variants of collaboration, two with high
autonomy scores, and one with very low scores. Yet all of these clusters have relatively
high scores on the interorganizational dimensions, meaning that the presence of highly
formalized policies and joint decision making do not necessarily result in loss of
autonomy.
The autonomy dimension is lifted primarily from the work of Thomson (2001);
Thomson et al. (2009), however, this dimension often gave inconclusive and sometimes
contradictory results. This was explained by the fact that organizations in Thomson’s
study samples “do not experience a great deal of tension between their own self-interest
and the collective interest of the collaboration” (Thomson, 2001, p. 145). A simple and
obvious explanation for this result, however, lies in the basic nature of interorganizational
interaction itself: the collective structures created to govern and administer a
collaboration may serve to mitigate the negative effects of reduced organizational
autonomy. If an organization is involved in collaboration in the first place, that may
signify that the collaboration is important to achievement of that organization’s mission.
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The loss of autonomy may be applicable at the very start of collaboration, but as
organizations interact and create joint governance and administration structures, the
autonomy issue is less relevant in the context of an ongoing collaborative process.
This suggests that, rather than considering the loss of autonomy in collaboration,
research should focus on how collaboration mitigates or reduces the importance of this
loss. This would involve a complete re-specification of the autonomy dimension in the
GIIA to an “Importance of Organizational Autonomy” dimension. There is indication of
the importance of this from the results concerning outcomes. When controlling for
autonomy, for example, MANCOVA results show a reduced significance and effect size
of difference between means of cluster solutions.
Given that autonomy is shown to vary across different interactions states in which
the interorganizational dimensions are essentially constant, there is little justification for
interpreting autonomy as a continuum, even though descriptive results show a smooth
distribution throughout the total sample. This also suggests that autonomy should not be
an intrinsic part of a definition of interorganizational interaction.
Trust
The trust dimension refers to the extent to which trustworthy relationships
between organizations are built. This dimension is derived from the wide literature on
institutional rational choice and game theory, which suggests that participation in
collective action is increased by tit-for-tat reciprocity between participants (Axelrod,
1984; Ostrom, 2005; Thomson, 2001). Short-term reciprocal behavior creates a
reputation and trust norm, which thus supports long term reciprocal behavior as this norm
become institutionalized. As related in the literature review on many of the frameworks
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and typologies, trust is essential to collaboration in the absence of formal legal rational
authority.
Trust is strongly discriminating in the 3CS and 4CS, but differentiates clusters in
a different manner to the autonomy dimension. In the 3CS, cluster one (collaboration)
and cluster two (informal partnering) exhibit similar high levels of trust, but differ in their
autonomy. Cluster three (difficult collaboration), on the other hand, is very low in trust.
In the 4CS, the three variants of collaboration differ markedly on their trust values.
The importance of trust can be evaluated using the five outcome variables. The
MANOVA analysis reported previously showed a multivariate effect of cluster
membership on outcome level for the 3CS (V = .220, F(10, 400) = 4.946, p < .001, η2 =
.110). When controlling for trust, however, a MANCOVA reveals that the significance in
differences in outcome means for each cluster are almost removed (V = .073, F(10, 398)
= 4.946, p = .131, η2 = .037). Individual post-hoc comparisons between clusters reveal
only barely significant differences between clusters one and three for Outcome2 and
Outcome4.
Similarly to autonomy, trust can vary significantly across similar interaction
states, thus there is little justification for interpreting it along a continuum of interaction.
Further research should encourage treating trust as an important interaction variable as
Lundin (2007) does, in addition to treating it as an input and output of a collective
process. The results in the present study do not support the description of trust in the
GIIA. At the highest levels of interaction trust was found at both high and low values.
The MANCOVA result show that trust is more important for outcomes than it is for
defining a particular level of interaction.
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Resolution of turf issues
This dimension was not evaluated in the survey.

Conclusions and Evaluation of Interorganizational Array Structure
A continuum of interaction?
The GIIA tested in this research was created from a variety of previous attempts
in the literature, which all have two things in common. First, they assume a continuum of
interaction, and second they define arbitrarily-named interaction states (i.e. cooperation,
coordination or collaboration) based on their constituent dimensions. Part of the
justification of this present study lies in the fact that many of the supporting typologies
and arrays as a whole have not been well tested.
While many of the dimensions included in typologies and arrays have strong
theoretical and empirical backing for their importance to interorganizational interaction,
when researchers attempted to overlay a continuum of interaction on these dimension, it
forced them to create operationalizations at each level for each dimension. For the arrays
with five or more discrete levels such as those by Mandell and Steelman (2003) and
Gajda (2004), it is questionable whether the level of detail is meaningful. With the large
sample of evidence presented in the present study what, if anything, needs to change? Are
the typologies and arrays valid and useful?
The results summarized in Table 5-35 at the end of this section paint a mixed
picture. Some dimensions can be interpreted as a continuum, while others cannot. The
fact that a dimension is a continuum, however, does not necessarily signify theoretical or
practical importance in defining an interaction state. In terms of distinguishing between
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interaction states, many of the interorganizational-type dimensions exhibit “threshold”
effects, independent of the level of interaction. Once a certain value is reached, any
additional variation makes no further difference. For the sample surveyed in this research,
the interorganizational-type dimensions are important only in a “binary” sense—either
they are high or low, and this is the only meaningful distinguishing feature between the
various clusters found. The implication for the GIIA or other arrays is that is it is not
meaningful to create highly refined graduations to distinguish interaction states.
On the other hand, three of the organization-type variables—problem orientation,
autonomy, and trust—are clearly continuous, thus one might assume that they can be
overlain on a continuum of interaction. The results show, however, that this is not the
case. In the four cluster solution, three collaboration-variant clusters are observed—based
on the interorganizational dimension values—yet these three clusters have completely
different values for autonomy. Thus it is clearly false to assign a particular level of
autonomy in the way in which the GIIA and many other arrays do. A similar result is
found for trust and also problem orientation. The results do not suggest that these
dimensions are unimportant, but merely that they cannot be included on a continuum of
interaction.
The importance of dimension type
From the twenty or so typologies and arrays reviewed in chapter two, a
framework was created to organize and categorize the dimensions encountered (Table 27). This framework distinguishes dimensions based on whether they are contextual,
organizational or interorganizational. From the literature analysis, a conclusion was
reached that the contextual-type dimensions should not be used to define interaction
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states, as they are by definition—contextual. The cluster analysis results show that this
conclusion is warranted: with the exception of the interdependence (role of single
organization) and the mandated/voluntary (impetus) dimensions, the contextual
dimensions generally have no bearing on the state of interaction. This does not imply that
they are unimportant, just that they should not be called upon do create fundamental
definitions.
The organizational- and interorganizational-type dimensions, on the other hand,
are key in defining interorganizational interaction states. The two-cluster solution shows
two distinct clusters in which the trust, autonomy and problem orientation dimensions are
essentially averaged out, but the interorganizational and remaining organizational
dimensions are either high or low. The “higher resolution” three-cluster and four-cluster
solutions mainly increase the detail of the “high” cluster in the two-cluster solution. Part
of the reason is that the interorganizational-type dimensions logically “hang” together—a
collective decision making process and an executive level decision board would suggest
that a formalized agreement is present between participants.
Likewise, the organizational-type dimensions of key personnel and resource
allocation logically are related: the extent to which personnel throughout an organization
are involved in an interaction, is likely related to the extent to which financial and
physical resources are involved. Again, the cluster solutions generally indicate that these
two variables exist in an either high or medium state.
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Table 5-35: Summary evaluation of evidence for each GIIA dimension

Dimensions

Type

Purpose of
Interorganizational
interaction

Context

Time

Context

Continuum of
Interaction?

Include in
GIIA?

N

N

Justification / Recommendations
No logical reason
No evidence

Y

N

No logical reason
No evidence

Difficulty

Context

Y

N

No logical reason
Weak evidence of discriminating
interaction states

Role of single
organization

Context

Y

Y

No evidence, but poorly
specified dimension
Important theoretical reasons for
inclusion
Improvement required in
construct of “interdependence”

Impetus for collective
action: Mandated
vs. voluntary

Context

N

Y

Important in discriminating
clusters

Impetus for collective
action: Reasons

Context

N

N

No logical reason

Numbers of
participating
organizations

Context

N

N

Category of
participating
organizations

Context

N

Inconclusive

Theoretical reasons for
inclusion, but evidence
inconclusive

History of previous
interaction in the
problem domain

Context

N

Inconclusive

Theoretical reasons for
inclusion, but evidence
inconclusive

Participant's Problem
Orientation

Org

Y

N

No evidence

No evidence

Varies across similar states of
interaction
Treat as important condition or
contextual factor

Resource allocation

Org

Y

Y

Examine “pooled resources”
construct
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Dimensions

Type

Continuum of
Interaction?

Include in
GIIA?

Incentives

Org

Y

N

Varies across similar states of
interaction

Time to establish
multiorganizational
arrangement

Context

Y

N

No evidence

Key personnel

Org

Y

Y

Importance to defining
interaction states may be
binary

Orientation of policy
objective (Goals)

Interorg

N

Inconclusive

Theoretical reasons for
inclusion, but insufficient
evidence to assess

Design

Interorg

Y

Y

Importance to defining
interaction states may be
binary

Formality of the
agreement

Interorg

N

Y

Importance to defining
interaction states may be
binary

Info. sharing and
communications

Interorg

Y

Inconclusive

Poorly specified dimension

Decision making

Interorg

Y

Y

Resolution of turf
issues

Interorg

Not tested

Not tested

Organizational
autonomy

Org

N

N

Varies across similar states of
interaction

Trust

Org

N

N

Varies across similar states of
interaction

Justification / Recommendations

Insufficient variation in data to
account for trends
Importance to defining
interaction states may be
binary
Not tested
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CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSIONS

This chapter summarizes the data analysis and results presented in chapters four
and five. The theoretical significance of the results is discussed in the context of the
literature, and then the practical significance of the results is assessed in terms of their
impact on managing and evaluating interorganizational interactions. The overall study
limitations are evaluated. Finally, the chapter lays out an agenda for future research and
offers concluding remarks to the study.

Study Conclusions
This study has investigated conceptualization and operationalization of
commonly-used constructs of interorganizational interaction in the public administration
literature. This research is important primarily because interaction between organizations
that occur outside of traditional government hierarchies is now commonplace in policy
implementation (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011; Goldsmith & Kettl, 2009; O'Leary &
Bingham, 2009). Thus it is essential for public administration research to develop stable
constructs of interorganizational interaction to allow cumulative research and shared
knowledge (Morris & Miller-Stevens, 2016a; Thomson et al., 2009; Wood & Gray,
1991).
Yet there are several problems in the way interorganizational interaction has been
conceptualized to date. There is a mismatch between systems-based frameworks that
emphasize process dynamics and typology / array frameworks that present detailed but
static conceptualizations. There is an overreliance on the untested assumption of a
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“continuum of interaction,” and more generally, both frameworks and arrays have
received little empirical confirmation. This research asked several basic questions to
consider these issues. First, in a large sample of interorganizational interactions, are the
most commonly described interaction states of collaboration, coordination and
cooperation observed? Second, are other interaction states observed? Third, what are the
most important dimensions for defining an interaction state? And finally, is the
continuum of interaction concept valid?
The results show that collaboration is the only interorganizational interaction state
that is clearly identifiable in the sample. When the sample is divided into two clusters,
one cluster containing over half the total cases identifies as collaboration based on the
interorganizational-type dimensions: the “design” or ways in which organizations work
together; the formality of agreements between organizations; the extent to which
collective decision making is practiced; and the density and institutionalization of
information sharing and communications in the interaction. The remaining cases in the
second cluster cannot clearly be identified as either coordination or cooperation.
When the sample is divided into three and four clusters, different variants of
collaboration are revealed, distinguished by the levels of shared perspectives between
participants, the impact on organizational autonomy, and the level of trust between
interacting organizations. These collaboration variants differ on perception of outcomes
from the interorganizational interaction, yet the level of trust between organizations is the
key factor that determines overall perception of outcomes. The organizational-type
variables are important in discriminating between different clusters, but are relatively
unimportant to the difference between collaboration and non-collaboration clusters. From
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the set of contextual-type dimensions studied, only a few are useful in distinguishing
between observed clusters. A conclusion is reached that, in general, contextual
dimensions are not useful in differentiating between interaction states, with the exception
of whether an interaction is voluntary or mandated. In the study sample, the majority of
interactions identifying as collaboration are mandated.
There is little evidence supporting the relevance of conceptualizing dimensions in
terms of a continuum of interaction. Some dimensions are “naturally” continuous such as
the time dimensions, the extent of shared perspectives, autonomy, trust, and
organizational commitments made in the interaction. Other dimensions appear to exist
only in binary conditions: the formality of the agreements between organizations, and the
voluntary or mandated status of an interaction. The extent to which a dimension can be
interpreted as existing on a continuum, however, has little relevance in distinguishing
between cluster structures or interaction states. Clusters that are clearly collaboration,
based on their interorganizational-type dimensions, have large variations across the
continuums of other dimensions, notably shared perspectives, trust and autonomy.
Furthermore, with the exception of a few combinations (formality of agreement and
presence of joint decision making structures), there are no logical restrictions that prevent
the co-existence of different “levels” of dimensions in a single interaction state. In fact,
all of the clusters observed displayed a mixture of interaction levels across dimensions, in
terms of the GIIA interpretation.
From the results obtained, there is little evidence to support the GIIA framework
overall. The conclusions drawn from this study, however, apply to a specific problem
domain (defense) and are based on a sample composed primarily of governmental and
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international organizations. This is addressed further in the Study Limitations section
below.

Theoretical Implications
Conceptualization and operationalization of interaction states
The literature review shows that typologies and arrays in the public administration
and organizational science literature seldom recognize the distinction between
contextual-, organizational-, and interorganizational-type dimensions. The empirical
results of this study confirm that distinguishing between these three types is essential. In
terms of identifying differences between interorganizational interaction states,
contextual-type dimensions have low relevance whereas interorganizational-type have
high relevance and are fundamental to characterizing “high” levels of interaction such as
collaboration.
The literature review shows that many scholars use contextual-type dimensions to
define interaction states: Mandell and Steelman (2003) use complexity and scope of
effort; Carrasco (2009); Gajda and Koliba (2007); Woodland and Hutton (2012) use
purpose of the interorganizational interaction; Keast et al. (2007) use purpose and the
time taken to establish the interaction; McNamara (2008) uses time, interdependence and
impetus for collective action; and Margerum (2008) uses the institutional level of
interaction and type of participant. And of course the GIIA tested in this research is an
omnibus compilation of all these dimensions.
What can explain this preponderance of attempts to conceptualize and define
collaboration or other interaction states using contextual-type dimensions? The systems
framework literature may point toward an answer. In this body of work, contextual-type
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dimensions are often referred to as preconditions (Wood & Gray, 1991), starting
conditions (Ansel & Gash, 2007), or antecedents (Thomson & Perry, 2006). The systems
framework literature, while generally conceptualizing contextual-type dimensions as
“inputs” to the system, often identifies specific categories of inputs such as “general
environment,” “direct antecedents,” and “contingencies and constraints” (Bryson et al.,
2006, p. 45). The systems view takes into account all parts of the system in understanding
how it works, yet there is less concern how discrete states of interaction are defined,
probably due to the fact that systems frameworks inherently account for dynamic
processes. The frameworks recognize, however, that contextual dimensions may affect
the overall process or outcomes in some manner.
Returning to the typology and array literature for the crucial insight, we can
observe that scholars who use contextual-type dimensions in conceptualizations generally
tend to refer to “collaboration” in the context of the entire system. On the other hand,
scholars who omit the contextual-type dimensions tend to conceptualize only the process
elements of collaboration—or other interaction states. Thus thinking of collaboration as a
system naturally requires consideration of all variables: contextual, organizational and
interorganizational. Collaboration as process, however, only requires interorganizationaltype, and to some extent the organizational-type dimensions. This is not far removed
from a similar problems with other concepts such as “governance,” for which ten
different uses in the literature have been identified depending on whether one views it as
system, process, structure, etc. (Kooiman, 1999).
The key question now is how best to define an interorganizational interaction state
such as “collaboration,” especially when the literature is rife with definitions that
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invariably mix contextual-type dimensions as evidenced by the review conducted by
Mayer and Kenter (2016). Unfortunately there is no right answer; other than to ensure
that a distinction is made between the whole-system and process views. Adopting the
system view to conceptualize a “collaborative system” requires contextual dimensions. It
is safe to say that a definition of a collaboration process, such as Thomson (2001)
approach, must include interorganizational-type dimensions: the common feature of all
collaboration definitions, typologies, and arrays is that they identify collective decision
making structures and processes as key to differentiating collaboration from other
interaction states. The definitional question becomes somewhat more challenging,
however, when considering the organizational-type dimensions.
The results from this research show that certain organizational-type dimensions—
shared perspectives, autonomy, and trust—can vary considerably across states identified
as collaboration based on the interorganizational-type dimensions. This is highly
inconsistent with the typologies and arrays that use these dimensions to define interaction
states, namely those by D'Amour et al. (2008); Keast et al. (2007); Mandell and Steelman
(2003); McNamara (2008, 2012). It may be the case that in the global population of
interorganizational interactions, low trust is generally associated with “cooperative”
interactions; however, this is a result that requires empirical testing across different
population segments to determine.
The results from this research show that the trust and shared perspectives
dimensions moderate the perceived effectiveness of collaboration. Thus when scholars
define collaboration as, amongst other factors, a high trust state involving shared
perspectives amongst participants, what the definer should really state is that “successful
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collaborations are associated with high trust and shared perspectives…” On the other
hand, a collaboration process could be defined simply by referring to the fundamental
interorganizational variables emerging from the interacting organizations: formalized
agreements, joint decision making structures, collective decision making processes, and
shared information and communications. In other words, a parsimonious definition of
collaboration need only refer to the presence of emergent interorganizational collective
decision making structures and processes, rather than incorporate subjective conditions
such as trust and perspectives, or claims about effectiveness.
This approach is somewhat at odds, however, with Thomson’s (2001)
collaboration process framework, which is one of the most cited in the literature.
Thomson’s framework incorporates five dimensions—joint decision making,
administrative structures, mutuality, norms of trust, and autonomy—that are indicators of
a higher-order latent “collaboration” dimension. The framework essentially allows
creation of a single collaboration score based on the five dimensions, and assumes
therefore, that higher trust and autonomy lead to higher levels of collaboration. As
mentioned previously in chapter five, the autonomy dimension was inconclusive in
several studies. In fact, in her original Ph.D. research (Thomson, 2001) a four-factor
latent model omitting the autonomy dimension was found that fit the data equally well;
however, Thomson chose to keep the autonomy dimension for theoretical reasons.
Likewise, when Thomson’s framework was used in other studies, results were
inconclusive for this dimension (Chen, 2006; Thomson et al., 2008). Thus taken in
tandem with the results of the present study, the conclusion that autonomy should not be
used as a definitional element of collaboration is supported.
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The systems framework literature offers some resolution to this conundrum
concerning the organizational-type dimensions of trust, shared perspectives and
autonomy. The early attempts by Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and more recently of
Ansel and Gash (2007) and Emerson et al. (2012) explicitly conceive of processes such
as trust building and developing shared perspectives that in turn affect the “institutional
arrangements” (Emerson et al., 2012, p. 7) or the “institutional design” (Ansel & Gash,
2007, p. 550). These frameworks allow for the natural variation and development of trust,
which then affects the collective decision making structures, thus mitigating the impact of
organizational autonomy of participants. In other words, in random sample of
collaborations in different stages their life-cycle, one would expect to find trust and
shared perspectives at different levels, as specified by the cyclical feedback loops that are
the “engine” of many systems frameworks.
What of the other interaction states of cooperation and coordination? The cluster
analysis results found no interaction state that could clearly be identified as either. While
conceptualization of collaboration is relatively stable in the literature, which identifies it
by the presence of collective decision making structures and processes, coordination is
less clear. There several approaches encountered. The first defines coordination as a
formalized state of interaction, but one in which the collective decision making occurs
either between the senior leadership of participating organizations or in a centralized
group of actors in the interaction. This is the approach adopted in the GIIA, which was
influenced by McNamara (2008, 2012). The second approach maps level of interaction
with the hierarchical level of participation in the organization: Carrasco (2009) for
example, considers cooperation as occurring between working level staff, coordination
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occurring at the level of team or business unit, and collaboration occurring between
leadership. Finally, the third approach is as a “continuum,” in which various elements
gradually emerge such as consensus decision making (D'Amour et al., 2008) or collective
leadership (Woodland & Hutton, 2012), putting coordination somewhere in the middle of
these continuums.
In terms of defining coordination, these approaches are clearly incompatible. A
similar problem occurs also for cooperation, although less so given that cooperation is
identified by an absence of formalized agreement between organizations. An approach
taken almost two decades ago by Konrad (1996) may offer a solution. Konrad puts
cooperation and coordination together in the same category on a continuum of “intensity
of integration.” While the continuum has five levels, they are labeled by a higher
category of either “informal” or “formal,” where cooperation and coordination are
informal, collaboration lies at the boundary of informal and formal and then “integration”
is at the higher end of formal. This is similar to the results of the cluster analysis. The
clusters observed are either relatively formalized in terms of the interorganizational-type
dimension, or not. Thus a key question is – do highly refined gradations of
interorganizational-type dimensions across interaction states yield any significant
explanatory power? This question can only be answered with additional empirical
research; however, the exploratory results in this study show that the general variation in
organizational-type dimensions is more important in determining outcomes rather than
defining interaction states.
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Interorganizational Interaction Arrays
Some key conclusions can be drawn regarding the nature and structure of
interorganizational arrays in general. First, the idea of a continuum of interaction is not
well supported. The literature analysis shows a general lack of consistency in how
interaction states are defined, and the empirical analysis demonstrates that organizationaland contextual-type dimensions are neither empirically nor logically constrained by
interaction states. Only interorganizational-type dimensions guarantee a differentiation
between states. Thus the evidence supports a radical restructuring of the array concept
moving away from the idea of a continuum of interaction.
The second conclusion concerns the utility of typologies. While typologies and
arrays are useful for exploratory research, organizing concepts, and introducing new
students to a subject, without a logical constraint on the possible numbers of
combinations of dimensions, it is easy to see how the empirical utility of arrays is limited.
In the case of this research, the array used for clustering analysis has ten dimensions each
with three values. Thus there are 310 or 59,049 possible combinations of cells, making it
likely that the neat gradations of cooperation, coordination or collaboration are unlikely
to be found in their “pure” states. This is important because without the ability to clearly
identify an interaction state as “cooperation” or “coordination” versus something else, it
is not possible to investigate meaningful research problems such as determining which is
more effective—cooperation or coordination? While in the research sample, collaboration
is the most prevalent state overall, there is a mixture of other states, making it challenging
to clearly identify cooperation or coordination. The tentative conclusion is that it is not
meaningful to distinguish between them.
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This result is foreshadowed in the very nature of the systems-based frameworks.
Given that collaboration is something “special”—identified only by the presence of
emergent collective decision structures, the majority of systems frameworks are called
“collaboration” frameworks. While some scholars use the term “cooperation” in their
frameworks, close inspection reveals that they are actually referring to collaboration.
A similar situation was encountered in the policy process literature. Initially,
scholars created typologies of the policy process, dividing it up into discrete stages. Many
attempts to confirm empirically these typologies and stage-models failed (Smith &
Larimer, 2009). The main reasons for failure were that the categories (i.e. dimensions)
were rarely mutually exclusive given the complexity of the systems that the typologies
attempted to describe, dynamic processes were not accounted for, and therefore the
typologies as a whole lacked predictive utility (McCool, 1995). Subsequently, scholars
went on to create systems-based frameworks that had better predictive utility and better
captured the complexities of the system (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1993).
The overall conclusion emerging from this analysis is that GIIA—and the general
approach of interorganizational interaction arrays—are not supported overall; systemsbased frameworks are a better approach to representing interorganizational interaction
such as collaboration both as an entire system and a distinct process. “Lower” levels of
interaction such as cooperation or coordination—or whatever term is chosen—could
either represent collaborations in the process of formation, or interorganizational states
where the contextual factors do not warrant the creation of collaboration, such as low
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interdependence. The cluster analysis results do not show any practical significance in
differences between these lower level states.
The array research should not be abandoned completely, however. The
operationalization of each dimension in the GIIA and the survey instrument are useful
contributions to the literature. While some dimensions were problematic, such as the role
of a single organization (interdependence) dimension, others showed reasonable
performance, such as the trust and autonomy, adding to the cumulative knowledge in the
discipline by refining the Thomson (2001) and Mattessich et al. (2001)
operationalizations. The use of the original Thomson (2001) outcome variables also adds
to the cumulative knowledge by showing that, at least, these outcome variables are
relevant to distinguishing between interaction states and have a strong relationship to
trust.
Defining research samples in interorganizational research
This research explicitly identifies an interorganizational-organizational unit of
analysis, with the limitation that each data point in the sample corresponds to only one
interorganizational-organizational dyad. The implications of this choice, expressed in
table 3-1 in chapter three, have received little attention in the literature, both in terms of
the effect on research results and sampling methodology. The discussion in chapter three
points out a critical, but unexplored point—the possibility that different organizations
participating in an interaction may experience or be involved in the process with differing
levels of commitment and intensity. Putting aside for a moment the fact that the
continuum of interaction language should be discarded in the previous sections, a
situation might be encountered in which organization A is at level of collaboration,
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whereas organization B is only cooperating with the group. In this situation how should
the collective interorganizational unit be described?
In the case of collaboration, the answer may be easy: once a collective decision
making structure is established, different organizations can participate with differing
levels of commitments and risks, but the whole interorganizational unit can still
meaningfully be called “collaboration.” In fact, at the time of writing, the author is
currently involved in a collaboration in which a memorandum of understanding written
between organizations allows for participation with differing levels of commitment.
Findings from the network literature suggest that organizations with stronger ties to a
collective unit have more influence on the development of trust-building processes than
organizations with weaker ties, but that the influence of weakly tied organizations cannot
not be ignored as they tend to bring in new information to the interaction (Brass et al.,
2004; Granovetter, 1973; Provan & Lemaire, 2012). In the case of informal
interorganizational interactions without collective decision making structures or
formalized agreement, it is more challenging to assess how different levels of
commitments can be described or understand their significance.
This short discussion highlights the importance of correctly defining—and
consistently maintaining—the unit of analysis in any study. Depending on whether an
organization is strongly or weakly tied to a collective group, or whether the
interorganizational group can be considered collectively as “collaboration” makes a
difference. If the research question focuses on strength of ties, sampling an entire
interorganizational unit is inappropriate as the importance of each tie is averaged out in
the group. Yet if the research question focuses on the properties of the collective as a
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whole, then selecting only one organization as representative of the collective could bias
findings depending on how strongly the sampled organization was connected.

Practitioner Implications
Interorganizational interactions are now commonplace in the landscape of
contemporary governance and public administration from national homeland security
initiatives (Hocevar, Jansen, & Thomas, 2011) to local ecosystem restoration projects
(Morris et al., 2013). Many policy areas see interorganizational interaction mandated by
either law or department policy (Brummel, 2010; Rodríguez et al., 2007). Besides
addressing the challenging theoretical issues in understanding interorganizational
interaction, there are several policy and practitioner areas that are affected by this results
of this research.
The first area concerns the practice of conducting evaluations of
interorganizational interactions. Often, grant allocations to nonprofits are contingent upon
forming community partnerships, and the growth in evaluation of interorganizational
interaction has been driven in part by the requirement to conduct program evaluations for
donors (Frey et al., 2006). Others also worry that the view that collaboration is a “cureall” is going unfounded and unchallenged in organizational policy (Conley & Margaret,
2003). Based on these concerns and factors, a growing body of practitioner-orientated
literature is developing various frameworks to evaluate interorganizational interactions,
most notably the “strategic alliance formative assessment rubric” (Gajda, 2004), the
“level of community linkage” (Cross et al., 2009), the “level of organizational integration
rubric” (Woodland & Hutton, 2012), and most recently the “collaboration assessment
tool” (Marek, Brock, & Savla, 2015)
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With the exception of Marek et al. (2015), these evaluation approaches
incorporate interorganizational arrays coupled with a continuum of interaction
assumption. From the commentary available in the cited articles, the frameworks appear
to be used as one aspect of a mixed-methods approach and as a discussion tool for
organizational leadership, rather than for quantitative survey analysis. Nevertheless,
given the results of the present study concerning the limitations of the continuum of
interaction concept, a meta-evaluation of the evaluation templates is suggested, as
program evaluations using the templates may be going to unnecessary levels of detail.
Furthermore, given the sampling considerations discussed above, there is a danger of
over- or under-emphasizing certain features of the interorganizational interaction,
depending on the sampling strategy used. This concern is acknowledged by Cross et al.
(2009), and the approach taken by Marek et al. (2015) actually abandons the continuum
concept and adopts a latent factor model.
The second practitioner implication concerns the requirements for collaboration
set out in policy mandates, and the steps organizations take to improve their capacity to
collaborate. In terms of policy mandates, policy makers would benefit from a more
refined understanding of how interorganizational interaction functions, especially when it
is required for grant allocation. Nonprofit and public managers on the receiving end of
federal grants, however, have observed that mandates often do not allow sufficient
flexibility (B. L. Lewis, Boulahanis, & Matheny, 2009) or run counter to local interests
(Conley & Margaret, 2003). An evaluation conducted of federal homeless assistance
grants that required local community collaboration, for example, encountered a wide
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range of interorganizational interactions (HUD, 2002). While benefits were observed,
attribution to the level of interorganizational interaction was not possible.
In terms of developing organizational collaborative capacity, a growing body of
literature is developing frameworks to help organizations plan for future required
collaboration. As an example, the lack of ability of organizations to collaborate was
identified as a failure in the responses to Hurricane Katrina and other disasters. Since
then, emergency management departments are investing in strategies for developing
interorganizational collaborative capacity (R. D. Hall, 2011). A common framework in
this discipline is that of Hocevar et al. (2011), which suffers from many of the problems
already identified in this thesis, including mixing contextual dimensions and assuming
levels of interaction. Thus, before this and other framework filter widely into the
emergency management literature, further investigations are warranted on the
applicability and relevance of levels of interaction to the development of collaborative
capacity.
Finally, a general implication for managers and leaders of interorganizational
interactions is the focus on the importance of trust and shared perspectives in successful
outcomes. The results of this research indicate that trust is the critical factor in higher
perceived outcomes. There is a tendency for organizations to emphasize “technocratic”
solutions to problems (Williams & Mengistu, 2015), yet the results of this thesis suggest
that above all else, managers and leaders should emphasize developing trusting
relationships rather than—or at least in addition to—bureaucratic solutions and
formalized policies.
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Study Limitations
While conceived as exploratory, the results and conclusions of this research
should be interpreted in the light of several limitations. First, the research was conducted
with the explicit assumptions of rational open systems organizational theory-namely that
interorganizational interactions can be described meaningfully by “objective” structures
that exist. Yet there are several other possible research perspectives that could affect the
interpretations. A natural open systems approach might emphasize more the importance
of dialogue, perspective and relationships, rather than formalization, decision making
structure and information sharing mechanisms. As noted in chapter two, however,
theoretical perspectives are often suited to certain contexts, and perhaps the rational
approach is better suited to the governmental-based research sample.
Nevertheless, care is required when interpreting the current results using other
theoretical lenses with different assumptions. Gray’s (1985, 1989) work on collaboration,
for example, drew heavily on conflict resolution and stakeholder theory as the
collaborations she studied were mainly between local community groups in conflicted
situations. Thomson (2001), on the other hand, drew her collaboration framework from a
nationwide sample of a national nonprofit organization. An example of why this is
important is illustrated by the voluntary / mandated dimension. The significance of a
“mandated” collaboration is probably more for the samples used by Thomson’s and
Gray’s original research, than the significance for the military-governmental sample in
this study, in which organizational mandates are commonplace. In other words, mandates
to collaborate may not affect the intrinsic process of collaboration between military
organizations, as much as it might between local nonprofit organizations. Other scholars
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have noted that actor-type makes a difference. Moore and Koontz (2003), for example,
found different variants of collaboration depending on whether government agencies or
local citizen groups were involved.
This leads to a general point about the research sample. Results cannot be
generalized to other research contexts (i.e. nonprofit or local community collaborations)
as the research was performed primarily on military, government, and international
organizations, which all display a similar characteristics of large bureaucracies with
highly formalized decision making. As Phillips (2000, p. 32) notes: “the social processes
that constitute a collaboration – the negotiation of membership, definition or issues and
standardization of practices – will be enacted in terms and concepts drawn from the
institutional fields in which members are located.”
Finally, several methodological limitations should be noted. The survey
prioritized quantity of dimensions over rigor in sampling each one. The approaches by
Thomson (2001) and Marek et al. (2015) used confirmatory factor analysis approaches
for fewer dimensions with more survey items, thus the error in each dimension is likely
reduced. A limitation with this thesis research is that each dimension was only sampled
by one or two survey questions. However, in essence, many questions asked simply for
the presence or absence of certain features. Another methodological limitation concerns
the level of analysis of the interorganizational field. While appropriate for the main
research questions in the study, this level omits important individual level factors. One
such factor is the importance of special individuals in collaborations and networks—
boundary spanners and managers—who have been shown to have major impacts (Meier,
2002; Williams, 2010).
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Another limitation is the way in which time is considered. Gray (1989), for
example, recognized several distinct stages of collaboration in a life cycle. In this
research, the survey did not take into account how interorganizational interactions might
change with time and it is not known from the data at which stage of the life cycle
sampled interactions were located. A much needed subject for further research, however,
is rigorous longitudinal studies of long-term collaborations.

Future research
This research primarily examined the extent to which clusters of
interorganizational interactions are distinguished by certain dimensions, in order to arrive
at conclusions about how best to define clusters. Thus the independent variable was
generally cluster membership. Given the data set obtained in this research, however, a
series of analyses are now possible that could examine relationships between different
dimensions across the whole sample, or across different clusters or interorganizational
interaction states. The most theoretically important subjects are as follows.
Replication Studies
The results obtained in this research are inherently limited by the choice of
sample, which was predominately composed of international and national defense
organizations. Thus results are not generalizable to other contexts. Further research using
other samples and contexts is required to increase the validity of findings. Another
variety of replication study involves re-testing published findings using the data set taken
in this research, thus contributing to cumulative knowledge in the field.
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Construct Development
Many constructs in the GIIA still require further refinement, ideally employing
confirmatory factor analysis approach with a greater number of items for each dimension.
Several dimensions, notably the “role of a single organization,” which captured the extent
of interdependence needs refining. This is quite a complex theoretical issue, as the nature
of interdependence has its source in many contextual and organizational factors (Gray,
1989).
The findings from this study showed that within the same type of interaction, the
values of organizational-type dimensions could vary quite considerably. An explanation
of this is provided by the systems-framework literature, which “allows” for dynamic
variation of organizational commitments and perceptions within any collaboration. The
constructs used in the GIIA do not assume anything about this dynamic variation;
however, they merely capture a static snapshot. Hence further construct development is
required to determine whether this static snapshot is appropriate for longitudinal research.
Perhaps the most intriguing result of this current study is the relationship between
trust and outcomes. While trust was positively associated with interorganizational
outcomes, further questions remain about specifically what processes might mediate this
relationship (Chen, 2010)? Does trust act as a replacement for legal rational authority
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001)? Is trust contingent on resource interdependence (Lundin,
2007)? Likewise, many possible research questions can be examined concerning the role
of organizational autonomy.
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Voluntary and Mandated Interactions
A small but growing body of literature now considers “mandated” collaboration
as a distinct state of interorganizational interaction, yet there is little theoretical
development or empirical studies that consider specifically how mandated collaborations
differ in terms of process compared to voluntary interactions. This research found more
cases of mandated interactions, but this is explained by the particular nature of the study
sample. In any case, further research is required. One route is to continue analysis and
refinement of interorganizational interaction arrays in which “mandated collaboration” is
a distinct state, as suggested by McNamara (2016). Another route is to test more directly
the factors that tend to be related with mandated interactions, notably the level of
formalization (Nylen, 2007).
Systems-Based Frameworks
The literature review found many systems-based frameworks describing
interorganizational interaction—but particularly collaboration—that were developed in
the past decade. Yet these frameworks have rarely been empirically tested. Subsequent
research has used them as an organizing lens for case studies, for example, rather than
testing the framework per se (Agbodzakey, 2012; Montoya, Montoya, & González,
2015). Given their prevalence and repeated citation in the public administration
collaboration literature, further research is warranted on the system frameworks’
approaches to conceptualization and operationalization of interorganizational interaction.
Related to the system-based framework approach is the study of
interorganizational interaction as a form of formal organization or as a network. Both
approaches depend on the type, scale and intensity of interaction, yet much research from
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organizational science offers systems concepts to treat collaboration as an organizationalform, and likewise, less intense forms of interaction can usefully be treated as networks.
As already alluded to, the time dimension in interorganizational interaction is critical and
systems-based frameworks offer a useful lens through which to consider the “life-cycles”
of collaborations (Williams, Merriman, & Morris, 2016).

Closing remarks
This research has examined aspects of a conventional paradigm within
interorganizational theory and conducted one of the first tests of the continuum of
interaction concept and its application in the interorganizational array and typology
literature in public administration. While the results were negative in the sense that the
continuum of interaction was not empirically observed, the power of this idea runs deep
in the public administration and program evaluation literature. There is something
irresistible about organizing and viewing the world in neat continuums, distinct stages or
processes, and ordered boxes. The prevalence of this idea speaks to its intuitiveness and
success in deconstructing highly complex systems into understandable parts. Yet in a
manner similar to the “policy stages” debate, occasionally enough problematic
observations about the paradigm are accumulated eventually to support their fall.
This research has cast doubt upon two notions in the conventional paradigm: the
notion of continuum of interaction, and the idea that three distinct states of interaction
exist called: collaboration, coordination, and cooperation. While collaboration is
supported—although we could just as well call it something else—cooperation and
coordination were not observed and theoretical analysis suggests that their reasons for
existing are overstated. Obviously, this research is unlikely to be the final word; further
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conceptualization and operationalization studies are required to ensure that public
administration research develops with valid, reliable and parsimonious constructs of
interorganizational interaction.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Solicitation email to be sent to respondent sample
Dear Colleague,
My name is Andrew Williams and I am writing to request your participation in a survey that
asks questions about your experiences working in a multiorganizational project. This survey
forms part of my Ph.D. research, directed by Professor John Morris, in the Strome College of
Business at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, United States.
This research aims to improve understanding of how organizations work together in
multiorganizational settings, how these interactions can be described, and which factors in
organizations are important in making interactions work. The findings from this study will be
used to produce my dissertation thesis and scholarly journal articles.
The survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is voluntary, and
you can stop taking the survey at any time. The information you provide will be anonymous
and will be reported in aggregate only. No identifying information such as individual or
organization names will be reported in the study.
If you would like to participate in this study, please click on the following link to complete
the survey. You are welcome to forward this survey to colleagues that worked with you in a
multiorganizational project, provided they do not work for the same organization as you.
SURVEY LINK
Please don’t hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. I sincerely thank you in
advance for your participation!
Andrew P. Williams
Ph.D. Candidate
School of Public Service
Strome College of Business
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23529
awill123@odu.edu
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Informed Consent Statement (First Page of Survey)
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study on multiorganizational interaction. This
survey asks questions about your experience, as a representative of your organization, in a
multiorganizational project in a NATO environment.
Your participation is voluntary, and you can withdraw from the study at any time. Neither
your identity nor the identity of the organization in which you may work will be revealed in
the publication of research results.
The nature of this study should not be invasive or embarrassing. Questions are confined to
ones that address your professional situation, work experiences, and perceptions. Any
information provided by you in the study will be afforded professional standards for
protection of confidentiality.
By completing this study, you are consenting to the terms of this research as stated above.
This notice serves as your copy of the consent agreement. You may also request a copy of
these consent terms by contacting the Principal Investigators of the study.
If you have any questions about the study, please contact the Principal Investigators of the
study:
Professor John C. Morris (Principal Investigator)
School of Public Service
Strome College of Business
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23529
jcmorris@odu.edu
Andrew P. Williams (Co-Principal Investigator)
Ph.D. Candidate
School of Public Service
Strome College of Business
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23529
awill123@odu.edu
If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject contact the Human
Subjects Research Committee Chair at 757-683-4520 or gmaihafe@odu.edu.
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Survey Instrument

Survey Instructions (Second Page of Survey)
Think of a program, project or task, either ongoing or occurring in the past five years, in
which your organization interacted as part of a group with one or more other
organizations in a NATO-related setting. This will be referred to in this survey as the
"multiorganizational interaction."
Answer all the survey questions with the same multiorganizational interaction in mind,
and around the same time period.
Make sure that your choice of multiorganizational interaction is one in which you directly
participated and with which you are very familiar.
Answer from the perspective of your organization, rather than as an individual or
representative of your nation.
The survey asks you to think about different organizations. An "organization" should
be understood as a separate legal entity. For example in the NATO case, NATO HQ,
IMS, SHAPE, JFCBS, HQ AIRCOM, HQ ARRC, HQ SACT, JALLC, JWC etc. are
considered separate and distinct organizations. In a national setting, the UK's Ministry of
Defence and its agency DSTL are considered as separate organizations.

□

I understand that I will answer the survey with the same
multiorganizational interaction in mind. I am ready to take the survey.

Q1: Briefly describe the objective of the multiorganizational interaction and your
organization’s role.

Q2: Which of the following best describes your work status during the
multiorganizational interaction? Select one:
1.
NATO international civilian
2.
Uniformed military service member
3.
Government civilian employee
4.
Contractor
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5.
6.

University faculty
Other - please describe _________________________

Q3: Which of the following best describes your organization’s type? Select one:
1.
International intergovernmental organization
2.
Government defense organization (military services or civilian
department)
3.
Government organization (non-defense)
4.
Educational organization (civilian university or college)
5.
Nonprofit organization
6.
For-profit business / corporation
7.
Other - please describe

Q4: Please select the responses that most closely correspond to the main purposes for the
multiorganizational interaction. Select all that apply.
1.
Create an informal network of communications among stakeholders
2.
Generate support for an initiative
3.
Conduct joint work with other organizations to ensure tasks are done, but
each organization remains mainly autonomous
4.
Reach predetermined mutual goals together, while remaining autonomous
5.
Share material, personnel or financial resources to address common issues
6.
Commit for a year or more to achieve short- and long-term outcomes
7.
Create institutional and system change in a policy area

Q5: What total length of time is the multiorganizational interaction expected to exist or
did exist?
1.
Indefinitely
2.
Or, enter number of months ___________

Q6: Think about the various tasks that must be accomplished by the multiorganizational
interaction. Please rate those tasks on the scales below:
Low in
number

High in
number
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How would you
characterize the
number of distinct
tasks conducted by
the
multiorganizational
interaction?

□

□

□

□

□

□

Very
similar
In general, how
similar are the tasks
in nature?

□

Very
different

□

□

□

□

□

Known and clearly
defined
How would you
characterize the
clarity of the tasks?

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Irregular / atypical

□

□

□

□

Agreed by all
participants
How would you
characterize the
level of agreement
amongst participants
in the
multiorganizational
interaction about the
required tasks?

□
Interdependent

Routine
To what extent are
tasks routine
business?

□
Ambiguous and
undefined

Independent from
each other
To what extent do
tasks depend on one
another?

□

□

□

Highly contested by
participants

□

Please answer all questions on this section

□

□

□

□

□
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Q7: Think about the goals of the multiorganizational interaction. Which statement is
most applicable to your organization? Select one:
1.
If required, my organization could achieve the goals independently
without support from other organizations
2.
My organization requires some assistance from other organizations to
accomplish the goals
3.
No organization can achieve the goal independently. My organization is
interdependent with other organizations.
Q8: Please select the statement that best describes why your organization participates in
the multiorganizational interaction. Select one:
1.
Directly tasked by a higher authority or mandate to participate (e.g. a
higher command, organizational policy or mission, organization leader
decision, legal requirements)
2.
No direct tasking, but not participating would result in either a loss of
reputation or an inability to meet organizational goals
3.
Participation is voluntary and was initiated primarily by senior
management
4.
Participation is voluntary and was initiated primarily by the staff level

Q9: Below are several reasons for joining the multiorganizational interaction. Select the
response that best indicates how important each reason is to your organization:
Not at all
important
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
important
7

To take advantage of
partner organizations
resources (for example:
money, information,
expertise, physical
property) to help my
organization achieve its
goals

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

To build relationships with
partner organizations
because we expect to
interact with them again in
the future

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
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Not at all
important
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
important
7

To enhance my
organization’s reputation
by working with partner
organizations that have
strong reputations

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

To enhance my
organization’s reputation
by demonstrating
commitment to resolving
important problems

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

To create a common vision
among organizations for
solving problems too
complex for my
organization to solve alone

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

To receive funding or
grants that are contingent
upon participation

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

To resolve conflicts that
have occurred between my
organization and partner
organizations

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Q10: How many organizations does your organization interact with as part of the
multiorganizational interaction?

Q11: What types of organizations are involved in the multiorganizational interaction?
Select all that apply.
1.
International intergovernmental organization
2.
Government defense organization (Military service or civilian department)
3.
Government organization (non-defense)
4.
Educational organization (civilian university or college)
5.
Nonprofit organization
6.
For-profit business / corporation
7.
Other - please describe
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Q12: Please rate the following two questions using the scale below:
Not at
all
1

2

3

4

5

6

To a
great
extent
7

Indicate to what extent
organizations involved in the
multiorganizational
interaction have worked
together on previous
initiatives?

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Indicate to what extent you
have previously worked with
individual staff from the
organizations involved?

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Q13: Indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:
Strongly
disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Somew
hat
agree

Strongly
agree

Generally, people in this
multiorganizational
interaction are dedicated
to the idea that we can
make this project work

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

My ideas about what we
want to accomplish with
this multiorganizational
interaction seem to be the
same as the ideas of
others

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Q14: Indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:

My contribution in the
multiorganizational
interaction is considered
part of my “regular
duties” by my
organization.

Strongly
disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Somew
hat
agree

Strongly
agree

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
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Q15: Please select one answer that best describes how financial resources are used by
your organization in the context of the multiorganizational interaction. Select one:
1.
My organization’s financial resources are not involved
2.
My organization allocates (or has received) funding specifically for
participation in the multiorganizational interaction
3.
My organization pools financial resources with other organizations into an
independent operating fund for the multiorganizational interaction
Q16: Please select one answer that best describes the primary resource shared by your
organization with other organizations in the context of the multiorganizational
interaction. Select one:
1.
Information
2.
The time and expertise of personnel
3.
Financial and material assets
4.
Logistical and administrative support to the multiorganizational group
Q17: Select a response that indicates how much you agree with the following statement.
(“Leadership” refers to Chief Executive and deputy level, Command Group level, or
organization head and deputy):

My organization’s
leadership recognizes the
benefits of participating
in the
multiorganizational
interaction

Strongly
disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Somewh
at agree

Strongly
agree

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Q18: How long did it take to form the multiorganizational interaction to the point where
it could achieve objectives? Enter a whole number of months.

Q19: Please select the most applicable statement describing the role of your
organization’s leadership in forming the multiorganizational interaction. (“Leadership”
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refers to Chief Executive and deputy level, Command Group level, or organization head
and deputy). Select one:
1.
Organizational leadership is not involved in decisions to work together
2.
Organizational leadership is openly supportive, but isn’t involved in
detailed planning of contributions to a multiorganizational interaction
3.
Organizational leadership is openly supportive AND is involved in
planning contributions to the multiorganizational interaction

Q20: Please select the most applicable statement describing the role of your
organization’s staff in forming the multiorganizational interaction. Select one:
1.
Interaction occurs through lower levels of organizations
2.
Mid-level management implements and administers organization’s
involvement in interaction
3.
The level of staff involved and their responsibilities adapt to the task at
hand; each role is considered equally important

Q21: Please select the statement which best applies to the multiorganizational interaction.
Select one:
1.
All organizations are equal partners
2.
One organization leads the group
3.
A few organizations share leadership of the group

Q22: Please select the most applicable statement concerning the goals of the
multiorganizational interaction. Select one:
1.
There are no shared goals
2.
Some shared goals, in addition to individual organizational goals
3.
Shared goals agreed between all participants

Q23: In what ways do organizations in the multiorganizational interaction work together?
Select all that apply:
1.
Informal communications between staff
2.
Official communications backed by organizational leadership
3.
Regular official meetings between working level staff
4.
Regular official meetings between organizational leadership
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5.

6.

Executive decision boards / committees created especially for the
multiorganizational group in which leadership make decisions about the
interaction
A new joint organization is created to implement the tasks of the
multiorganizational interaction

Q24: Please select one answer that best describes the formality of the agreement between
interacting organizations. Select one:
1.
Individual organizations informally agree to work together to achieve
individual or mutually-beneficial goals
2.
Policy documents (such as terms of reference or memoranda of
understanding) identify each organizations roles and responsibilities, and
are signed off by leadership
3.
Policy documents (such as terms of reference or memoranda of
understanding) describe detailed implementation plans in addition to roles
and responsibilities, and are signed off by leadership

Q25: Please select the statements that best describe information sharing in the
multiorganizational interaction. Select all that apply:
1.
Information is shared through informal channels and relationships between
participants (e.g. staff email)
2.
Formal (official documents) and informal communication channels are
used
3.
Interorganizational communication is formalized, with staff given mandate
to share information
4.
Formalized communications infrastructures begin to develop (group email
lists, shared web-based information repositories etc.)
5.
Open and frequent communication through formal and informal channels
6.
Interorganizational communication is institutionalized in organizational
policies and processes (e.g. policy requirements to share information with
partner organizations)

Q26: Please select the statements that best describe decision-making in the
multiorganizational interaction. Select all that apply:
1.
Decisions are made independently by each organization
2.
Centralized decision making is practiced; a lead organization(s) dominates
the decision making process
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3.
4.

5.
6.

Senior leadership (chief executive or command group level) conducts
collective decision making about the interorganizational interaction
Participative decision making based on consensus and compromise
generates rules to govern activities and relationships between
organizations
Organizational representatives have latitude to negotiate rules and discuss
agreements to identify common ground
Joint decision making occurs at all levels of organization

Q27: Please select the most applicable statement to your organization concerning policies
(rules, memorandums of understanding, regulations, terms of reference) related to the
multiorganizational interaction. Select one:
1.
The multiorganizational group does not have policies
2.
Policies developed for the multiorganizational group are compatible with
my organizations policies
3.
Partner organizations jointly develop policies and negotiation is required
when they conflict with individual organization policies

Q28: Select responses that indicate how much you agree with the following statements:
Strongly
disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Somewh
at agree

Strongly
agree

The
multiorganizational
interaction hinders my
organization from
meeting its own
mission

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

My organization’s
independence is
affected by having to
work with partner
organizations on
activities related to the
multiorganizational
interaction

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

338

As a representative of
my organization, I feel
pulled between trying
to meet both my
organization’s and the
multiorganizational
interactions
expectations

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Q29: Select the responses that indicate how much you agree with the following statements:
Strongly
disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Somewh
at agree

Strongly
agree

The people who
represent partner
organizations in the
multiorganizational
interaction are
trustworthy

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

My organization can
count on each partner
organization to meet
its obligations in the
multiorganizational
interaction

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

My organization feels
it worthwhile to stay
and work with partner
organizations rather
than leave or scale
back commitments to
the
multiorganizational
interaction

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Q30: Please select the most applicable statement concerning the role of trust between
organizations in the multiorganizational interaction. Select one.
1.
Trust relationships are nice to have, but are actually not required for
organizations to work together
2.
Trust relationships are useful, but must be based on reciprocal behaviors
3.
Trust between organizations is necessary; in all levels of staff
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Q31: Select the responses that indicate how much you agree with the following
statements:

Strongly
disagree

Somewh
at
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Somewh
at agree

Strongly
agree

Overall, the
multiorganizational
interaction is effective
in achieving expected
outcomes

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Overall, high quality
working relationships
have developed
between my
organization and
partner organizations
as a result of this
multiorganizational
interaction

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Overall, my
organizations view of
the issue(s)/problem(s)
that brought the
organizations together
has broadened as a
result of the
interaction

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Overall, my
organization has
increased its
interaction with
partner organizations
as a result of the
multiorganizational
interaction

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

Overall, the
multiorganizational
interaction has helped
to make partner
organizations’
influence on each
other more equal

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
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These questions are for control purposes only and do not form part of the analysis.
Q32a: What is your gender?
1. Male
2. Female

Q32b: What is your nationality?
 List of NATO, EU, NATO Partnership for Peace nations, plus Multinational
Capability Development Campaign Nations as of 2015

Q32c: How many years of professional working experience do you have?

Q32d: If desired, please provide any comments about the survey, or any relevant
information about the multiorganizational interaction:
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTION—DIMENSION MATCHING

Table C – 1 shows which survey questions operationalize the dimensions in the
GIIA. Several questions that are not related to the GIIA are omitted from this table:


Q2 and Q3 capture demographic information about the respondent and their
organization;



Q31 captures 5 interorganizational output/outcome measures



Q32—the final survey question—is a free text field to allow the respondent to
enter any additional information they wish.

Table C-1: Link between dimensions of the GIIA and survey questions
Survey
Question
#

Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Purpose of
Interorganizational
interaction

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The overall purpose of the
interorganizational
interaction [Adapted from
Mandell & Steelman (2003),
and Keast et al. (2007)]

Q1

Time

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The length of time that the
interorganizational
interaction is expected to
work together to accomplish
the policy objective
[modified from McNamara,
2008]

Q5

Difficulty

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The complexity of tasks that
the interorganizational
interaction undertakes to
accomplish the policy
objective [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q6

Q4
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Survey
Question
#

Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Role of single
organization

Interorg.Policy
Objective

Context

The roles individual
organizations assume to
accomplish the policy
objective [McNamara, 2008]

Q7

Impetus for
collective action

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The reason for developing the
interorganizational
interaction and the way in
which it was developed
[modified from McNamara,
2008]

Q8

Numbers of
participating
organizations

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The number of organizations
with first degree network ties
participating in the
interorganizational
interaction [Author
definition]

Q10

Category of
participating
organizations

Interorg. Policy
Objective

Context

The sector and/or type of
organization: federal
government, state
government, local
government, international
organization,
intergovernmental
organization,
nongovernmental
organization, private sector,
academia, think tank, etc.

Q11

History of previous
interaction in the
problem domain

Organizational
Management

Context

The extent to which
organizations and participants
from those organization have
worked previously together
on other projects in the
problem domain [definition
adapted from Mattesich et al.,
2001]

Q12

Participant's
Problem
Orientation

Organizational
Management

Org

Reflects the degree to which
the members view the
problem from a shared or
individual perspective. This
has to do with members'
values and perceptions
[Mandell & Steelman, 2003]

Q13

Q9
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Survey
Question
#

Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Resource allocation

Organizational
Management

Org

The contributions allocated by
individual organizations to
the interorganizational
interaction in support of the
policy objective [modified
from McNamara, 2008]

Q14
Q15
Q16

Incentives

Organizational
Management

Org

The intrinsic and extrinsic
rewards provided to
individuals and participating
organizations to encourage
support for the
interorganizational
interaction [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q17

Time to establish
multiorganizationa
l arrangement

Interorganizatio
nal
Infrastructure

Context

The length of time, relative to
the time for implementation
of the interaction, that the
partnership takes to establish.
[Inferred from Keast et al.,
2007]

Q18

Key personnel

Interorganizatio
nal
Infrastructure

Org

Personnel who are responsible
for bringing together and
implementing the
interorganizational
interaction [Modified
McNamara, 2008]

Q19

Orientation of
policy objective
(Goals)

Interorganizatio
nal
Infrastructure

Interorg

The agreed and comprehensive
nature of goals between
interacting organizations
[Adapted from D'Amour et
al., 2008]

Q22

Design

Interorganizatio
nal
Infrastructure

Interorg

The administrative structure
emerging from the
interorganizational
interaction [Modified
McNamara, 2008]

Q23

Q20
Q21
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Survey
Question
#

Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Formality of the
agreement

Interorg.
Infrastructure

Interorg

The way in which individual
organizations agree on their
roles and responsibilities
within the interorganizational
interaction [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q24

Information sharing
and
communications

Interorg.
Procedures

Interorg

The ways in which personnel
within the interorganizational
interaction use information
and communication processes
to attain the policy objective
[modified from McNamara,
2008]

Q25

Decision making

Interorg.
Procedures

Interorg

The ways in which the
organizations within the
interorganizational
interaction make
implementation decisions
pertaining to the policy
objective [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q26

Resolution of turf
issues

Interorg.
Procedures

Interorg

The process used for solving
conflicts between
organizations within the
interorganizational
interaction [modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Not testetd

Organizational
autonomy

Autonomy

Org

The degree to which each
partnering organization
independently operates, in
terms of the extent that their
operating procedures and
policies are adapted by the
interorganizational
interaction, and the extent of
authority given to the
collective to develop policies
that guide operations of the
collective. [Modified from
McNamara, 2008]

Q27
Q28
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Dimensions

Constructs

Type

Meaning

Trust

Norms of trust
and
reciprocity

Org

The extent to which
trustworthy relationships
between organizations within
the interorganizational
interaction are built [modified
from McNamara, 2008]

Survey
Question
#
Q29
Q30
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